Suffolk Journal of Trial and Appellate Advocacy
Volume 23

Issue 1

Article 5

1-1-2018

Promissory Estoppel's Avoidance of Injustice and Measure of
Damages: The Final Frontier
Tory A. Weigand

Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.suffolk.edu/jtaa-suffolk
Part of the Litigation Commons

Recommended Citation
23 Suffolk J. Trial & App. Advoc. 1 (2017-2018)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Collections @ Suffolk. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Suffolk Journal of Trial and Appellate Advocacy by an authorized editor of Digital Collections @ Suffolk.
For more information, please contact dct@suffolk.edu.

PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL'S AVOIDANCE OF
INJUSTICE AND MEASURE OF DAMAGES: THE
FINAL FRONTIER
By Tory A. Weigand
........... 2
I. INTRODUCTION
.................................
3
II. RELIANCE AND MUTUALITY..................................
6..........6
............
III. SECTION 90 OF THE RESTATEMENT
...................
10
IV. THE MASSACHUSETTS EXPERIENCE
A. FROM IN PAIS TO INDEPENDENT ACTION ..................... 11
....................... 24
B. MASSACHUSETTS EMPIRICAL DATA....
...... 24
................................
1. Trial Courts
26
2. Appellate Courts....................................
........... 30
C. THE AVOIDANCE OF INJUSTICE .............
........... 32
...........................
1. Judge or Jury
2. Independent or Redundant
......................
37
........... 38
a. The Separate Substantive Element View .
43
b. Lack of Independence View .....................
45
3. Limiting Principle or Robust Remedy ....................
52
.....................................
4. Remedial Measure
a. Expectation, Reliance or Discretionary...
............ 52
.................................. 59
5. Fifty State Survey
70
..................................
D. POTENTIAL APPROACH
1. The Injustice Element and Measure of Damages are Questions of
............ 70
Law for the Court Based on Applicable Policy .
2. Informative Considerations as to Both Avoidance of Injustice and
.............. 72
Remedy ..........................
a. Applicable Social Policies Pertaining to the Promise or the
.......... 72
.....................
Parties' Relation
74
b. Availability of Other Remedies ......................
................. 76
...........
c. Fairness and Hardship
d. Extent of Foreseeability and Intent to be Bound.................. 77
e. Degree and Nature of Reliance and any Foregone
................................. 79
Opportunities
................. 81
f. Party Relation, Form and Setting
g. State of Mind, Opportunism, and Dishonesty....................... 84

The author is a Partner at Morrison Mahoney LLP.

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

2

[Vol. XXIII

h. Foreseeability, Certainty and/or Speculation as to any
.......... 85
Expectation Remedy (remedy only) .........

........................................

V. CONCLUSION

I.

86

INTRODUCTION

Promissory estoppel's voyage has been transformative. Birthed as
an equitable defensive rule of evidence and shield requiring willful intent, it
migrated to an affirmative sword rendering certain discrete promises
binding. Its fundamental essence, detrimental reliance, in turn, both predated
and later provided relief from bargained-for exchange and its perceived
restrictiveness. It is now a full-fledged independent cause of action
applicable to any sufficient "promise." It proclaims equal stature with
bargained for obligation, yet remains unshackled from mutuality of bargain
or assent and can provide relief from such venerable protections as the statute
of frauds, 2 statute of limitations, and the parol evidence rule.' To some, it is
appropriately poised to assume a plenary position providing affirmative
relief based on reliance in the name of "fairness" and "justice."' To others,
it represents "an internal contradiction"' serving to wrongly obliterate the
sanctity of bargain with its adoption and "aftershocks [leaving] us in
theoretical chaos." 6
2 See generally, Stephen J. Leacock, Fingerprintsof Equitable Estoppel and Promissory
Estoppel on The Statute ofLimitations in ContractLaw, 2 WM & MARY Bus. L. REV. 73, 92-100

(2011) (discussing elements of equitable and promissory estoppel and relationship with statute of
frauds); Cellucci v. Sun Oil Co., 320 N.E.2d 919, 923 (Mass. App. Ct. 1974) (asserting estoppel
precluded reliance on statute of frauds), further review, 331 N.E.2d 813 (Mass. 1975).
3 See Michael B. Metzger, The Parol Evidence Rule: PromissoryEstoppel's Next Conquest?,

36 VAND. L. REV. 1383, 1403-08 (1983) (looking towards future of parol evidence); Ehret Co. v.
Eaton, Yale & Towne, Inc., 523 F.2d 280, 284 (7th Cir. 1972) (evaluating application of parol
evidence and promissory estoppel), overruled by, Sunstream Express, Inc. v. Int'l Air. Serv. Co.,
734 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1984); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Clark, 456 F.2d 932 935-37, (5th Cir. 1972)
(analyzing promissory estoppel's effect on parol evidence rule); see also Weiss v. Smulders, 96
A.3d 1175, 1195 (Conn. 2014) (holding parol evidence rule did not apply to promissory estoppel
claim).
4

See Eric Mills Holmes, The FourPhasesofPromissoryEstoppel, 20 SEATTLE UNIv. L. REV.

45, 67-78 (1996) (explaining various approaches to promissory estoppel and how each approach
helped develop doctrine's evolution).
s Juliet Kotrinsky, The Rise & Fall of Promissory Estoppel or is Promissory Estoppel As
Unsuccessfulas Scholars Say It Is?, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 531, 535 (2002).
6 Eric Alden, Rethinking Promissory Estoppel, 16 NEV. L. J. 659, 661, 666 (2016) (arguing

promissory estoppel created uncertainty, and "introduced significant... unresolved theoretical
instability into American contract law."). Alden further stipulates that promissory estoppel must
be severely limited and applicable only to limited categorical exceptions to the consideration
requirement. Id.; see also Juliet P. Kostritsky, The Rise and Fall of Promissory Estoppel Or Is
Promissory Estoppel Really as Unsuccessful as Scholars Say It Is: A New Look at The Data, 37
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Amidst the rancor, the applicable remedy, as well as the doctrine's
"avoidance of injustice" component, have received limited to no meaningful
attention. The result has left open questions including whether avoidance of
injustice is a substantive element separate and distinct from promise and
reliance; whether it provides a limiting or robust remedial function; whether
the applicable remedy is one of contractual expectation or reliance; and
whether the injustice element and measure of damages are for the court or
jury to determine. Underlying these issues is the ever present and
fundamental tension between whether the doctrine should be centered on the
enforcement of promises or the protection of reliance. Looming is the
penultimate question of whether the doctrine's evolution includes a final
"pure equity phase" wherein the principles of estoppel, contract, and tort
merge to rectify perceived wrongs based on "fairness" and "justice"' or, to
the contrary, the doctrine must be confined to the domain of extraordinary
circumstances given the importance of freedom of contract and mutual
assent.8 This article reviews the history and development of promissory
estoppel in Massachusetts including the various views as to both the
appropriate remedy and the meaning and implementation of the injustice
element. It likewise proposes a construct for addressing these issues.
II. RELIANCE AND MUTUALITY
The term "promissory estoppel" first appeared in Professor Samuel
Williston's 9 1920 treatise on contracts.'o Williston intended the term to
WAKE FOREST L.REv. 101, 112(2002) (exploring promissory estoppel's demise); Robert Hillman,
The Triumph of Gilmore's The Death of Contract, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 32, 33 (1995) (noting
argument that "legal liability to others discourages social useful activity."); Michael Gibson,
PromissoryEstoppel, Article 2 of the U.C.C., and the Restatement (Third) of Contracts, 73 IOWA
L. REV. 659, 666 (1988) (arguing reliance does not equal agreement and plays minor role in contract
formation and enforcement); Randy Barrett & Mary Becker, Beyond Reliance: Promissory
Estoppel, Contract Formalities and Misrepresentations, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 443, 444 (1985)
(viewing promissory estoppel "as either an unfathomable conundrum or as ... flexible means of
achieving fairness.").
' See Holmes, supra note 4, at 56 (emphasizing fairness and justice); see also Michael B.
Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, The Emergence ofPromissory Estoppel as an Independent Theory
of Recovery, 35 RUTGERS L. REv. 472, 509-11, 547 (1983) [hereinafter Metzger & Phillips]
(defining promissory estoppel as tort-like remedy designed for compensation of reliance).
8 See Alden, supra note 6, at 704-06 (addressing future of contract law).
Professor Samuel Williston taught contracts at Harvard Law School from 1890 to 1938.
10 See I SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 139, at 308 (1st ed. 1920) (discussing
promissory estoppel); David Epstein, Melinda Arbuckle & Kelly Flanagan, Contract Law's Two
"P.E.'s": PromissoryEstoppel and the ParolEvidence Rule, 62 BAYLOR L. REV. 397, 402 (2010)
(discussing and citing to sources identifying and confirming Williston as source of promissory
estoppel); Benjamin F. Boyer, PromissoryEstoppel:Requirements andLimitationsofthe Doctrine,
98 U. PA. L. REv. 459, 459 n.1 (1950) (identifying Williston as discoverer of promissory estoppel).
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differentiate between reliance on a factual misrepresentation as a means of
negating the denial of the truth of the representation from reliance on a
gratuitous promise, which could be used offensively to create a binding
promise." The notion evolved as a means to avoid results that were deemed
unjust and harsh in certain cases lying on the outskirts of contract, such as
gratuitous promises, charitable subscriptions, and intra-family gifts and other
similar promises.12 The objective was to allow for reliance to substitute for
consideration in such un-bargained for transactions. It provides relief from
the perceived shortcomings of formal contract principles. Due to Williston's
influence, the principle made its way into the First and Second Restatement
of Contracts,13 whose provision (Section 90) is one of the most widely cited
sections of the seminal work. 14
Although "reliance" was the binding element of the doctrine,
Williston viewed the fundamental purpose to protect and serve the
underlying promise, not the activating reliance." Substantial reliance upon a
promise reflected the seriousness and quality of the promise. Reliance had
historically been one of two legs to consideration and thus justified
enforcement to the same extent as bargained contracts. 16 Notably, the
drafters of the Restatement placed promissory estoppel in a separate section
than the section governing bargain for consideration-entitled "informal
Contracts Without Assent Or Consideration-and otherwise subjected both
recovery and remedy to an interest ofjustice component fueling the promise
and expectation versus reliance divide.1 7

" See Epstein, supra note 10, at 405 (explaining Williston's intention behind term "promissory
estoppel").
12 See Alden, supra note 6, at 683-704 (explaining evolution of promissory estoppel).
13

RESTATEMENT

(FIRST) OF

CONTRACTS

§90

(1932);

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF

CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
14 Joel M. Ngugi, Promissory Estoppel: The Life History of an Ideal Legal Transplant,41 U.
RICH. L. REv. 425, 428-42 (2007) (reviewing history of promissory estoppel and Williston's role);
Kevin M. Teeven, Origins of Promissory Estoppel: Justifiable Reliance and Commercial
UncertaintyBefore Williston's Restatement, 34 U. MEM. L. REv. 499, 510, 532 (2004) (discussing
origins of reliance and Restatement and Williston's role); Christopher T. Wonnell, W(H)ither the
Reliance Interest?:Expectation Reliance & The Two ContractualWrongs, 38 SAN. DIEGO L. REV.
53, 54 (2001) ("[e]xpectation and reliance are concepts that continue to vie for priority as core
organizing principles of contract law.").
15 See Boyer, supra note 10, at 459 n.4 (identifying Willison's purpose behind reliance).
16

See PATRICK S. ATIYAH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CONTRACT 53-54 (4th ed.

1989) ("[D]etrimental reliance seems to be the key to promissory estoppel and it is also one of the
twin legs of the doctrine of consideration itself.").
17 See Marco J. Jimenez, The Many Faces of Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical Analysis
Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 57 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 669, 673 (2010) (explaining
changing face of promissory estoppel); Kotritsky, supranote 5, at 534 (including benefit of bargain
and promissory estoppel, Restatement "created. . internal contradiction within [c]ontracts"); see
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By the turn of the century, the remedial interests of contractual
damages garnered attention and were deemed to reflect the fundamental and
underlying purpose of contract law." The reliance interest was central to the
analysis." At the same time reliance was weaving its way as a means of
contractual enforcement, it was likewise considered a fundamental means of
compensation. Reliance based damages were argued to serve the reliance
interest and were separate and distinct from expectation damages- the
otherwise usual and traditional remedial measure for breach of contract. 2 0
The result pitted the view that promissory estoppel was a means of creating
an enforceable contract, the breach of which requires expectation damages,
against the view that reliance damages were the most appropriate remedy to
protect the reliance interest that is so central to the doctrine and to provide a
necessary demarcation between bargained for contracts and promises
enforced through reliance.2 1
The remedial debate between expectation and reliance underscores
the larger conflict promissory estoppel engenders.22 Reliance as
consideration ran counter to the bargained for mutuality of obligation
conception of consideration, which grew in stature particularly at the turn of
the century. 23 For instance, Oliver Wendell Holmes was a staunch supporter
also Jay M. Feinman, PromissoryEstoppel & The Judicial Method, 97 HARV. L. REv. 678, 685
(1984) ("[T]he relation between reliance and bargain-has always been uneasy.").
1 See Lon L. Fuller & William R Purdue, Jr., The RelianceInterest in ContractDamages: 1,
46 YALE L. J. 52 (1936) [hereinafter Fuller 1] (promoting remedial interests of restitution, reliance
and expectation while underlying fundamental purpose of contract law); Lon L. Fuller & William
R. Purdue, Jr., The Reliance of Contract Damages: 2, 46 YALE. L. J. 373 [hereinafter Fuller 2]
(discussing same promotions as part 1 of Fuller's analysis); Jay M. Feinman, The Last Promissory
Estoppel Article, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 303, 305-06 (1992) (explaining Fuller's analysis centering
on remedial interests and reflecting purpose of contract law).
'9 See Todd D. Raskoff, Fuller and Perdue's The Reliance Interest as a Work of Legal
Scholarship, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 203 (1991) (discussing Fuller and Purdue's reliance interest in
contract damages).
20 See Fuller 1, supra note 18, at 55-56 (discussing reliance and expectation damages); Fuller
2, supra note 18, at 376 (discussing interaction between reliance and expectation).
21 Edward Yorio & Steve Thei, The PromissoryBasis ofSection 90, 101 YALE L. J. 111, 13637 (1991) (noting "remedial straightjacket" when promise is proven and expectancy is feasible).
Following a nation-wide and state by state survey of case law, it was concluded that courts "actually
enforce promises rather than protect reliance" in promissory estoppel cases and otherwise apply
general contract damages in enforcing section 90 promises. Id. at 111.
22 See Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: The PerilsofPromissory Estoppel, 49 HASTINGS
L. J. 1191, 1332 (1998) (noting promissory estoppel is contractual and not tort based and properly
so); Alden, supra note 6, at 661, 666 (detailing how promissory estoppel is in direct conflict with
consideration and mutual assent).
23 See Ives v. Sterling, 1843 Mass. LEXIS 62, at *8-9 (Mass. Sept. 1, 1843) (recognizing
difficulty in reconciling all views). The Ives court stipulates:
[i]t may be found somewhat difficult to reconcile all the views which have been taken,
in the various cases that have arisen upon the validity of promises, where the ground of
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of bargain for consideration and rejected justifiable reliance as a means of
rendering binding a business subscription.2 4 Holmes believed in the
objectification of contract and that neither benefit nor detriment constituted
consideration for a binding contractual obligation. Indeed, any such benefit
or detriment must demonstrate the "relation of reciprocal conventional
inducement" between "consideration and promise."25 Contract formation
requires a bargain in which there is a "manifestation of mutual assent to the
exchange."2 6 According to Holmes, "[i]t would cut up the doctrine of
consideration by the roots, if a promisee could make a gratuitous promise
binding by subsequently acting in reliance on it." 2 7
III. SECTION 90 OF RESTATEMENT
The First and Second Restatement cemented promissory estoppel's
place in American jurisprudence.2 8 The First Restatement was published in
1932 with Williston as the primary reporter and drafter. Although both

defense has been that they were gratuitous and without consideration. The decisions, in
some of the earlier cases, were strongly against the validity of such promises, while they
constituted mere promises of future contribution, and nothing had been done, by way of
expenditure, upon the faith of them.
Id.
24 See Martin v. Meles, 60 N.E. 397, 398-99 (Mass. 1901) (exemplifying Holmes' belief in
bargain for consideration); see also Teeven, supra note 14, at 511-528 (discussing Holmes and
Dean Langdell as leading proponents of bargained for contracts).
25 French v. Boston Nat'l. Bank, 60 N.E. 793, 795 (Mass. 1901) ("We quite agree
that reliance upon a promise gives it no new validity when such reliance is not the conventional
inducement of the promise, that is to say, when it is not contemplated by the terms of the bargain
as the equivalent of the promise."); Wis. & M. Ry. v. Powers, 191 U.S. 379, 386-87 (1903) (same);
see also Miller v. Cotter, 863 N.E.2d. 537, 549 n.16 (Mass. 2007) ("[The] reciprocal exchange of
benefit and detriment constitutes consideration."); Congregation Kadimah Toras-Moshe v. DeLeo,
540 N.E.2d 691, 692 (Mass. 1989) (holding promise lacked consideration where "no legal benefit
to. . . promisor nor detriment to the promisee"); United Beef Co. v. Childs, 27 N.E.2d 962, 964
(Mass. 1940) ("[c]onsideration consists only of that which the contracting parties offer and
accept"); Gishem v. Dura Corp., 285 N.E.2d 117, 123 (Mass. 1972) (finding fulfillment of a moral
obligation alone is insufficient).
26 I & R Mech. Inc. v. Hazelton Mfg. Co., 817 N.E.2d 799, 802 (Mass. App. Ct. 2014) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 17(1) (1981)).
27 Commonwealth by Comm'rs of Say. Banks v. Scituate Say. Bank, 1884 Mass. LEXIS 254,

at *3 (Mass. June 25, 1884).
28 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 90 cmt. a. The Second Restatement, like the
First Restatement, does not use the term promissory estoppel in the text of section 90 or in any
other section. Id. The term is mentioned in Comment "a" as to the Second Restatement: "This
Section is often referred to in terms of 'promissory estoppel,' a phrase suggesting an extension of
the doctrine of estoppel. Estoppel prevents a person from showing the truth contrary to a
representation of fact made by him after another has relied on the representation." Id.
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treatises incorporated the bargain-for exchange rule for consideration,29 they
also, consistent with Williston's promise based view, included section 90
which initially provided that "a promise which the promisor should
reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and
substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such
action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by
enforcement of the promise." 30 The remedy for promissory estoppel was to
be the same as for breach of contract, thus permitting the recovery of full
contract or expectation damages-which are usually a more generous
measure than either restitution or reliance. The expectation remedy required
not just any reliance, but only that which was of a "definite and substantial
character.""
By the time of the Second Restatement in 1981, the importance of
the reliance interest had gained traction.32 The drafters opted to remove the
"definite and substantial character" element and otherwise added a "as
justice requires" requirement for remedy.
Both changes reflect an
endorsement or emphasis on the reliance interest as opposed to promise and
expectation.33 As revised and as existing today, Section 90 provides:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to
induce action or forbearance on the part of the promise or a
third person and which does induce such action or
forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by
enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach
may be limited as justice requires.34
This formulation makes no mention of either reliance or
reasonableness, only "action or forbearance." In providing that "breach may
be limited as justice requires," the Second Restatement backed off the
29 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981) (incorporating bargain-forexchange). The Second Restatement defines a bargain as "an agreement to exchange promises or
to exchange a promise for a performance or to exchange performances." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 3 (1981). Consideration is defined in section 71: "(1) To constitute consideration,
a performance or a return promise must be bargained for. (2) A performance or return promise is
bargained for if it is sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and is given by the
promisee in exchange for that promise." Id.
30 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS
3' Id.

§ 90

(1932).

32 See Fuller1, supra note, at 18 (discussing reliance interest underlying contract law); Knapp,
supra note 22, at 1199 (discussing implication of reliance on promissory obligation).
3 Gerald Reidy, Note, Definite and Substantial Reliance: Remedying Injustice under Section
90, 67 FORD. L. REV. 1221, 1223 (1998) (explaining reliance requirement of definite and substantial
character existed for full enforcement of donative promises).
34 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1981).
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expectation measure in all cases and adopted a discretionary approach.
Comment d states:
A promise is binding under this section as a contract, and
full-scale enforcement by normal remedies is often
appropriate. But the same factors which bear on whether any
relief should be granted also bear on the character and extent
of the remedy. In particular, relief may sometimes be limited
to restitution or to damages or specific relief measured by
the extent of the promisee's reliance rather than by the terms
of the promise.35
Since its formal emergence in 1932, as well as its reformation in
1981, promissory estoppel is considered by some to be the Restatement's
"most notable and influential rule" 36 having a "profound influence on the law
of contracts."37 Despite this prevalence and the prominent use of "justice" in
the formulation, little guidance or attention has been provided.3 8 As will be
seen, avoidance of injustice is seemingly a separate test yet, in application,
is subservient if not subsumed by the factual components of "promise" and
"action or forbearance." The remedial "limited as justice requires"
component, in turn, was to ensure discretionary flexibility for remedy in
order to serve the purposes of expectation, reliance, or restitution in
particular circumstances; however, the component also remains somewhat
adrift in the disquieting sea of "justice" based grant of judicial discretion.
Many have voiced concerns as to promissory estoppel. The lament
is that contract rules begin to "[dissolve] into tort-type notions of unfairness
and injustice."3 9 In the commercial context, there is always a measure of
reliance as "people do not distinguish between promised deals and

s RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

Yorio & Thei, supra note 21,

§ 90

cmt. d. (1981).

at 111.
* Id.; see also Charles Knapp, Reliance in The Revised Restatement: The Proliferation of
PromissoryEstoppel, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 52, 53 (1981) (discussing Section 90 and its widespread
acceptance).
3 William Burnett Harvey, Discretionary Justice Under the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 666, 675 (1982) (noting likely intent behind avoidance-of-injustice
was to prevent enforcing promise if restitution available) (citing 4 A.L.I. PROCEEDINGS 91, 103-04
(1926)).
39 Susan Lorde Martin, Kill The Monster: PromissoryEstoppel as an Independent Cause of
Action, 7 WM & MARY BUS. L. REv. 1, 3 (2016). Martin's article also references promissory
estoppel as a "monster" as it imposes liability without mutual bargain or consent and injecting
commercial uncertainty as a result. Id. at 3; see also Alden, supranote 6, at 661, 666 (contending
insufficient investigation into policy and judgment allowing considerations of promissory estoppel
in particular circumstances).
36
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performed deals." 40 Reliance is not agreement. To have contractual liability
turn on what is or is not reasonable reliance provides unwarranted
uncertainty. Reliance as justification for contractual enforcement is thus
viewed as having no rightful place in commercial dealings and being
improperly used beyond the limited circumstances (charitable subscriptions
1
or certain other discrete gratuitous promises) in which it was birthed.4
Freedom of contract, which includes the power and right to be bound to an
agreement voluntarily through bargain and exchange including the right to
establish its form and terms, is deemed mortally wounded.42 According to
one famous scholar nearly 42 years ago, bargain for exchange and reliance
were "two contradictory propositions" which "cannot live comfortably
together: in the end one must swallow the other up." 43
Others see the modern formulation of promissory estoppel as the
result of the natural drift of the common law, with its presence and a robust
role vitally important." "When the common law grew too stiff or narrow,
equity often came to the rescue, allowing old doctrines to survive with
changed names. Promissory estoppel is simply consideration, cloaked in a
new name." 45 While the doctrine reduces formal protection against
nonconsensual bargains, reliance provides ample protection with the
promisor otherwise free to condition, restrict, disclaim, or withdraw the

'

Gibson, supra note 6, at 672.

41 Id.; Alden, supra note 6, at 661, 666.

&

42 See Gibson, supra note 6, at 672 (criticizing notion of reliance protection in area of
commercial contracting and noting it generates reliance); Sidney W. DeLong, The New
Requirement ofEnforcement Reliance In Commercial Promissory Estoppel: Section 90 as Catch22, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 943, 945 (1997) ("The concerted effort by lawyers and judges to limit
commercial promissory liability to formal contract commitments is returning the commercial world
to its pre-Section 90 tranquility."); Martin, supra note 39, at 4 ("If contract rules are frequently
displaced by ad hoc decision about unfairness, the predictability and reliability of business
transactions will diminish to the detriment to all who engage in them."); Gibson, supra note 6, at
674 (finding consideration was traditionally problematic "because its technical requirements
caused courts to ignore the existence of agreement between the parties, the solution is not to ignore
the existence of agreement, by reliance.").
43 GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 61 (1974); Marco J. Jimenez, The Many Faces
of PromissoryEstoppel: An EmpiricalAnalysis Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 57
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 669, 674, n. 12 (2010) [hereinafter Jimenez, The Many Faces] (discussing
Gilmore's comparison of bargain for exchange and reliance, noting Gilmore's work was
"prescien[t]"). To another more recent commentator, promissory estoppel "has had a metastatic
and corruptive effect on the theoretical underpinnings of contract law." Alden, supra note 6, at
677.
' Kotritskey, supra note 5, at 109 (positing promissory estoppel remains "vital" to contract);
Holmes, supra note 4, at 48, 56 (noting equitable importance of promissory estoppel); Metzger
Phillips, supra note 6, at 474 (same).
45 C.M.A. McCauliff, A Historical Approach To The Contractual Ties That Bind Parties
Together, 71 FORD. L. REv. 841, 864 (2002).

10

JOURNAL OF TRIAL &APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XXIII

promise prior to any detrimental reliance.46 Under this view, promissory
estoppel is a sui generis "super-hero" caped in both legal and equitable
principles, filling necessary gaps left by the limits of bargain for
consideration and providing a counter-balance to the weight of rigid legal
rules based on equitable notions of fairness and good faith.4 7
IV. THE MASSACHUSETTS EXPERIENCE
Massachusetts has a long history of recognizing estoppel in its
various forms most notably equitable or estoppel in pais.4 8 Estoppel has
historically been a defense or bar to recovery 49 and otherwise based on
representations (or conduct) as to past or present, but not future facts.so It

' See Loranger Constr. Corp. v. E.F. Hauserman Co., 374 N.E.2d 306, 308-11 n.4 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1978), further appellatereview, 384 N.E.2d 176 (Mass. 1978) (discussing promissory estoppel
in commercial transactions).
47 See Knapp, supra note 22, at 1291-1331 (providing overview of promissory estoppel and
identifying importance of reliance in contract law and liability).
48 See Plumer v. Lord, 1864 Mass. LEXIS 291, at *4 (Mass. Nov. 1, 1864) (defining estoppel
in pais); Jennings v. Wall, 104 N.E. 738, 740-41 (Mass. 1914) (explaining estoppel in pas); Glass
v. Hulbert, 1869 Mass. LEXIS 260 at *1, 10-11 (Mass. 1869) (examining equitable estoppel).
Equitable estoppel functions "to prevent one from benefiting from his own wrongdoing and to avoid
injustice." Harrington v. Fall River Hous. Auth., 538 N.E.2d 24, 29 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989);
Renovator's Supply, Inc. v. Sovereign Bank, 892 N.E.2d 777, 785-86 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008)
(discussing equitable estoppel's function). Other estoppels include judicial estoppel (see e.g.,
Holland v. Kantrovits & Kantrovitz, LLP, 81 N.E.3d 774, 780-81 (Mass. App. Ct. 2017)); estoppel
by deed (see Gibbs v. Thayer, 1850 Mass. LEXIS 75, at *3-8 (Mass. 1850); Nourse v. Nourse, 1874
Mass. LEXIS 32, at *5-6 (Mass. 1874) (1874); Dalessio v. Baggia, 783 N.E.2d 890, 891 (Mass.
App. Ct.2003)), and collateral estoppel (see Heacock v. Heacock, 520 N.E. 2d 151, 152-53 (Mass.
1988). Estoppel by deed prevents an assertion of title to property previously assigned to another.
Gibbs, 1850 Mass. LEXIS 75, at *3-6; Dalessio, 783 N.E.2d at 891. The Dalessio court states,
[e]stoppel by deed occurs when .. . a grantor conveys property by deed which, unknown
to the grantee, the grantor does not own at the time of the conveyance, but which the
grantor later acquires. In such a case, the grantor (and anyone claiming under him) is
estopped from asserting against the grantee a claim of title to the property conveyed.
Dalessio, 783 N.E.2d at 891 (quoting Zayka v. Giambro, 594 N.E.2d 894, 897 (Mass. App. Ct.
1992).
49 See, e.g., Looney v. Trimount Theatrics, Inc., 184 N.E. 683, 685 (Mass. 1933) (stopping
building owner, seeking to collect against tenant, from asserting ownership/conversion claim);
Moran v. Gala, 845 N.E.2d 1170, 1174 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (holding equitable estoppel barred
plaintiffs' claims against neighbor and record holder of title); McLearn v. Hill, 177 N.E. 617, 620
(Mass. 1931) (barring statute of limitations defense).
so See Loranger Const. Corp., 374 N.E.2d at 308 (finding subcontractor's quote was relied
upon by contractor in placing bid); Sullivan v. Chief Justice for Admin. & Mgmt. of the Trial Court,
858 N.E.2d 699, 711 (Mass. 2006) (relying on theory of equitable estoppel); Boylston Dev. Group,
Inc., v. 22 Boylston St., Corp., 591 N.E.2d 157, 163 (Mass. 1992) (discussing successful estoppel).
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served as a defense to a cause of action, precluding the claimant from
denying the truth of a prior position or statement.5
A. FROM IN PAIS TO INDEPENDENTACTION
An early formulation required a showing that the party seeking to be
estopped willfully intended that the conduct on his part should lead to any
action on the part of the defendant.5 2 Massachusetts followed the estoppel in
pais formulated in England by Lord Campbell in Howard v. Hudson, 2 El.
& Bl. 10:
If a party wilfully makes a representation to another,
meaning it to be acted upon, and it is so acted upon, that
gives rise to what is called an estoppel. It is not quite
properly so called; but it operates as a bar to receiving
evidence contrary to that representation, as between those
parties. Like the ancient estoppel, this conclusion shuts out
the truth, and is odious, and must be strictly made out. The
party setting up such a bar to the reception of the truth must
show that there was a wilful intent to make him act on the
faith of the representation, and that he did so act.53

" Turner v. Coffin, 1866 Mass. LEXIS 112, at *1-3 (Mass. 1866) (using estoppel in paid as a
defense); see also 3 JoHN N. POMEROY, EQUIrY JURISPRUDENCE § 802 (Spencer W. Symons, 5th
ed. 1941) (asserting equitable estoppel is intended to promote "equity andjustice."). Furthermore,
Promeroy's Equity Jurisprudencedeclares that equitable estoppel's intent to promote "equity and
justice of the individual case by preventing a party from asserting his rights under a general
technical rule of law, when he has so conducted himself that it would be contrary to equity and
good conscience." 3 JoHN N. POMEROY, EQUIrY JURISPRUDENCE § 802 (Spencer W. Symons, 5th
ed. 1941); Moran v. Gala, 845 N.E.2d 1170, 1175 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (noting application of
estoppel in pais in fraud cases).
52 See Plumer, 1864 Mass. LEXIS 291, at *1-3 (Mass. 1864) (finding estoppel requires willful
intent to induce action); Rice v. New England Mut. Aid Soc., 15 N.E. 624, 628 (Mass. 1888)
(creating an estoppel in pais, declaration/acts must be accompanied with a design to mislead); see
(Mass. 1855) (finding that
also Osgood v. Nichols, 1855 Mass. LEXIS 335, at *1-2
misrepresentation causes bar to using estoppel defense); Audenried v. Betteley, 1862 Mass. LEXIS
389, at *8-11 (Mass. 1862) (applying estoppel theory); Langdon v. Doud, 1865 Mass. LEXIS 146,
*1-4 (Mass. 1865); Andrews v. Lyons, 1865 Mass. LEXIS 269, at *1 -2 (Mass. Nov. 1865); Turner
v. Coffin, 1866 Mass. LEXIS 112, at *1 (Mass. 1866); Zuchtmann v. Roberts, 1871 Mass. LEXIS
114, at 2-3 (Mass. 1871); Nourse v. Nourse, 1874 Mass. LEXIS 32, at *5-6 (Mass.
1874); Institution for Say. v. Littlefield, 1850 Mass LEXIS 124, at *5-9 (Mass. 1850); Page v.
Wight, 1867 Mass. LEXIS 47, at *3-4 (Mass. 1867).
" Lyons, 1865 Mass. LEXIS 269, at *1-2 (quoting Howard v. Hudson, 2 El. & Bl. 10); see
also Plumer, 1864 Mass. LEXIS 291, at *5 (stating "[t]here must also be shown a wilful intent to
induce the party to act on the faith of the alleged statements or representations. This is the well
settled rule of law"). A number of decisions rejected any effort to invoke the estoppel bar, finding
the willful intent element not met. Connihan v. Thompson, 1873 Mass. LEXIS 234, at *5 (Mass.
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Estoppel soon shed any willful intent requirement and, with it, held
that conduct and statements falling short of deceit or fraud could still form
the basis of estoppel with the purpose to effectuate estoppel's equitable and
predominant concern of "fair dealing" and "good conscience".5 4 Estoppel
evolved to require only "words or conduct not consonant with fairness and
designed to induce action by the plaintiff to his harm."s5 The early case law
likewise held that estoppel did not apply to future promises. 56 This was
consistent with the understanding that the purpose and effect of "estoppel"
is to "shut out a party from offering evidence in a court of justice, contrary

1873) (rejecting estoppel defense to sale of land where no evidence of intent); Nichols v. Arnold,
1829 Mass. LEXIS 37, at *6-7 (Mass. 1829) (finding no estoppel as declaration relied upon was
made by mistake). But cf Nickerson v. Massachusetts Title Ins., 59 N.E. 814, 815 (Mass. 1901)
(concluding there was estoppel because omissions rising from negligence can constitute estoppel).
54 See McLearn v. Hill, 177 N.E. 617, 620 (Mass. 1931). According to the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts:
[W]hile the doctrine of estoppel in pais rests upon the ground of fraud, it is not essential
that the representations or conduct giving rise to its application should be fraudulent in
the strictly legal significance of that term, or with intent to mislead or deceive; the test
appears to be whether in all the circumstances of the case conscience and duty of honest
dealing should deny one the right to repudiate the consequences of his representations
or conduct; whether the author of a proximate cause may justly repudiate its natural and
reasonably anticipated effect; fraud, in the sense of a court of equity, properly including
all acts, omissions, and concealments which involve a breach of legal or equitable duty,
trust, or confidence, justly reposed, and are injurious to another or by which an undue
and unconscientious advantage is taken of another.
Id. It was held early on that there could be estoppel "by silence" where it constitutes a
representation by consent. See Tracy v. Lincoln, 14 N.E. 122, 123-24 (Mass. 1887) (holding that
plaintiff's choice to remain silent estopped her from later claiming ownership against mortgagee);
D'Almedia v. Boston M & R. R., 113 N.E. 187, 189 (Mass. 1916) (noting estoppel by silence well
established).
5 McLearn, 177 N.E. at 620. According to the court in McLearn,
[fjacts falling short of [fraud] may constitute conduct contrary to general principles of
fair dealing and to the good conscience which ought to actuate individuals and which it
is the design of courts to enforce. It is in the main to accomplish the prevention of results
contrary to good conscience and fair dealing that the doctrine of estoppel has been
formulated and taken its place as a part of the law.
Id. at 619; see also Edwards v. Sullivan & Cogliano Cos., 2002 Mass. App. Div. LEXIS 19, at *11
(Mass. App. Ct. 2002) (quoting MacKeen v. Kasinskas, 132 N.E.2d 732, 734 (Mass. 1956));
Renovator's Supply, Inc. v. Sovereign Bank, 892 N.E.2d 777, 785 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008) (quoting
Turnpike Motors, Inc. v. Newbury Grp., Inc., 596 N.E.2d 989, 991 (Mass. 1992)).
56 See Jackson v. Allen, 1875 Mass. LEXIS 129, at *28 (Mass. 1876) ("Mere disappointment
in expectation, or breach of promise or covenant relating to the future, cannot constitute an estoppel
in pais.").

2017-18]

THE FINAL FRONTIER

13

to his previous statements."5 The future promise versus past or present facts
distinction has not always been easily maintained."
As of the turn of the century, estoppel as a rule of evidence and bar
required that "it must appear that one has been induced by the conduct of
another to do something different from what otherwise would have been
done and which has resulted to his harm and that the other knew or had
reasonable cause to know that such consequence might follow." 9 This
simplified, yet expansive, articulation has been applied and allowed to
prevent the use of such legal bars as the statute of frauds, 60 statute of
limitations, 61and the parol evidence rule, 62 as well as to substantive
defenses. 63 The doctrine was "not [to be] applied except when to refuse it
" Langdon v. Loud, 1865 Mass. LEXIS 146, at *5 (Mass. 1865).
58 See Raldne Realty Corp. v. Brooks, 183 N.E. 419, 420 (Mass. 1932); Cellucci v. Sun Oil
Co., 320 N.E.2d 919, 924 (Mass. App. Ct. 1974), aff'dsub nom. Cellucciv. Sun Oil Co., 331 N.E.2d
813, 924 (Mass. 1975) ("Although as a general rule representations as to future events are not
actionable. . ., an exception has been recognized 'where the parties to the transactions are not on
equal footing but where one has or is in a position where he should have superior knowledge
concerning the matters to which the representations relate."'); see also Moreira v. Citimortgage,
Inc., No. 15-13720-LTS, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121469, at *13-14 (Sept. 8,2016) ("The difference
between promissory estoppel and equitable estoppel claims centers around the temporal nature of
the misrepresentation-the former concern misrepresentations of future intent, the latter past or
present facts."); Marquez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2727, at *10 (D.
Mass. 2013) (noting distinction between promissory and equitable estoppel); Lawson v.
Affirmative Equities Co., 341 F. Supp. 2d 51, 66 (D. Mass. 2004) (same).
so See Boston & A.R.R. v. Reardon, 115 N.E. 408, 411 (Mass. 1917); see also McLearn, 177
N.E. at 619 (quoting the same statement in Boston & A.R.R. v. Reardon, 115 N.E. 408, 411 (Mass.
1917)); Stiff v. Ashton, 29 N.E. 203, 204 (Mass. 1891) ("[O]ne is responsible for the word or act
which he knows, or ought to know, will be acted upon by another.").
6) See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139(1) (1981) (stating promise inducing
detrimental reliance enforceable notwithstanding Statute of Frauds where justice so requires); see,
e.g, Cellucci, 320 N.E.2d at 923 ("An estoppel, if appropriately applied in this case, would also
preclude [the defendant] from asserting the affirmative defense of the Statute of Frauds."), aff'd,
331 N.E.2d 813 (Mass. 1975); Barrie-Chivian v. Lepler, 34 N.E.3d 769, 771 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015)
(holding promissory estoppel claim not barred by Statute of Limitations). The Lepler court further
stipulates that, "[iut would work a harsh injustice to permit the Statute of Frauds to bar recovery for
the plaintiffs where the defendant admits he induced the plaintiffs' reliance by promising to execute
a written agreement, the absence of which he now seeks to use to avoid the debt." Lepler, 34
N.E.3d at 772.; Goeken v. Kay, 751 F. 2d 469, 472-74 (1st Cir. 1985) (affirming Massachusetts
law allowed recovery on reasonable reliance for oral contract notwithstanding Statute of Frauds);
Palandjian v. Pahlavi, 614 F. Supp. 1569, 1581-82 (D. Mass. 1985) aff'd, 808 F. 2d 1513 (1st Cir.
1986) (holding that reasonable reliance on oral promise precluded Statute of Frauds defense).
61 See McLearn, 177 N.E. at 620 (concluding defendant barred from pleading statute of
limitations where plaintiff relied upon the defendant's implicit assurance); MacKeen v. Kasinskas,
132 N.E.2d 732, 733 (Mass. 1956) (same); Libman v. Zuckerman, 599 N.E.2d 642, 644-46 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1992) (preventing defendant from raising Statute of Limitations defense where plaintiffs
relied on defendant's promise).
62 See Espstein, supra note 10, at 416-32 (analyzing parol evidence rule in contract law).
63 See Cellucci, 320 N.E.2d at 926 (holding defendant estopped from denying contract was
formed); Calkins v. Wire Hardware Co., 165 N.E. 889, 896-97 (Mass. 1929) (recognizing estoppel
prevented defense of illegality).

JOURNAL OF TRIAL &APPELLATE ADVOCACY [Vol. XXm

14

would be inequitable"' and likewise recognized that "the law does not
regard estoppels with favor, nor extend them beyond [the requirements of]
the transactions in which they originate."'6 5
In addition to equitable estoppel, Massachusetts recognized that
either benefit to the promisor or detriment to the promisee constituted
consideration sufficient to enforce a promise.6 6 The two concepts merged to
provide justification for enforcement of certain discrete promises. The most
prominent of these cases were charitable subscription cases which allowed
recovery on behalf of a charity where the charity had relied on the promise

6

Boston & A.R.R. v. Reardon, 115 N.E. 408, 411 (Mass. 1917).

6' Reardon, 115 N.E. at 411 (quoting Tracy v. Lincoln, 14 N.E. 122, 124 (Mass. 1887)); see

also Huntress v. Hanley, 80 N.E. 946, 948-49 (Mass. 1907) (finding insufficient facts to use
estoppel). The notion that estoppels were to be construed narrowly has been found to apply to all
forms of estoppel. See Patel v. Planning Bd. of N. Andover, 593 N.E.2d 544, 547 (Mass. App. Ct.
1989) (holding Massachusetts has never recognized easement by estoppel and such recognition
would require narrow application); Andrews v. Lyons, 1865 Mass. LEXIS 269, at *5 (Mass. Nov.
1865) ("Estoppels are not favored in law, and everything necessary to establish them must be
strictly made out in evidence."). There is some sentiment to the contrary. See, e.g., Poor v. Poor,
409 N.E.2d 758, 760-61 (Mass. 1980) ("[a]lthough the facts do not support the invocation of the
doctrine of estoppel, in its true sense, on all of the evidence ... it would be inequitable to permit
[husband] in these actions to challenge the validity of the Haitian divorce [of his wife's first
marriage]."). In Poor, the court stated, "[w]e have ... indicated that the policy considerations
underlying the use of estoppel are expansive rather than narrow. 'It is in the main to accomplish
the prevention of results contrary to good conscience and fair dealing that the doctrine of estoppel
has been formulated and taken its place as a part of the law."' Id. at 762 n.5 (quoting McLearn,
177 N.E. at 619).
' See Wilson v. Clements, 1807 Mass. LEXIS 1, at *3 (Mass. July 1, 1807) ("[a] naked
promise like this, made from the feelings of friendship, or upon an idle and insignificant
consideration, can be no foundation for an action at law."); Trs. of Farmington Acad. v. Allen, 1817
Mass. LEXIS 41, at *6 (Mass. June 1, 1817) ("a promise of this sort, made to no particular person,
and having only a public benefit for its consideration, is no more binding in law than it is upon the
consciences of men who are base enough to refuse to perform them"); Cabot v. Haskins, 1825
Mass. LEXIS 24, at *20 (Mass. Mar. 1, 1825) ("either an actual damage, or a suspension or
forbearance of right, or a possibility of loss occasioned to the one to whom the promise is made, to
give it validity."); Trs. of Amherst Acad. v. Cowls, 1828 Mass. LEXIS 56, at *13 (Mass. Sept. 1,
1828) ("It seems that an actual benefit to the promisor, or an actual loss or disadvantage to the
promisee, will be a sufficient consideration to uphold a promise deliberately made. Whether the
consideration received is, equal in value to the sum promised to be paid, seems not to be material
to the validity of a note. . ."); Stone v. White, 1857 Mass. LEXIS 133, at *9 (Mass. Sept. 1, 1857)
(declaring detriment or benefit required for consideration); Cottage St. Methodist Episcopal Church
v. Kendall, 1877 Mass. LEXIS 37, at *4 (Mass. Jan. 3, 1877) (establishing consideration requires
"either a benefit to the maker of the promise, or a loss, trouble or inconvenience to, or a charge or
obligation resting upon, the party to whom the promise is made."); Drury v. Fay, 1833 Mass. LEXIS
80, at *4 (Mass. Oct. 1, 1833) ("The principle is well established, that an injury to the promisee,
occasioned by the act of the promisor, without any benefit to the latter, will support a promise.");
Baglio v. New York C.R.R., 180 N.E.2d 798, 801 (Mass. 1962); McLearn, 177 N.E. at 620 ("The
facts do not disclose an inducement and promise on the part of the defendant which caused the
plaintiff to forbear bringing any action on his claim until the expiration of the period prescribed by
the statute of limitations.").
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of a donation.6 7 Massachusetts, in fact, is considered one of the first
jurisdictions to extend equitable estoppel principles to the donative setting
and to otherwise expressly confirm that detrimental reliance was sufficient
for consideration. 68 In 1815, the Supreme Judicial Court extended reliance
as consideration to the commercial, business subscription setting holding
that a claimant was entitled to recovery where he was induced by the
defendant's subscription promise to advance money to establish a
newspaper.69 Although the court did so under "equity and good conscience,"
by 1827, the Supreme Judicial Court combined the equitable notion with
reliance constituting sufficient consideration to find the subscriber "legally
and equitably bound." 7

The mutuality of obligation conception of consideration was also no
stranger to-contractual liability and gained force by the turn of the century.7
In 1881, Justice Holmes' bargain theory took shape with it emphasized that
the "the root of the whole matter is the relation of reciprocal conventional
inducement, each for the other, between consideration and promise."7 2
Mutuality was not a new notion,7 and cases emerged rejecting reliance as
sufficient to render enforceable a contractual undertaking-"reliance upon
a promise gives it no new validity" absent mutuality.7 4 In a 1901 decision,
for instance, Justice Holmes held, in a business subscription case, that there
was no enforceable promise based on reliance unless the reliance was
bargained for. It was only mutually bargained for and assented to
67 See Martin v. Meles, 60 N.E. 397, 398 (Mass. May 23, 1901) (reviewing charity's reliance
on a donation); Ladies Collegiate Inst. v. French, 1860 Mass. LEXIS 258, at *10-11 (Mass. Oct. 1,
1860) (reviewing a charitable subscription case).
61 See Kevin M. Teeven, A History ofPromissoryEstoppel: Growth In the Face ofDoctrinal
Resistance, 72 TENN. L. REV. 1111, 1123 (2005) ("Massachusetts introduced the concept of
reliance relief for subscriptions in the United States, and its ground-breaking subscription
precedents became the leading decisions on the subject in the country.").
6
See Barzilla Homes v. Dana, 1815 Mass. LEXIS 15, at *3-4 (Mass. Mar. 1815) (holding
claimant entitled to recovery); see also Cottage St., 1877 Mass. LEXIS 37, at *4-5 (suggesting
reliance as consideration); Packard v. Richardson, 1821 Mass. LEXIS 7, *16-18 (Mass. Mar. 1,
1821); Ives v. Sterling, 1843 Mass. LEXIS 62, at *8-16 (Mass. Sept. 1, 1843).
7o Bryant v. Goodnow, 1827 Mass. LEXIS 74, at *34 (Mass. Sept. 1, 1827). In 1932, Judge
Learned Hand found that promissory estoppel was a form or species of consideration. See Porter v.
Comm'r., 60 F. 2d 673, 675 (2d Cir. 1932).
71 See Teeven, supranote 14, at 545 (discussing the initial use of "mutuality").

72 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 293-94 (1881).

7 See Wild v. Dean, 1862 Mass. LEXIS 102, at *3 (Mass. Jan. 1, 1862) ("[t]he fundamental
principle on which all contracts rest is the mutual assent of the parties.").
74 French v. Boston Nat'l Bank, 60 N.E. 793, 795 (Mass. 1901).
75 See Martin v. Meles, 60 N.E. 397, 398 (Mass. 1901) ("[t]here must be some ground for
saying that the acts done in reliance upon the promise were contemplated by the form of the
transaction either impliedly or in terms as the conventional inducement, motive and equivalent for
the promise."); French, 60 N.E. at 795 ("reliance upon a promise gives it no new vitality when such
reliance is not the conventional inducement of the promise, that is to say, when it is not
contemplated by the terms of the bargain as the equivalent of the promise."); see also

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

16

[Vol. XXIHI

'

contractual undertakings that deserved enforcement in that they promoted
"the increase of value in society." 76 Recent decisions have marked a material
distinction between the donative promise and commercial promises with the
Supreme Judicial Court stating that "we do recognize that the 'meeting of
the minds' between a donor and a charitable institution differs from the
understanding we require in the context of enforceable arm's-length
commercial agreements."7 7 Regardless, contractual liability largely runs on
two tracks-one track resting on bargain and the other on detrimental
reliance.
The term "promissory estoppel" first emerged in Massachusetts in
two 1933 decisions, one of which expressly relied upon Williston's treatise.79
In both cases, the doctrine was invoked in an effort to prevent a defense and
was rejected.so In a 1935 case involving an oral realty contract, estoppel was
used against a defendant's reliance upon the Statute of Frauds." In 1974, the
Appeals Court pushed the reach of the doctrine further when it applied
equitable estoppel to a dispute over the sale of land and to what was
essentially a promissory representation. 82 In Cellucci v. Sun Oil,83 it was
found that the detrimental reliance of the seller of a gas station, in breaking
off the negotiations with a competing purchaser, was actionable. The original
purchaser had given assurances that a deal for the sale of the gasoline station
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71(1) ("to constitute consideration, a performance or
a return promise must be bargained for."); Lamaster v. Sutherland, 14-P-165, 2015 Mass. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 422, at *5-6 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015) (noting bargained for exchange in which a
"return promise. . .'sought by promisor in exchange for promise and is given by promisee in
exchange for promise."') (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 71(2)).
76 U.S. v. Meadors, 753 F.2d 590, 596 (7th Cir. 1985).
" King v. Trs. of Boston Univ., 647 N.E.2d 1196, 1202 (Mass. 1995).
78 PATRICK S. ATIYAH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CONTRACT 153-54 (4th ed. 1989)

("for detrimental reliance seems to be the key to promissory estoppel, and it is also, of course, one
of the twin legs of the doctrine of consideration itself'). See generally, Lamaster v. Sutherland, 14P-165, 2015 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 422, at*5-6 n.4 (Mass. App. Ct. May 14, 2015) (stating
"essence of bargained-for exchange, in which a return promise is 'sought by promisor in exchange
for ... promise and is given by the promisee in exchange for that promise."') (quoting Restatement
(Second) Of Contracts § 71(2)).
79 See Sheehan v. Commercial Travels Mut. Accident Ass'n, 186 N.E. 627, 630 (Mass. 1933)
(utilizing promissory estoppel and relying on Williston's Treatise); Danis v. Angelo, 186 N.E.
558, 559 (Mass. 1933) (utilizing promissory estoppel).
8o Danis, 186 N.E. at 559 (rejecting plaintiff's reliance in action on promissory note). The
court rejected the reliance on promissory estoppel to defeat the defendant's claim of no liability,
which was based on the statement "I won't bother you no more," as it was not shown to have been
intended to make a gift of the promissory note. Id. See also Sheehan, 186 N.E. at 630 (rejecting
plaintiffs reliance on promissory estoppel to preclude insurer's defense that condition was not

met).
s" See Andrews v. Charon, 193 N.E. 737, 739 (Mass. 1935) (discussing estoppel's use against
defendant's reliance on Statute of Frauds).
82 Cellucci v. Sun Oil Co., 320 N.E.2d 919, 923-25 (Mass. App. Ct. 1974) (applying
equitable estoppel to a dispute over the sale of land).
83 320 N.E.2d 919 (Mass. App. Ct. 1974).
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would go through and that it could not sell to the competing purchaser as the
seller had signed a standard purchase and sale agreement, estopped the
purchaser from asserting that there was no binding contract of sale.84 The
estoppel applied not only to deny the enforceability of the agreement, but to
preclude application of the statute of frauds (purchaser had not signed
agreement) and any argument that many of the conditions of the sale applied
and defeated any enforceability." The putative representations included a
statement that was essentially a prediction that the sale would go through, as
well as one of "law," since the purchaser informed the seller it could do
nothing with the property because of the signed purchase and sale."
The Cellucci decision is notable not only as to the scope of the
preclusive effect (i.e. barred application of the statute of frauds; denial of
contract; and enforcement of various conditions) but that it was applied to
what was essentially a promissory statement. Although representations as to
future events are not usually actionable, it was held that an "exception"
applied 'where the parties to the transaction are not on equal footing but
where one has or is in a position where he should have superior knowledge
concerning the matters to which the misrepresentations relate.""' There is
no explicit reference to promissory estoppel, but the court clearly found that
both the statements and detrimental reliance worked an estoppel thus all but
expressly merging equitable and promissory estoppel. The decision has since
been routinely cited as a decision for promissory estoppel."
Four years later (in 1978), the Appeals Court formally adopted the
First Restatement's formulation of "promissory estoppel" in a case
addressing a contractor's asserted reliance on a subcontractor's bid-an area
where courts had readily applied estoppel." There, the court noted the
* See id. at 924 (noting both factual and legal misrepresentations).
s See id. at 924-25 (explaining misrepresentations of law).
86 See Cellucci, 320 N.E.2d at 924-25 (identifying misrepresentation of law).
87 Id. at 924 (quoting SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §
1496, 373-74 (3d ed. 1976)).
8 The decision was affirmed by the Supreme Judicial Court with no discussion of the estoppel
element. See Cellucci v. Sun Oil Co., 331 N.E.2d 813 (Mass. 1975); see also Barrie-Chivian v.
Lepler, 34 N.E.3d 769, 771 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015) (stating "[a]lthough the court [in Cellucci] did
not use the term 'promissory estoppel,' instead referring to 'an estoppel' occasioned by 'detrimental
reliance,' the terms are used interchangeably in the case law."); Consolo v. Bank of Am., No. 1511840, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67450, at *4 (D. Mass. May 2,2017).
89 See Loranger Constr. Corp. v. E.F. Hauserman Co., 374 N.E.2d 306, 308 (Mass. App. Ct.
1978), aff'd, 384 N.E.2d 176 (Mass. 1978); see also Janke Constr. Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co.,
386 F. Supp. 687, 692 (W.D. Wis. 1974), affd, 527 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1976) (applying estoppel in
construction bid case); Reynolds v. Texarkana Const. Co., 374 S.W.2d 818. 820 (Ark. 1964)
(same); Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 5642, 1958 Cal. App. LEXIS 2503, at *4-6 (Cal. App. 1958)
(same); Chedd-Angier Prod. Co. v. Omni Publications Int'l, Ltd., 756 F.2d 930, 936-37 (1st Cir.
1985) (explaining that Massachusetts, through Loranger,has adopted RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS

§

90).
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academic literature as to promissory estoppel and its adoption and
incorporation into section 90 of the Restatement and that prior Massachusetts
decisions had "elasticized the concept of consideration" based on detrimental
reliance.9 0 It also noted that while Massachusetts had not formally accepted
the theory of promissory estoppel by name, "its underlying principles have
in effect been applied to reach equitable results" and has otherwise applied
the estoppel theory to misrepresentation of future intent.9 1 The "theory of
promissory estoppel" was officially adopted and applied to provide relief to
a general contractor who bid for and was awarded a construction contract
which bid included a subcontractor's quote to provide certain materials and
services which had been dishonored.92 The court found that there was no
need for an offer in the contractual sense requiring only a "promise upon
which the promisee would reasonably have placed reliance."" As to any
conflict with the need for consensual bargains, the court held that the
promisor was adequately protected by reliance and the ability to limit,
restrict, or revoke the promise prior to any reliance.94
Upon further appellate review to the Supreme Judicial Court,95
Justice Braucher-a Reporter to the Second Restatement-rejected the
contention that promissory estoppel was novel, holding that reliance
rendering a promise enforceable as a contract "antedat[ed]" the more recent
advent of bargained for consideration.9 6 Justice Braucher thus eschewed the
label "promissory estoppel" stating the expression "tends to confusion rather
' See Loranger Constr. Corp., 384 N.E.2d at 179 (explaining term of promissory estoppel).
9' See Loranger, 374 N.E.2d at 309 (noting where Massachusetts uses promissory estoppel).
92 See Loranger Constr. Corp., 384 N.E.2d at 178 (finding reliance). It was found that the
subcontractor knew the general was relying on the quote in submitting the bid and if awarded the
contractor would be bound by the bid. Id. As a result of reneging on the quote, the general
contractor had to secure another subcontractor for the services at a higher price. Id The Court
noted that as to the issue that the general contractor delayed in notifying the subcontractor of the
acceptance of the quote (2.5 months) and otherwise bid shopped, it was a matter for the jury to
consider. Id. at 178-79.
* Loranger Constr. Corp., 374 N.E.2d at 310.
* Id. at 308-11 (holding promisor protected by reliance).
s See Loranger Constr. Corp. v. E.F. Hauserman Co., 384N.E.2d 176 (Mass. 1978) (reviewing
lower court decision).
96 Id. at 179 (stating promissory estoppel is not novel). The reference to promissory estoppel
was essentially dicta as Justice Braucher found that the facts supported a finding of consideration.
Id at 179-80. He noted that there is a reciprocal relation between the promisee and the
consideration in a typical bargain, and otherwise found that traditional consideration including
implied in fact inference. Id. at 179. The Court found that the jury instructions never included any
theory of liability based on promissory estoppel or detrimental reliance principles but on offer,
acceptance, and consideration and thus, had to analyze the evidence based on the instructions given.
Idat 180. It proceeded to find that there was evidence to support that the bid was an offer and had
been accepted by the general contractor. Id. As to consideration, the Court found there was a basis
for consideration by virtue that the bid was intended to induce the general contractor's action in the
hope that the defendant would benefit, and that the general contractor action was induced by the
defendant's quote warranting a finding of a "typical bargain." Id.
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than clarity."9 7 The contractual basis was made clear: "when a promise is
enforceable in whole or in part by virtue of reliance, it is a 'contract,' and it
is enforceable pursuant to a 'traditional contract theory."'98 Cases have since
routinely noted that detrimental reliance serves as the equivalent of
consideration for a non-bargained for promise.99
Following the formal recognition of section 90 and "promissory
estoppel," the claim surfaced in a myriad of settings, largely as an alternative
or adjunct to breach of contract and/or misrepresentation.1 00 As to
"equitable" estoppel, traditionally a rule of evidence 01 and a defense as
opposed to an independent and affirmative cause of action, a number of
decisions appear to treat, at least implicitly, equitable estoppel as a cause of
action.102 Both this and the sometimes blurry distinction between
representations of present and past facts versus future intent or promises' 03
bleeds the two notions together. The result was a singular "estoppel" or
"detrimental reliance" doctrine that is now an independent cause of action
for reliance on representations regarding past, present or future facts or

&

97 Id. at 179. See C.M.A McCauliff, supra note 45, at 864 ("Only its new, equitable name
concealed its origins in consideration, perhaps to protect it from those in the ascendancy who denied
its role in contract."). See also Teeven, supra note 14, at 526 ("the label was oxymoronic in
combining a promise looking to future performance with an estoppel looking to past conduct.").
9 Loranger, 384 N.E.2d at 179.
9 See Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank. v. Varadian, 647 N.E. 2d 1174, 1179 (Mass. 1995)
(holding promissory estoppel required proof of all elements of contract except consideration);
Nichols v. Pritzker, 12-P-1328, 2013 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 828, at *4 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013)
("[t]he plaintiff s detrimental reliance on the defendant's promise constituted a sufficient substitute
for consideration"); Johnny's Oil Co. Eldayha, 978 N.E.2d 86, 94-95 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012) (same);
Weston Forest & Trial Ass'n, v. Fishman, 849 N.E.2d 916, 921-22 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (same);
Kiely v. Raytheon Co., 105 F.3d 734, 736 (1st Cir. 1997) (recognizing detrimental reliance is
substitute for consideration, rendering promise enforceable under traditional contract theory).
" See Sherwin v. Fletcher, 47 N.E. 197, 197-98 (Mass. 1897) (utilizing reliance as
consideration); Cellucci v. Sun Oil Co., 320 N.E.2d 919, 925 (Mass. App. Ct. 1974) (finding relief
needed where there is reliance on a misrepresentation).
10' See Low v. Bouverie [1891] 3 Ch. 82, 101 (L.J. Lindley) (establishing estoppel as an
evidence rule, precluding someone from denying truths of statements previously made).
102 See generally, Moreira v. Citimortgage, Inc., No. 15-13720-LTS, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
121469, at *13-14 (D. Mass. 2016) (differentiating between equitable and promissory estoppel
which were both asserted as independent causes of action); Yarde Metals, Inc. v. New England
Patriots Ltd. P'ship, 834 N.E.2d 1233, 1237-38 (Mass. 2005) (discussing equitable estoppel in
terms of cause of action).
13 See Loranger Constr. Corp. v. E.F. Hauserman Co., 374 N.E.2d 306, 308-09 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1978) ("[Equitable estoppel] differs from promissory estoppel primarily in that equitable
estoppel permits recovery only where there has been reliance upon the misrepresentation of past or
present facts whereas recovery may be had under the theory of promissory estoppel where reliance
has been placed upon statements of future intent"); see also Sullivan v. Chief Justice for Admin.
Mgmt. of Trial Court, 858 N.E.2d 699, 711 (Mass. 2006) (asserting equitable or promissory
estoppel principles in plaintiffs' complaint); Boylston Dev. Grp., Inc., v. 22 Boylston St. Corp.,
591 N.E.2d 157, 163-64 (Mass. 1992) (listing requirements of equitable estoppel); see also
Hortman v. Miamisburg, 852 N.E.2d 716, 718 (Ohio 2006) (distinguishing equitable estoppel from
promissory estoppel.
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promises and actionable regardless of any lack of deceit.'" The view that
estoppel was to be construed narrowly remains, but is no longer mentioned
with some decisions-voicing that the fundamental policy and purpose
behind estoppel is "broad."os
The treatment of promissory estoppel, since Justice Braucher's
contract based proclamation and adoption of Section 90 into Massachusetts
jurisprudence in 1978, remains difficult to pigeon hole or categorize. The
claim has been asserted in various contexts eluding any generalization as to
treatment. There is, however, a measure of unevenness in scope with certain
decisions seeing promissory liability as more expansive under tort-like
notions with others significantly curtailing the doctrine.
106
For instance, in a 1985 decision, Greenstein v. Flatley, the
Appeals Court bestowed a strong tort connotation by virtue of the suggestion
that the making of a promise and failing to inform that the promise may, or
will, not be honored can be "tortious" or "unfair and deceptive" under the
state's consumer protection statute. In Greenstein, a landlord submitted a
lease to a prospective tenant and then was found to have strung him along
for a number of months before repudiating the leasr.' 7 The court held that
the conduct of the landlord "was calculated to misrepresent the true situation
to the [tenant], keep him on a string, and make the [tenant] concludereasonably-that the deal had been made and that only a bureaucratic
formality remained."' The conduct was deemed misleading and thus "[fit]
comfortably 'within at least the penumbra of some common-law, statutory,

.

'" See Calkins v. Wire Hardware Co., 165 N.E. 889, 896-97 (Mass. 1929) (relating salary to
promissory estoppel claims); Looney v. Trimount Theatres, Inc., 184 N.E. 683, 684-85 (Mass.
1933) (explaining situation where fraud not necessary for promissory estoppel claim); see also
Anzalone v. Admin. Office of Trial Court, 932 N.E.2d 774, 785-86 (Mass. 2010) (referencing
detrimental reliance as promissory estoppel and defining promissory estoppel as involving
representation that induces reliance).
105 Poor v. Poor, 409 N.E.2d 758, 762 n.5 (Mass. 1980) ("We have, however, indicated that
the policy considerations underlying the use of estoppel are expansive rather than narrow. 'It is in
the main to accomplish the prevention of results contrary to good conscience and fair dealing that
the doctrine of estoppel has been formulated and taken its place as a part of the law."') (quoting
McLearn v. Hill, 177 N.E. 617, 619 (Mass. 1931); but see Licata v. GGNSC Malden Dexter LLC,
2 N.E.3d 840, 849 (Mass. 2014) ("The law does not regard estoppels with favor, nor extend them
beyond . .. the transactions in which they originate.") (citing Boston & Albany R.R. v. Reardon,
115 N.E. 408, 411 (Mass. 1917)) (Tracy v. Lincoln, 14 N.E. 122, 124 (Mass. 1887));ee generally
Corea v. Bd. of Assessors, 427 N.E.2d 925, 926 (Mass. 1981) (expressing application of
estoppel against government in exercise of its official duties is disfavored). "In Massachusetts, . .
one relies at his peril on representations by a government official concerning legal requirements.
[Citations omitted]. Particularly where misstatements about the effect of applicable rules and
regulations relied upon are oral, reliance on them may not be regarded as reasonable." Harrington
v. Fall River Hous., Auth., 538 N.E.2d 24, 30 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980).
106 474 N.E.2d 1130 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985).
107 See id. at 1131-32 (discussing facts of case).
"o Id. at 1133 (characterizing defendant's conduct).
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or other established concept of unfairness."'"" While the court in Greenstein
stated that the case presented an identifiable application of promissory
estoppel, it concluded that it was not necessary to fit the conduct "into a
precise tort or contract niche" for relief to be appropriate."1 0 The court all but
equated promissory estoppel liability with the liability under the state's
consumer protection statute. This "dangling on a string" tort notion has since
surfaced in other decisions as well.'
By virtually equating promissory estoppel liability with unfair and
deceptive conduct under the consumer protection statute, the doctrine's
reach is significantly expanded beyond contract and even tort. This is
particularly so in that it has long been held that neither negligence nor a claim
for breach of contract, alone, can suffice to meet the level of "unfair and
deceptive conduct" required under the statute.1 12 As such, reliance based
contracts are elevated to a stature imposing more significant liability then
contract based on mutual assent and consideration.
On the other side of the spectrum, there are cases curtailing the
doctrine. In Rhode Island Trust v. Varadian,113 the Supreme Judicial Court,
in overturning a jury's award under promissory estoppel, limited the scope
of the doctrine." 4 The claim for promissory estoppel was made against a
bank for an alleged breach of an oral promise to lend $43.5 million as to a
construction project. The jury answered a slew of special questions
including, inter alia, whether (a) the bank did make the oral promise
intending to induce reliance; (b) there was reasonable reliance upon that oral
promise; and (c) the claimants knew that the bank intended to be bound to
'`

Id. (quoting PMP Assocs., Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 321 N.E.2d 915, 917 (Mass.

1975)).
I'
See id. at 1133 (broadening application of promissory estoppel).
.. See Dixon v. Wells Fargo Bank, 798 F. Supp. 2d 336, 344 (D. Mass. 2011) ("[t]ypically,
where Massachusetts courts have applied the doctrine of promissory estoppel to enforce an
otherwise unenforceable promise, 'there has been a pattern of conduct by one side which has
dangled the other side on a string."') (quoting Pappas Indus. Parks, Inc. v. Psarros, 511 N.E.2d 621,
622 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987)); see also Mass. Eye & Ear Infirmary v. QLT Phototherapeutics,
Inc., 552 F.3d 47, 69-70 (1st Cir. 2009) (explaining that "'stringing along' a counterparty to induce
detrimental reliance can constitute a Chapter 93A violation."). The court also observes that "[o]ther
Massachusetts cases ... recognize a need to police negotiations-even those among relatively
sophisticated parties-to ensure that they are not unfair or deceptive." Id at 70; see also Full
Spectrum Software, Inc. v. Forte Automation Sys., Inc., 858 F.3d 666, 674 (1st Cir. 2017) ("one
business's stringing along of another to the other's detriment can satisfy [Chapter 93A, § 11]").
112 See Woods v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 733 F.3d 349, 358 (1st Cir. 2013) (addressing 93A
claim under section nine, stating mere breach of contract does not warrant 93A relief); see
Alexander v. Shoopak, 15-P-701, 2016 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 230, at *15 (Mass. App. Ct.
Mar. 3, 2016) ("We have consistently held that a mere breach of contract without more does not
violate G.L. c. 93A."). Furthermore, "a negligent act, standing alone, does not give rise to a
violation under G.L. c. 93A." Shoopak, 2016 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 230, at *15.
"
647 N.E 2d 1174 (Mass. 1995).
114 See id. at 1178-79 (applying promissory estoppel analysis to facts of case)
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the loan only by an agreement in writing."I5 Despite the jury's finding of an
intention to induce reliance and resulting reasonable reliance, the court held
there could be no recovery given the finding that the claimants understood
the bank's intention not to be legally bound.1 16 Since the claimants were
aware that the bank did not intend to be bound absent a writing governing
the loan transaction, they could not have reasonably relied on the oral
promise as a matter of law.117
Varadian significantly curtailed the reach of the doctrine in the
commercial setting. It required all the elements of a contract except for
bargained for consideration"' and, as such, made clear that the promise must
be "unambiguous" equating to a "commitment" or "'promise' in the
contractual sense."ll 9 The promise must demonstrate "an intention to act or
refrain from acting in a specified way, so as to justify a promisee in
understanding that a commitment has been made."' 2 0 Accordingly, the
claimants could not have reasonably understood the bank's statements as a
"promise" in the sense of a "commitment" given the understanding and
knowledge that the bank did not intend to be bound absent an agreed upon
writing. 121

Varadian represents a substantial limitation in that promissory
estoppel liability cannot be found unless the promisor manifests an intention
to be legally bound by something other than a promise intended to induce
reliance and which does induce reliance.1 22 Liability is thus arguably limited
to those instances in which the promisor expressly indicates an intention to
be legally bound by the promise beyond the intentional reliance inducing
promise. This is a substantial change from Section 90 which makes no
reference of any requirement that the promisor manifest an intention to be
bound or requiring such a showing through evidence other than the promise
and reliance.
The fundamental areas of substantive dispute remain over what is a
sufficient promise and reasonable reliance. A representation of future, rather
than present intention will not preclude recovery, so long as the promisor's

115 See id. at 1175-76 (establishing specific questions on theory of promissory estoppel upon
which judge instructed jury).
116 See id. at 1179 (concluding that promise in contractual sense had been made).
117 See id. (looking at evidence most favorable to defendants).
118 See Varadian, 647 N.E.2d at 1179 (noting reliance is equivalent to contract tort).
1 See id.; see also Buker v. Nat'l Mgmt. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 1299, 1304 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983)
(holding reliance on vague promise is unreasonable); Congregation Kadimah Toras-Moshe v.
DeLeo, 540 N.E.2d 691, 693 (Mass. 1989) ("A hope or expectation, even though well founded, is
not equivalent to either legal detriment or reliance.").
120 Varadian, 647 N.E.2d at 1179 (quoting Restatement (Second) Of Contracts § 2 (1981)).
121 See id at 1178 (explaining plaintiff estopped to avoid agreement).
122 See id. (focusing on reasonableness of promise).
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expectation to be legally bound is clear. 123 Reasonableness, in turn, requires
consideration of the sophistication of the parties 124 and the existence or
contemplation of controlling or contradictory documents or other
formalities. 125 While generally a question for the fact finder, 12 6 it is many
times found as a matter of law by the court. 12 7
To the extent case law does reference injustice, it fails to provide any
meaningful explanation as to its substance and purpose with, at most, the
decisions simply reciting, in rote fashion, that "[p]romissory estoppel is an
equitable doctrine, and judges are to apply it flexibly to avoid injustice." 28
In the limited cases that have touched on the element, some have found
dispositive the availability of money damages, 12 9 a countervailing policy
121 See Sullivan v. Chief Justice for Admin. & Mgmt. of the Trial Court, 858 N.E.2d
699, 711,

722 n.9 (Mass. 2006) (quoting Boylston Dev. Grp., Inc. v. 22 Boylston St. Corp., 591 N.E.2d 157,
165 n.17 (Mass. 1992)).
124 See Kennedy v. Josephthal & Co., Inc., 814 F.2d 798, 804 (1st Cir. 1987) (discussing
factors used by courts in examining whether reliance or misrepresentation is justified); Cataldo
Ambulance Serv. V. Chelsea, 688 N.E.2d 959, 962 (Mass. 1998) (examining when reasonable
reliance can be question of law especially where parties are sophisticates).
125 See Trifiro v. New York Life Ins. Co., 845 F.2d 30, 33-34 (1st Cir. 1988) ("The conflicting
content of [the defendant's] oral statement with [his] written statement ... should have placed [the
plaintiff] on notice that he should not rely on either statement."); Kuwaiti Danish Comput. Co. v.
Digital Equip., Corp., 781 N.E.2d 787, 795 (Mass. 2003) ("Reliance on any statement or conduct ...
was unreasonable as a matter of law because it conflicted with the qualifying language [in a written
document].").
126 See Danielczuk v. Ferioli, 388 N.E.2d 724, 725 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979) ("The assertion of
an estoppel raises factual questions of reliance and reasonableness. . . that should have been left for
resolution at trial."); McMahon v. Digital Equip. Corp., 162 F.3d 25, 39 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding
recovery not possible when plaintiff chooses to believe on statement more appealing than other.);
Trent Partners & Assocs., Inc. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 120 F. Supp. 2d 84, 104-05 (D. Mass. 1999)
("as a matter of law. . ..an oral statement made in the face of a written contract was not a 'promise'
or 'commitment' for promissory estoppel purposes because the existence of a written contract
demonstrated the parties intention that it would govern their intricate transaction.").
127 See Harrington v. Fall River Hous. Auth., 538 N.E.2d 24, 30 (overturning finding of
reasonable reliance and holding no such reliance as matter of law). The court further held that
plaintiffs ought to have known of HUD's regulations which were otherwise published and publicly
available, and one relies at his own peril on representations by government official concerning legal
requirements. See id See also Cataldo, 688 N.E.2d at 962 ("The question whether a party's
reliance on a promise by another is reasonable is often a question of fact, but in an appropriate case
can present an issue of law"); Farsheedv. Syed, 10 N.E.3d 672 (Mass. App. Ct. 2014) (finding
reliance unreasonable as matter of law).
128 Barrie-Chivian v. Lepler, 34 N.E.2d 769, 772 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015) (citing Harrington v.
Fall River Hous. Auth., 538 N.E.2d 24. 29 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989)); Brown v. One West Bank, 13
N.E. 3d 1027 (Mass. App. Ct. 2014); see also Steinke v. Sungard Fin. Sys., 121 F.3d 763, 776 (1st
Cir. 1997) ("[c]ourts typically invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel when the formal
requirements of contract formation are absentand when enforcing the promise would serve the
interests ofjustice").
129 See Clawson v. Clawson, 15-P-58, 2016 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1000, at *14-15 (Mass.
App. Ct. Oct. 19, 2016) (rejecting reliance on promissory estoppel on oral lease agreement because
adequate remedy at law existed); see also Knowlton v. Swampscott, 181 N.E. 849, 851 (Mass.
1932) ("A party cannot come into equity to secure relief open to him at law.").
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requiring non-enforcement,13 0 or that under the facts enforcement of the
promise would not provide any relief.' 3 1
The overwhelming majority of cases involving promissory estoppel
are now commercial. The intra-familial and charitable subscription or
donation cases, which first spawned the initial promulgation of Section 90,
are virtually non-existent remnants of history. 13 2 Promissory estoppel is
otherwise commonly asserted with a breach of contract claim with it oftrepeated that there can be no promissory estoppel liability where there is an
enforceable or applicable contract.133 Indeed, the subordination of Section 90
and promissory liability to a formal contract in a commercial setting reflects
the preference (both among sophisticated businessmen and the judiciary) of
formal contract in creating an enforceable obligation thus supporting a
limiting principle function of the avoidance of injustice element. 134
B. MassachusettsEmpiricalData
1. Trial Courts
Since Massachusetts' adoption of promissory estoppel in 1978 in
Loranger, promissory estoppel has been raised or mentioned in numerous
decisions. The resulting empirical data' 35 is as follows:
MA Superior Court

Federal District Court (MA)

Motion to Dismiss

30

58

Prevailed on PE Claim

15

20

Did Not Prevail on PE Claim

15

38

Promise Insufficient

6

12

130 See cases cited infra notes 150-53.
131 See Doe v. W. N.E. U., 228 F. Supp. 3d 154, 182 (D. Mass. 2016) ("Plaintiffs failure to

plausibly claim that the university's decision was arbitrary or capricious or made in bad faith bars
relief under the 'basic fairness' standard."); see also, JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO,
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 6-1, 273 (3d ed. 1987) ("[I]njury is what is required because without
injury there would be no injustice in not enforcing the promise.").
132 See Delong, supra note 42, at 972 (noting charitable donation and other pre-cursor cases
to Section 90 now relegated to case studies).
133 See Malden Police Patrolman's Ass'n. v. Malden, 82 N.E.3d 1055, 1064 (Mass. App. Ct.
2017) ("Where an enforceable contract exists, however, a claim for promissory estoppel will not
lie.").
134 See Delong, supra note 42 at 979 ("The subordination of promissory estoppel to formal,
bargain contract reflects the preference of commercial promisors and promisees for certainty and
flexibility.").
' The cases were identified through the Westlaw database and spanned from 1978 to
December 1, 2017.
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3

8

Both Promise/Reliance

1

12

Lack of Authority

2

0

Alt. Remedy

2

6

Public Policy

3

5

No Harm

0

4

No Injustice

0

1

Summary Judgment

77

53

Prevailed

17

10

Reliance Insufficient

Motion for

Did Not Prevail

60

43

Promise Insufficient

17

5

Reliance Insufficient

17

8

Both Promise/Reliance

14

20

Lack of Authority

6

0

Alt. Remedy

6

5

Public Policy

1

2

No Harm

2

3

Injustice Not Mentioned

92

77

Not Applied

23

32

Injustice Mentioned/Applied

4

3

of Damages

1

2

Expectation

0

0

Reliance

1

2

Restitution

2

0

Injustice Mentioned

Discussed Measure

The survey reveals that a significant percentage of promissory
estoppel claims fail to survive dispositive motions (i.e. motion to dismiss
and/or summary judgment). As to the Massachusetts Superior Court
decisions examined, 50% of the cases addressing promissory estoppel claims
on a motion to dismiss were found insufficient to proceed, while over 80%
of summary judgment decisions found the promissory estoppel claim
insufficient.136 The lack of a sufficient promise and reasonable reliance were
the predominant basis for finding the claim insufficient with both promise
and reliance about equal in reference. The lack of a sufficient promise was
the justification in 23 out of 107 total Superior Court decisions, while lack
of reasonable reliance was found in 20 out of the 107 total decisions with 15
"' It is likely that a fair number of decisions denying summary judgment in an action
including a claim for promissory estoppel claim are not reported in the Westlaw database.

26

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XXIII

decisions referencing both as the dispositive failure. As to post-jury trial
motions or jury waived findings, promissory estoppel claims were found to
have prevailed 50% (6/12) with the lack of a sufficient promise, lack of
reasonable reliance, and the availability of alternative remedy as the
prevailing justifications for denial of the claim.
The "avoidance of injustice" was not mentioned or listed as an
element in 92 of the 119 total decisions surveyed. 23 of the 119 decisions
reviewed mentioned avoidance of injustice with no application while only 4
of the 119 decisions both mentioning and applying the avoidance of injustice
element.
The survey of decisions of the Federal District Court of
Massachusetts revealed similar findings. Over 75% of all reported decisions
addressing a promissory estoppel claim on a motion to dismiss or at summary
judgment found the estoppel claim insufficient. Both promise and reliance
were, again, about equal as the basis for rejecting the claim with 32 out of 80
decisions rejecting the claim based on the inadequacy of both elements.
Over 70% of the total decisions surveyed (119) made no mention or
recitation of avoidance of injustice as a required element, in addition to 30
of the 119 decisions mentioning or listing the "avoidance of injustice" as a
required element, but not addressing it. Only 3 of the 119 decisions both
mentioned and applied the "avoidance of injustice" element at least to some
degree.13 7 Only two reported decisions contained any discussion of the
measure of damages.1 38
2. Appellate Courts
Appeals Court

TOTAL

15

66

99

4

18

25

First

Supreme

Circuit

Judicial Court

Total

18

Prevailed

3

Jury

3

8

11

Court

1

10

11

137 See Gozzo v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 16-10499-LTS, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40537, at *12
(D. Mass. Mar. 21, 2017) (finding no injustice related to asserted promise that sale on foreclosure
would take place earlier); see also Pitts v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC., No. 13-11597-RWZ, 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184512, at *10-11 (D. Mass. June 18, 2015) (noting if sufficient promise and
reasonable reliance found, no injustice because plaintiff would default anyway); White v. Bell Atil.
Yellow Pages, No. 01-10157-DPW, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4720, at *30-31 (D. Mass. Mar. 23,
2004) (enforcing promise would not yield relief because refusing to enforce promise does not
equate injustice).
131 See Palandjian v. Pahlavi, 614 F. Supp. 1569, 1581 (D. Mass. 1995) (examining recovery
on reasonable reliance); Dixon v. Wells Fargo Bank, 798 F. Supp. 2d 336, 347 (D. Mass. 2011)
(discussing measure of damages).
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15

11

49

74

7

3

17

26

9

4

26

39

1

0

2

3

0

0

2

2

0

4

4

8

Court

10

27

37

Jury

1

0

1

11

11

62

82

5

4

55

62

And Applied

2

1

10

13

Expectation

3

1

1

5

Reliance

0

1

0

1

Restitution

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Insufficient Promise
Insufficient Reliance
No Authority
Adequate Remedy
Public Policy

Injustice Not
Mentioned
Injustice Mentioned
But Not Applied
Injustice Mentioned

Specific Performance

The appellate court survey demonstrates that over 75% of all cases
addressing a promissory estoppel claim on appeal were found to be
insufficient. A lack of reasonable or detrimental reliance was found the
primary reason for the failure of the claim constituting the reason for
invalidity 52% of the time, while lack of sufficient promise was the
justification 39% of the time. Less frequent grounds of denial included the
existence of an adequate remedy and public policy.13 9 Examples of policy
considerations considered in the injustice inquiry include the
unenforceability of an oral promise pertaining to marital property rights-as
Massachusetts has never recognized property rights in non-marital partners
absent express written agreement;1 40 an implicit promise to not be forced to

19 See Clawson v. Clawson, 15-P-58, 2016 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1000, at *14 (Mass.
App. Ct. Oct. 19, 2016) (refusing to enforce promise under promissory estoppel as there existed
adequate remedy at law); Capazzoli v. Holtwasser, 490 N.E.2d 420,422 (Mass. 1986) (recognizing
promise to abandon marriage violates public policy and is unenforceable).
140 See Northrup v. Brigham, 826 N.E. 2d 239, 244 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (finding nonmarital partner not entitled to property rights).
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take early retirement as a result of being asked to obtain federal documents
in violation of federal law; 14 1 an oral promise to gift to be enforced against
an estate; 142 and long-standing policy precluding application of estoppel to
bind the government to contract of employment. 143
The need for an "unambiguous" promise in the nature of a
"commitment" remains a formidable obstacle, 1" as does the asserted
reliance on verbal statements in the face of actual or intended documentation
or agreements.1 45 To the extent the promise is "ambiguous" and not a
"commitment," but rather an expression of hope, expectation, vagueness, or
indefiniteness, Massachusetts courts, as a matter of law, have refused to find
a viable claim. 146 Claims have been found deficient where there is a lack of

See Kiely v. Raytheon Co., 105 F.3d 734, 735-36 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding plaintiffs
promissory estoppel claim unenforceable); see also Gonsalves v. Nissan Motor Corp., 58 P.3d
1196, 1213 (Haw. 2002) (finding promise of continued employment was not enforceable based
on promissory estoppel).
142 See Congregation Kadimah Toras-Moshe v. DeLeo, 540 N.E. 2d 691, 693 (Mass. 1989)
(finding promise sufficient for promissory estoppel against estate).
See Dagastino v. Commissioner of Correction, 754 N.E. 2d 150, 153-54 (Mass. App. Ct.
"
2001) ("Those who deal with the Government are expected to know the law and may not rely on
the conduct of Government agents contrary to law .... "); see also Doherty v. Bartlett, 81 F.2d 920,
925 (1st Cir. 1936) ("[T]he doctrine of estoppel ... has no application to a contract ... which is void
because it violates ... the dictates of public policy."') (quoting Colby v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 117
P. 913, 918 (Cal. 1911)).
'" See generally Rhode Island Hosp. Tr. Nat'l Bank v. Varadian, 647 N.E.2d 1174, 1179
(Mass. 1995) ( "[a]n essential element under the promissory estoppel theory is that there be an
unambiguous promise and that the party to whom the promise is made reasonable relied on the
representation."); Doe v. W. N. E. U., 228 F. Supp. 3d 154, (D. Mass. 2016) (discussing
applicability of promissory estoppel doctrine), rev'd, 228 F. Supp. 3d 154 (D. Mass. 2017); see
also Upton v. JWP Businessland, 682 N.E.2d 1357, 1360 (Mass. 1997) (stating promise must be
unambiguous); Day v. Staples, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 2d 336, 348 (D. Mass. 2008) (same).
145 See Varadian, 647 N.E.2d at 1179; Trent Partners & Assocs., Inc. v. Digital Equip. Co.,
120 F. Supp. 2d 84, 104-05 (D. Mass. 1999) (finding "oral statement made in the face of a written
contract was not a 'promise' or 'commitment' for promissory estoppel purposes because the
existence of a written contract demonstrated the parties intention that it would govern their intricate
transaction."); see also Neves v. Neves, 15-P-99, 2017 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 388, at *68(Mass. App. Ct. Apr. 14, 2017) (allowing JNOV motion as insufficient promise and trial court
properly rejected effort to recast fiduciary breach).
146 See, e.g., Armstrong v. Rohi & Haas Co., 349 F. Supp. 2d 71, 83 (D. Mass. 2004)
("[P]romise to give plaintiffs 'all the work they could handle' is too vague and indefinite to be
enforced as a contract."); Buker v. Nat'l Mgmt., 448 N.E.2d 1299, 1303 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983)
(holding the statement " [we will] work things out" too vague to be actionable); Rogartkin v.
Raliegh Am. Inc., 69 F. Supp. 2d 294 n. 18 (D. Mass. 2014) (general statements of optimism like
"greatly increased support," "green light," and "golden life" too vague); Primarque Products Co.,
Inc. v. William W. & Witt's Prods. Co., No. 15-30067-TSH, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144197, at *1
(D. Mass. Oct. 18, 2016); Engler v. C.R. Bard, Inc., No. 94-10602-RCL, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23124, at *18 (D. Mass. Nov. 20, 1997) (finding no promissory estoppel when statements "merely
[give] rise to a hope or expectation on the part of the promise.") (quoting Kiely v. Raytheon Co.,
914 F. Supp. 708, 712 (D. Mass. 1996)); Moore v. Laz-Z-Boy, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 2d 136, 142 (D.
Mass. 2009) (stating promise must be sufficiently definite and certain in its terms). See generally
141
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causative relationship to the promise; 147 lack of authority; 148 lack of any
measurable detriment; 14 9 and/or an available alternative remedy.5 o No
Massachusetts decision has addressed whether "silence" can be a basis for
detrimental reliances1 with the bulk (albeit not complete unanimity) of the
case law declaring that the "promise" meet all the requirements of a
contractual offer. 15 2 Despite the substantial case law finding either or both of
the elements of promise and reasonable reliance insufficient as a matter of
law, Courts have stated, particularly as to reliance, that it is usually a decision
for the fact-finder.153 Courts have also referenced that liability for promissory
estoppel is appropriate where "there has been a pattern of conduct by one
Hall v. Horizon House Microwave, Inc., 506 N. E.2d 178, 184 (Mass. 1987) ("[i]nchoate
negotiations are no better basis for reliance than for an action in the purported contract as such.").
147 See Kuwaiti Danish Comput. Co. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 781 N.E. 2d 787,
796 (Mass.
2003) (finding lack of causative relationship between representation and asserted harm).
148 See Mailloux v. Littleton, 473 F. Supp. 2d 177, 186 (D. Mass. 2007) (finding
fire chiefs
lack of authority to make promise negated plaintiffs reliance on promise).
149 See Suominen v. Goodman Indus. Equities Mgmt. Grp., 941 N.E.2d 694, 702 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2011) (holding employee's act in continuing employment, alone, insufficient to establish
detriment as matter of law); see also Gould v. N.Y. Mellon, 123 F. Supp. 3d 197, 204 (D. Mass.
2015) (holding mortgagor and husband failed to allege detriment from reliance on alleged
representation); Pappas Indus. Parks, Inc. v. Psarros, 511 N.E. 2d 621, 623 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987)
(declining to apply estoppel where plaintiff took no detrimental steps before withdrawing from
alleged agreement).
Iso See Moore v. Laz-E-Boy, No. 07-CV-10708-RGS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42735, at *10
n.6 (D. Mass. May, 30, 2008) ("[e]quitable remedies, for example (unjust enrichment, promissory
estoppel), are not available where a plaintiff has a remedy at law (contract).); Lopes v.
Commonwealth, 811 N.E.2d 501, 508 (Mass. 2004) (same); Santagate v. Tower, 833 N.E.2d 171,
175-76(Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (same).
s' See, e.g., Sperry Rand Corp. v. Hill, 356 F.2d 181, 187 (1st Cir. 1966) (holding that
defendant justifiably relied on plaintiffs unjustifiable silence); Nabisco, Inc. v. Ellison, No. 941722, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16041, at *6-7 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 8, 1994) (discussing conflicting
authority on whether action for promissory estoppel may be based on silence); Tracy v. Lincoln,
14 N.E. 122, 123 (Mass. 1887) (finding plaintiffs silence estopped her from later claiming
ownership against mortgagee); D'Almeida v. Boston M. R. R., 113 N.E 187, 189 (Mass. 1916)
(noting estoppel by silence well established).
152 CompareKiely v. Raytheon, 914 F. Supp. 708, 712 (D. Mass. 1996) ("the putative promise
must not only be definitive and certain in its terms, but also must be one that the promisor expecting
to be legally bound by it, intends as a firm commitment."), aff'd, 105 F.3d 734 (1st Cir. 1997);
Cataldo Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. Chelsea, 688 N.E.2d 959, 963 n. 6 (Mass. 1998) (noting promise
must be interchangeable with offer "in the sense of a commitment"), with Dixon v. Wells Fargo
Banks, 798 F. Supp 2d. 336, 343-44 (D. Mass. 2011) ("requirement that the promise giving rise to
the cause of action must be so comprehensive in scope as to meet the requirements of an offer that
would ripen into a contract if accepted by the promisee.") (quoting Hoffman Red Owl Stores, Inc.,
133 N.W.2d 267, 275 (Wis. 1965).
15
See Suominen v. Goodman Indus. Equities Mgmt. Grp., 941 N.E.2d 694, 702 n.12 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2011) ("forbearance of a colorable legal claim alone can make out 'legal detriment'
without having to demonstrate the ultimate viability of such a claim."). Furthermore, the
Suominen court found that, for purposes of promissory estoppel, "whether reliance was
reasonable is more typically treated as a question of fact to be resolved by the jury." Suominen,
941 N.E.2d at 703 n. 14 (citing Cannon v. Cannon, 868 N.E.2d 636, 644 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007)
(reversing dismissal of promissory estoppel claim)).
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side that has dangled the other side on a string."S4 The decisions otherwise
reflect the need to protect the cautionary and channeling function as to form
because courts readily find un-actionable asserted reliance on verbal
statements where there is contrary written documentation or statement, or
where there is contradictory information."5 s
The survey also confirms the scant reference or discussion of
"avoidance of injustice." It was, in fact, not even mentioned in over 84% of
all cases. It is otherwise mentioned and applied, at least to some degree, in
only 13% of the total cases. Indeed, a vast majority of decisions, particularly
from the Appeals Court, do not even mention the injustice component at
all. 156

No Massachusetts decision has addressed the applicable measure of
damages. Massachusetts cases reveal awards under both reliance and
15
expectation measures without much discussion as to either. ' Expectation
appears to be the presumptive measure although certain federal district court
decisions, applying Massachusetts law, have found reliance to be more
appropriate.

154 See Dixon, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 343 (citing Pappas Indus. Parks, Inc. v. Psarros, 511 N.E.
2d 621 (1987) and cases cited); see also Neves v. Neves, 15-P-99, 2017 Mass. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 388, at *12 (Mass. App. Ct. Apr. 14, 2017) ("Frequently, when [promissory estoppel] has
been applied, there has been a pattern of conduct by one side which has dangled the other side on
a string.").
...See Marram v. Kobrick Offshore Fund, Ltd., 809 N.E.2d 1017, 1031 ("a plaintiffs reliance
on oral statements in light of contrary written statements is unreasonable as a matter of law.");
Saade v. Pannymac Loan Service, LLC., No. 15-CV-12275-IT, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144200, at
*14 (D. Mass. Oct. 17, 2016) (finding promissory estoppel involving alleged promise as to loan
modification failed as matter of law); Trifiro v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 845 F. 2d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 1988)
("[w]hen a person acts in a way contrary to his own acknowledged understanding of the facts, his
act must be deemed unreasonable as a matter of law.").
156 See Brown v. Marone, 1 1-P-916, 2012 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 460, at *1 (Mass. App.
Ct. Apr. 11, 2012) (noting no mention of injustice component); see also Rooney v. Paul D. Osborne
Desk Co., Inc., 645 N.E.2d 50, 51 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995) ("[Promissory estoppel] consists simply
of a promise that becomes enforceable because of the promisee's reasonable and detrimental
reliance."); Suominen, 941 N.E.2d at 700-01 (analyzing defendant's appeal with no mention of
injustice).
157 See Renovator's Supply, Inc. v. Sovereign Bank, 892 N.E.2d 777, (Mass. App. Ct. 2008)
(finding bank equitably stopped from terminating line of credit without reasonable notice); see also
Rooney, 645 N.E.2d at 53 (finding that based on promissory estoppel employee was entitled to
value of shares after employee had committed herself in reliance on promise); see also Rhode Island
Hosp. Tr. Nat'l Bank v. Varadian, 647 N.E.2d 1174, 1177 (Mass. 1995) (awarding reliance and
mitigation damages in promissory estoppel claim for oral promise to provide $43,500,000 loan);.
See generally, Situation Mgmt.Sys. v. Malouf, Inc. 724 N.E.2d 699,703 (Mass. 2000) (stating usual
rule for breach of contract is expectation).
"5 See Dixon, 798 F. Supp. 2d 336 (holding reliance damages applied as to oral modification
of contract); Palandjian v. Pahlavi, 614 F. Supp. 1569, 1581 (D. Mass. 1995) (holding reliance
measure more appropriate given primacy of the reliance interest).
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C. The Avoidance ofInjustice
Although Section 90's formulation of promissory estoppel requires
a showing that "injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise," the reference has been labeled as "enigmatic" as well as
"disquiet[ing]," 5' 9given the limited guidance as to its meaning and
application.160 Even Williston noted the "leeway" left by the use of
"injustice," ruminating that "in regard to [Section 90], if you bind up too
closely with familiar mathematical rules as to the law of consideration, the
boiler will burst." 61 Under one view, "'the avoidance of injustice"' element
is all that prevents Section 90 from making all relied upon commercial
promises enforceable, thereby eliminating mere performance reliance from
the commercial world."1 62
The overall lack of case law addressing, in any meaningful way, the
avoidance of injustice element is striking. 163 The primary focus remains on
only promise and reliance with little mention of "injustice" or its equitable
origin and purpose. Indeed, it may reflect an implicit understanding or rote
acceptance that the element has no independent significance. It likewise may
reflect resistance and dislike for amorphous standards such as "avoidance of
injustice" or "injustice," as well as the importance of freedom of contract.
Regardless, the role and purpose of "injustice" seems to have been forgotten,
lost, or ignored.
One fundamental discord that emerges is whether avoidance of
injustice is a separate independent element or one of redundancy and
underlying purpose. This includes the struggle over whether avoidance of
1' Harvey, infra note 230, at 678 (stating "the use of 'justice' as a crucial datum in the
expression of rule or doctrine, a professional concern for certainty and predictability inevitably
carries disquiet.").
10 See Alden, supra note 6, at 676 n. 66 (citing Samuel Williston, Discussion of Tentative
Draft, ContractsRestatement No. 2, 4 AM. LAW INST. PROC. APP. 61, 90 (1926) (remarks of Prof.
Williston, reporter)) (stating "injustice" terms means "something indefinite"); see also Boyer, supra
note 10, at 484 (noting term "injustice" is "indefinite" and would be "difficult to establish criteria");
Orit Gan, The JusticeElement ofPromissoryEstoppel, 89 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 55, 60 (2015) (noting
injustice element has garnered little attention from courts); Jimenez, supra note 17, at 672 (finding
in survey of cases on promissory estoppel "few judges speak in terms of 'equity' or 'justice');
Midwest Energy, Inc. Orion Food Sys. Inc., 14 S.W. 3d 154, 161 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (noting
avoidance of injustice "is not cast with precision").
161 Sidney DeLong, The New Requirement ofEnforcement Reliance in Commercial
PromissoryEstoppel: Section 90 as Catch-22, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 943, 963 (1997) (quoting
Discussion of the Tentative Draft of Cor cts Restatement No. 2, 4 AM. LAW INST. PROC APP.
61, 86 (1926).
162 See id. at 958.
163 Complicating the issue is that the text of Section 90 does not include any express
reference to "reasonable reliance" only "action or forbearance," which the promisor reasonably
should foresee. As such, these phrases provide fodder that the reasonableness of the reliance
falls within the "injustice" inquiry.
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injustice is to ensure liability is limited to only extraordinary or exceptional
circumstances or rather a tool for a more robust remedy and redistribution.
There likewise remains the issue of whether the element is one for the court
or jury. These issues are reviewed below.
1. Judge or Jury
No reported Massachusetts appellate case has yet to directly address
whether a claimant has a right to ajury trial as to a promissory estoppel claim
or, alternatively, whether such a right includes the avoidance of injustice
element. 164 The case law demonstrates that promissory estoppel has been
165
tried both before ajury as well as jury waived with no mention of the issue.
Where the suit is "between two or more persons" or the matter is a
"controvers[y] concerning property," Article 15 of the Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights1 6 6 accords a jury trial "except in cases in which it has
heretofore been otherwise used and practiced." This exception "sought to
retain the ordinary forms and administration of the English common law
(with which they were most familiar), while allowing future generations to
create new forms of actions and proceedings which, for practical reasons,
might not require, or be appropriate for, decision by a jury." 167 This inquiry
requires consideration of whether the cause of action in question is
"analogous" to some form of claim previously recognized at common law as
opposed to being "a wholly new cause of action," and whether the remedies
sought are "predominantly legal" as opposed to "equitable." t 6 'As a result of
" There was a vague intimation that a promissory estoppel claim was for the jury in Simon v.
Simon, 625 N.E.2d 564, 568-69 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994), but the legal issue of whether or not the
claim carries a right to a jury trial does not appear to have been raised. Id. A 1993 Federal District
Court decision summarily held that a right to a jury trial applied to a promissory estoppel claim
under Massachusetts law. See Charlton Memorial Hosp. v. Foxboro Co., 818 F. Supp. 456, 460
(D. Mass. 1993) ("plaintiff remains entitled to ajury trial for his claim of promissory estoppel .... ").
"' See Maja Hosp. Corp. v. Central One Fed. Credit Union, 16-P-644, 2017 Mass. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 668, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct. June 21, 2017) (trying promissory estoppel claim before
jury without objection together with misrepresentation claims); see also Simon v. Simon, 625
N.E.2d 564, 568-69 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (intimating right to jury trial attaches to promissory
estoppel claim); Meng v. Boston University, 91-6655-G, 1995 Mass. Super. LEXIS 248, at *1
(Mass. Sup. Ct. June 27, 1995), rev'd693 N.E.2d 183 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998) (promissory estoppel
claim submitted to the jury without discussion).
166 MASS. CONST. Pt. 1, art. XV (1780) provides: "In all controversies concerning property,
and in all suits between two or more persons, except in cases in which it has heretofore been other
ways used and practised, the parties have a right to a trial by jury; and this method of procedure
shall be held sacred.
167 Commonwealth v. Mongardi, 522 N.E.2d 984, 987 (Mass. App. Ct. 1988) (citing Parker v.
Simpson, 62 N.E. 401, 407-11 (Mass. 1902)).
' See Dalis v. Buyer Advert., Inc., 636 N.E.2d 212, 216 (Mass. 1994) (discussing right to
trial byjury). See also Department of Revenue v. Jarvenpaa, 534 N.E.2d 286,292-93 (Mass. 1989)
(Legislature cannot take jury right way through procedure change that renders claim equitable).
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this exception, the right to a jury does not apply to cases which traditionally
would have fallen within the jurisdiction of a court of equity. 16 9
The application of this test to promissory estoppel is not particularly
straightforward.17 1 Promissory estoppel, in its present form, did not exist as
of 1780, yet it is a direct descendant of equitable estoppel which was a
principle of equity with reliance, in turn, a long-time basis for finding
contractual consideration.171 When used as a bar to prevent reliance on such
impediments as Statute of Frauds, the doctrine is acutely analogous to
equitable estoppel and more closely a creature of equity. When used as an
affirmative action seeking enforcement of a promise for money damages, the
issue is more difficult but the principle's equitable nature arguably
remains.17 2 Money damages are only realized upon the equitable
determination that the promise is binding. Promissory estoppel's
fundamental element of reasonable or good faith reliance is of equitable
origins. It can be argued that regardless of whether the claim includes a
request for damages or enforcement of an un-bargained for contract, its
nature and character is one of honest good faith and reasonable reliance
which was a pillar underlying equity cases at the time of the Constitution's
adoption.17 3 The equitable nature and origin of promissory estoppel is further
All rights to a jury trial stem from Article 15 of the Declaration of Rights which provides a greater
right to jury trial than that provided for by the Seventh Amendment under the Federal Constitution
as to new actions (i.e., arising after 1780). As to such "new actions," there is a presumption of a
right to jury trial as the "right attaches to all new causes of action whatever their nature unless the
relief permitted is other than penal and could have been granted by a Massachusetts court of equity."
In Re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 712 F. Supp. 994, 1010 n. 10 (D. Mass. 1989).
169 See Dalis, 636 N.E.2d at 214 (deciding if there is a right to jury trial in case); Donaldson v.
Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 197 N.E.2d 671, 674 (Mass. 1964) (noting this case is not one which
would have been triable for jury in 1780). Further, recasting as equitable a remedy for which a
right to jury trial existed at common law does not eradicate that right. See Dalis, 636 N.E.2d at
214-15.
170 See Sedghi v. PatchLink Corp., 823 F.Supp.2d 298, 302 (D. Md. 2011) (stating promissory
estoppel defies easy classification for determining whether it carries right to jury trial); Nimrod
Mktg. (Overseas), Ltd. v. Texas Energy Inv. Corp., 769 F. 2d 1076, 1078-79 (5th Cir. 1985)
(finding no jury trial right on promissory estoppel under Seventh Amendment as equitable in
nature); Merex A.G. v Fairchild Weston Sys., Inc., 29 F.3d 821, 824-26 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding
promissory estoppel's use in response to defense of statute of frauds was equitable.). The court
further found that as such, there was no right to jury trial, implying form of promissory estoppel in
section 90 of Restatement conferred right to jury trial. See Merex A.G., 29 F.3d at 824.
171 See 3 JOHN N. POMEROY, Equity Jurisprudence § 802 (Spencer W. Symons 5th ed. 1941)
("The doctrine of equitable estoppel is pre-eminently the creature of equity."); Hopkins v.
Kedzierski, 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d 551, 557-59 (Cal. App. 2014) (finding no right to jury trial); see also
Holmes, supra note 4, at 48 ("[T]he root basis of the doctrine is equity").
172 See, Tae Yon Kim v. Dean, 135 P.3d 978, 982 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (finding no right to
jury trial on promissory estoppel claim notwithstanding request for monetary damages); Brooks v.
Hollaar, 297 P.3d 125, 129-30 (Alaska 2013) (discussing right to jury trial applied to promissory
estoppel claim where monetary damages sought).
173 See Merex A.G., 29 F. 3d at 825 (holding detrimental reliance has "legal roots" in assumpsit
but doctrine as whole remains equitable); see also A-C Co., Inc. v. Sec. Pac. Nat'l. Bank, 219 Cal.
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buttressed by the requirement that the promise underlying promissory
estoppel is to be enforced only to the extent to prevent injustice with any
remedy also determined "in the interest ofjustice:" Since the claim does not
arguably present any quantifiable measure of damages, but requires a
balancing of equities, it falls within the traditional province of an equity
court. 17 4 A number of courts, including some applying Massachusetts law,
7
reference promissory estoppel as an equitable claim.s
1
There is a substantial counter-argument that the right to a jury trial
does attach. As a cause of action developed after 1780, the presumption of a
right to a jury trial can be argued to apply. It is a new cause of action which,
unlike equitable estoppel, applies to future promises and is not just a bar, but
an affirmative cause of action allowing for monetary damages. 176 Further, if
promissory estoppel is a substitute for bargained for consideration rendering
the promise enforceable as a contract, it is of a substantial legal character.
The allowance of monetary damages particularly expectation damages
underscores its kinship with contract and its legal nature. While good faith
reliance has its origins in courts of Chancery, it also made its way into the

Rptr. 62, 68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (noting promissory estoppel is peculiarly equitable doctrine);
Anderson v. Larry H. Miller Commc'ns. Corp., 351 P.3d 832, 841 (Utah Ct. App. 2015) (finding
promissory estoppel claim is founded in equity and had no right to jury trial); JP Morgan Chase
Bank Nat'l. Ass'n., v. Bach, No. 2014AP2781, 2017 Wisc. App. LEXIS 439, at *9-10 (Wis. Ct.
App. June 14, 2017) (holding no right to jury trial on estoppel claim).
1' See C & K Eng'g v. Amber Steel Co., Inc. 587 P.2d 1136, 1141 (Cal. 1978) ("the 'gist' [of
promissory estoppel] ... is equitable. Both historically and functionally, the task of weighing such
equitable considerations is to be performed by the trial court, not by the jury."). Further support
for this position can be found by the determination that the right to a jury trial applies to quantum
meruit or quasi contract claims. See Wendt v. Barnum, 2007 Mass. App. Div. 93, 95-96 (2007);
Malonis v. Harrington, 816 N.E.2d 115, 120 (Mass. 2004) ("The underlying basis for this legal
obligation [quantum meruit] is derived from principles of equity and fairness, to prevent unjust
enrichment of one party (the windfall of free legal services to the client) at the expense of another
(the discharged attorney who expended time and resources for the client's benefit)."); Doherty v.
Retirement Bd. of Medford, 680 N.E.2d 45, 50-51 (Mass. 1997) (finding no right to jury trial as to
claim for restitution); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 424 (1987) (finding restitution is an
equitable remedy which does not require jury trial under Seventh Amendment).
175 See Malden Police Patrolman's Ass'n. v. Malden, 82 N.E.3d 1055, 1064 (Mass. App. Ct.
2017) ("Promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine") (quoting Barrie-Chivian v. Lepler, 34
N.E.3d 769, 772 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015);.BBJ, Inc. v Millercoors LLC, No. 12-cv-1 1305-IT, 2017
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33072, at *21 (D. Mass. Mar. 8, 2017) (noting promissory estoppel and quantum
meruit are "equity based claims"); Robinson v. Spence Stuart, Inc., No. 13-10278-RWZ, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 183961, at *12 (D. Mass. Feb. 24, 2015) (stating promissory estoppel is equitable
remedy); Lawson v. Affirmative Equities Co., L.P., 341 F. Supp. 2d 51, 66-67 (D. Mass. 2004)
(same); Insurative Premium Fin. (Jersey) Ltd. v. Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc., No. 12-10642-NMG,
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187058, at *34 (D. Mass. Dec. 18, 2012) (finding promissory estoppel is
"equitable theory").
176 Some cases, in fact, have held that even the defensive use of equitable estoppel is a jury
issue. See LeBlanc v. Snelgrove, 133 A.3d 361, 372 (Vt. 2015) (holding right to jury trial includes
right to trial by jury on factual issues).
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common law courts through the law of assumpsit.177 Assumpsit provided for
reliance based recovery for breach of a promise. Reasonable or justifiable
reliance, in turn, was integral to assumpsit just as detrimental reliance was
integral to equity.17 As an action at law, assumpsit was entitled to a jury trial
for the purpose of making binding a promise.
Courts which have addressed the issue readily admit that "the
protean doctrine of promissory estoppel eludes classification as either
entirely legal or entirely equitable."' 7 9 According to the Second Circuit,
"both law and equity exert gravitational pulls on the doctrine, and its
application in any particular case depends on the context in which it
appears."'o As such, a number of cases have determined that when used as
a bar to such impediments as Statute of Frauds, it is equitable with no right
to a jury, even if the claimant is seeking contract damages."s' When the
doctrine is being used for purpose of seeking contract damages and a form
of consideration, the analogy to assumpsit is compelling and likely to carry
the right to a jury trial. 182 Some courts have found a right to jury simply on
the basis that the promissory estoppel claim sought money damages. 8
Not all courts agree.' 84 A number of held that promissory estoppel
remains essentially equitable in nature with no concomitant right to a jury
177 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. a ("enforcement of informal
contracts in the action of assumpsit rested historically on justifiable reliance on a promise.").
" See Olson v. Synergistic Techs. Bus., 628 N.W. 2d 142, 149-51 (Minn. 2001) (finding
reliance integral to assumpsit claim).
1' Merex AG v. Fairchild Weston Systems, Inc., 29 F. 3d 821, 825 (2d Cir. 1994); InCompass
IT, Inc. v. XO Communc'ns. Servs., Inc., 719 F. 3d 891, 897 (8th Cir 2013) (finding that, with
regards to a claim under promissory estoppel, "the nature of the remedy sought is 'the more
important of the two' inquiries in determining whether a right to ajury trial exists under the Seventh
Amendment."); Holmes, supra note 4, at 45-48 (discussing promissory estoppel is neither
exclusively contract, tort or equity).
180 See Freeman v. U.S. Bank, No. 2:10-CV-01544 RSM, 2014 WL 969642, at *3 (W.D.
Wash. Mar. 12, 2014) (same).
" See Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc., No. 98 Civ.861 RWS, 2003 WL
1345136, at *3 (S.D. N.Y. Mar. 19,2003); see also 2 FRED F. LAWRENCE, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
§§ 1044, 1046 (1929) (discussing estoppel as bar was only available in equity).
182 See Osborne-Davis Transp. Co v. Mother Work Inc., No. 02512, 2008 WL 2175580 (Ct.
Com. P1. Pa. Feb. 20, 2008) (analogizing promissory estoppel to contract; therefore, right to jury
trial exists when seeking monetary damages); Barr Labs., 2003 WL 1345136, at *4. But see Merex
A.G., 29 F.3d at 824 (noting despite tie to assumpsit, promissory estoppel is of equitable origins).
See Brooks v. Hollaar, 297 P.3d 125, 130 (Alaska 2013) (holding right to jury trial); Sedghi
18
v. PatchLink Corp., 823 F. Supp. 2d 298, 306 (D. Md. 2011) (finding claim for money damages
constitutes "legal" relief); ServiceMaster v. Gab Business Servs. Inc., 530 N.W. 2d 558, 563 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1995) (finding since claimant sought money damages equitable estoppel claim carries
right to jury trial).
See Tolboe Constr. v. Staker Paving & Constr. Co., 682 P.2d 843, 849 (Utah 1984) (finding
'"
no right to jury trial); Andreason v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 848 P.2d 171, 177-78 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993) (finding trial court did not err); Wyler Summit P'ship v. Turner Broad Sys., Inc., 235
F.3d 1184, 1194 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting promissory estoppel is "a cause of action only cognizable
... in equity.").
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trial."' They hold that seeking monetary damages through a claim of
promissory estoppel is not dispositive because the controlling inquiry is
whether the cause of action is equitable or not.' 6 Some have found that if
only reliance damages are sought or available, this supports the finding of an
equitable based claim.' Further, the interest of justice component
particularly as to the measure of damages has also been relied upon to find
no right to a jury."'
Some jurisdictions take a hybrid position. They allow promissory
estoppel claims to be submitted for jury determination except for the
avoidance of injustice element."' Under the section 90 Restatement
formulation, the underlying promise is to be enforced by virtue of reliance

185 See Nightingale v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-571,2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132756,
at *3-4 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2015) (applying Ohio law); Tipp City v. Watson, No. 02CA43, 2003
Ohio App. LEXIS 4369, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App Sept. 12, 2003) ("[w]here a plaintiff... seeks
primarily equitable relief, with or without money damages, [the] party is not entitled to a trial by
jury."); Freeman, 2014 WL 969642, at *3 (noting that under Washington state law promissory
estoppel is equitable claim); Tae Yon Kim v. Dean, 135 P.3d 978, 983 (Wash. Ct. App.2006)
(same); Nimrod Mktg. (Overseas). Ltd. V. Texas Energy Inv. Corp., 769 F.2d 1076, 1080 (5' Cir.
1985) ("Promissory estoppel is an equitable form of action in which equitable rights alone are
recognized .... Defendants had no right to trial by jury...."); C & K Eng'g Contractors v. Amber
Steel Co., 587 P.2d 1136, 1139 (Cal. 1978) (same); JP Morgan Chase Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Bach,
No. 2014AP2781, 2017 Wisc. App. LEXIS 439, at *11 (Wis. Ct. App. June 14, 2017) ("Since
promissory estoppel is entirely equitable, it carries with it no jury trial right."); Anderson v. Larry
H. Miller Commc'ns Corp., 351 P.3d 832, 841 (Utah 2015) (recognizing that promissory estoppel
claims are equitable).
"8 See Anderson, 351 P.3d 832, 841-42 (Utah 2015) (noting plaintiff must establish nature of
claim, either legal or equitable); see also Reese v. IBEW Local 82 Pension Plan, No. 3:1 1-cv-242,
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32219, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 12,2012) (rejecting argument that promissory
estoppel claim, which included money damages, entitled plaintiff to jury trial.).
187 See InCompass IT, Inc. v. XO Commc'ns Servs., Inc., 719 F.3d 891, 896 (8th Cir. 2013)
(applying Minnesota law and holding "reliance damages place ... promissory estoppel claim in ...
province of equity").
'8 See Kim, 135 P.3d at 983 (finding plaintiff's claim purely equitable, thus had no right to
jury trial).
89 See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Chaplake Holdings Ltd., 822 A.2d 1024, 1034 (Del. 2003)
("[t]he avoidance of injustice element is, however, a legal concept and not a question of fact to be
submitted to the jury."); Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267, 275 (Wis. 1965)
(holding injustice element of promissory estoppel case matter of policy and question of law); Tour
Costa Rica v. Country Walkers, inc., 758 A.2d 795, 801 (Vt. 2000) ("[w]hether injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise is a question of law . . .."); Cohen v. Cowles Media
Co., 479 N.W.2d 387, 391 (Minn. 1992) [Hereinafter Cohen Il] (holding promissory estoppel
injustice case "is . . . legal question for . .. court, as it involves . . .policy decision."); D & S Coal
Co., Inc. v. USX Corp., 678 F. Supp. 1318, 1320-21 (E. D. Tenn. 1988) ("[t]he injustice
requirement of promissory estoppel is an equitable consideration which must ultimately be
determined by the Court, not the jury."); Pavel Enters. Inc., v. A. S. Johnson Co., Inc., 674 A.2d
521, 533 (Md. 1996) ("as to the fourth prima facie element, the trial court, and not a jury must
determine that binding the [defendant] is necessary to prevent injustice."); Tour Costa Rica v.
Country Walkers, Inc., 758 A.2d 795, 801 (Vt. 2000) (stating injustice element is question of law);
Singer v. Lajaunie, 339 P.3d 277, 283 (Wyo. 2014) (finding injustice element of promissory
estoppel is for court).
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only if injustice can be avoided by enforcement. Courts have found this
element to be an equitable and policy decision and, therefore, solely a matter
for the court. Other courts submit the issue to the fact finder as with all other
elements.
Given the presumption of a right to jury trial to new causes of action
and that Massachusetts treats detrimental reliance as sufficient consideration,
the right to a jury trial likely will be found to apply where promissory
estoppel is being asserted as an independent cause of action for monetary
damages. Where asserted as a defense or bar, it could be found not to carry
a right to jury trial. 190 Further, promissory estoppel is commonly asserted
together with other claims including breach of contract, breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and misrepresentation-both
negligent and intentional. Where claims are mixed, the trial judge has the
choice of (1) letting the jury find the facts on both types of claims, (2)
deciding himself/herself all aspects of the non-jury claims, or (3) asking the
jury for nonbinding findings as to the non-jury claims. 191 In exercising such
discretion, the court must not infringe on the right to a jury trial on legal
issues.192
The legal/equitable divide is significant, despite the regular practice
of submitting promissory estoppel claims to a jury. It is hard to deny the
purely equitable nature of the avoidance of injustice element and that it
carries no right to a jury trial. Given that avoidance of justice is largely one
of policy based on the underlying circumstances, it remains more suitable
for judicial treatment. As noted, "[b]oth historically and functionally, the
task of weighing such equitable considerations is to be performed by the trial
court, not the jury."19 3 Courts in Minnesota, Wisconsin, District of Columbia,
Vermont, Wyoming, and Minnesota have all held or intimated that the issue
4
remains one for the court. 19

2. Independent or Redundant
Despite its unequivocal inclusion in Section 90's black-letter
formulation, there remains uncertainty over whether avoidance of injustice
is a separate prima facie element and whether it provides any meaningful
" See Barrie-Chivian v. Lepler, 34 N.E.3d 769, 772 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015) ("[p]romissory
estoppel is an equitable doctrine, and judges are to apply it flexibly to avoid injustice.").
191 See Dalis v. Buyer Advert., Inc., 636 N.E.2d 212, 217 (Mass. 1994).
192 See Ed. Peters Jewelry Co., Inc. v. C & J Jewelry Co., Inc., 215 F.3d 182, 191 (1st Cir.
2000) (setting limits on court infringement).
193 See C & K Eng'g Contractors v. Amber Steel Co., 587 P.2d 1136, 1141 (Cal. 1978).
19 See Cohen H1, 479 N.W 2d at 391 (deciding decision left for court); see also Hoffman, 133
N.W.2d at 275 (same); Tour Costa Rica, 758 A.2d at 799 (same); Singer, 339 P.3d at 277 (same).
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substance beyond the elements of promise and reliance. 195 While the court
in Loranger adopted Section 90's formulation, 196 numerous Massachusetts
appellate decisions do not even mention the injustice component in their
prima facie recitation and, to the extent mentioned, provide little to no insight
as to its substance. 19 7
a. The SeparateSubstantive Element View
Section 90's formulation treats avoidance of injustice as a separate
substantive component identifying the prima facie showing as follows: (1) a
promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance; (2) the promise induced such action or forbearance by the
promisee; and (3) injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise. If a promise, which the promisor should foresee, would induce
action or forbearance by the promisee and cause such action or forbearance,
it is "binding." The inquiry does not end, however, because- regardless of
the action or forbearance resulting from the promise-the promise is binding
only if "injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise."l9 8 A
number of courts applying Massachusetts law do, in fact, recognize
avoidance of injustice as a prima facie element. 199 Moreover, and at least as

'95 See Boyer, supra note 10, at 482 (discussing avoidance of injustice by enforcement of
promise).
' See Loranger Constr. Corp. v. E. F. Hauserman Co., 374 N.E.2d 306, 309-10 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1978), affd, 384 N.E.2d 176 (Mass. 1978); see also Neuhoff v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co.,
370 F.3d 197, 203 (1st Cir. 2004) (applying Massachusetts law); Carroll v. Xerox Corp., 294 F.3d
231, 242 (1st Cir. 2002) (same).
197 See Bongaards v. Millen, 793 N.E.2d 335, 340 (Mass. 2003); Sullivan v. Chief Justice for
Admin. & Mgmt., 858 N.E.2d 699 (Mass. 2006); Rhode Island Hosp. Tr. Nat'l Bank v. Varadian,
647 N.E.2d 1174 (Mass. 1995); Turnpike Motors, Inc. v. Newbury Grp., Inc., 596 N.E.2d 989
(Mass. 1992); Pinto v. HSBC Bank, N.A., No. 12-11332-LTS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178796, at
*12 (D. Mass. Dec. 18, 2012) (citing Anzalone v. Admin. Office, 932 N.E.2d 774, 786 (Mass.
2010); Kirtz v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 12-10690-DJC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170357, at *1 (D.
Mass. Nov. 29, 2012); Bean v. N.Y. Mellon, No. 12-10930-JCB, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132447,
at *1 (D. Mass. Sept. 18, 2012): Micciche v. N.R.I. Data & Bus. Prods., No. 09-11661-GAO, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109969, at *1 (D. Mass. Sept. 27, 2010).
198 See, e.g., Curtis v. Dalrymple, 11-P-1059, 2012 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 607, at *8
(Mass. App. Ct. May 11, 2012) (quoting Northrup v. Brigham, 826 N.E.2d 239, 244 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2005)) ("[p]romissory estoppel is 'implicated when a promise was intended to induce the
reactions it elicited, and when injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise."');
Simon v. Simon, 625 N.E.2d 564, 569 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (same)).; Gan, supranote 160, at 100
(advocating that injustice element should be "an independent and significant element of promissory
estoppel based on . . distributive justice.").
199 See Neuhoffv. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., 370 F.3d 197,203 (1st Cir. 2004); Carroll v.
Xerox Corp., 294 F.3d 231, 242 (1st Cir. 2002) ; Conte v. Bank of American, 52 F. Supp. 3d 265,
269 (D. Mass. 2014); Mackenzie v. Flagstar Bank, 738 F.3d 486, 496 (1st Cir. 2013); Trifiro v.
N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 845 F.2d 30, 31 (1st Cir. 1988); Akar v. Fannie Mae, 845 F. Supp. 2d 381 (D.
Mass. 2012); see also Veranda Beach Club Ltd. P'ship v. W. Sur. Co., 936 F.2d 1364, 1380 (1st
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to its black-letter formulation, the avoidance of injustice is the ultimate and
necessary requirement before relief can be provided. Indeed, it has been
dubbed, by some, "[tihe principal substantive check upon application. "200
Despite its standing, the role and content of "injustice" is far from
self-evident or defining. While the "reasonableness" of the action or
20 1
its
forbearance has been identified by some as falling within its purview,
remaining constituents are unclear. Nonetheless, within this vacuum is the.
general recognition that "injustice" has long-standing roots in equity,202
reflecting the equity based origin behind promissory estoppel, and consistent
with such principles as "clean hands," "unconscionability," "laches," and the
203
notion that "he who seeks equity must do equity." Section 90 otherwise
2
does not provide much guidance, ' although the concept and term is found
in a number of other provisions of the Restatement,2 0 with Comment b of
206
section 90 providing the most insight as to operative criteria. It provides:

Cir. 1991) (applying promissory estoppel "'if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise."'); Steinke v. Sungard Fin. Sys., 121 F.3d 763, 776 (1st Cir. 1997); Piantes v. Pepperidge
Farm, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 929, 935 (D. Mass. 1995); Trent Partners & Assocs. v. Dig. Equip. Corp.,
120 F. Supp. 2d 84, 105 (D. Mass. 1999).
200 Alden, supra note 6, at 676.
201 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. b (1981); Hawley v. Dresser
Indus., Inc., 737 F. Supp. 445, 464 (S.D. Ohio 1990) (noting reasonable reliance is part of criterion
of avoidance of injustice element); Morauer & Hartzell v. Local Union No. 77, No. 1275-73, 1974
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11824, at *9-10 (D. Col. Nov. 27, 1974) (holding avoidance of injustice not met
as no evidence of reasonable reliance).
202 See Are-Tech Square, LLC v. Galenea Corp., 16-P-612, 2017 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS
150, at *7 (Mass. App. Ct. Feb. 16, 2017) ("corporate disregard ... [is equity doctrine] 'to provide
a meaningful remedy for injuries and to avoid injustice."') (citing Kraft Power Corp. v. Merrill,
981 N.E.2d 671 (Mass 2013)); Hanson v. Bradley, 10 N.E.2d 259, 264 (Mass. 1937) (noting
corporate disregard exercised "only for the defeat of fraud or wrong, or the remedying of
injustice."); East Boston Savings Bank v. Ogan, 701 N.E.2d 331, 328-30 (Mass. 1998) (recognizing
equitable subrogation intended to guard against injustice in reliance on recording system); Carter
v. Exch. Tr. Co., 108 N.E. 359, 361 (Mass. 1915) ("[w]hile equity, in order to avoid injustice,
ordinarily will enforce, when necessary, a set-off of demands between the same parties").
203 See New England Merchants Nat'l. Bank v. Kann, 294 N.E.2d 390, 393 (Mass. 1973). It
has been repeatedly emphasized that the purpose of equitable estoppel is "to prevent one from
benefiting from his own wrongdoing and to avoid injustice.'' Harrington v. Fall River Hous. Auth.,
538 N.E.2d 24, 29 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989); see also Blanchard v. Ellis, 1854 Mass. LEXIS 28, at
*8-9 (Mass. 1854) (noting doctrine of estoppel rests on "the prevention of wrong and injustice").
204 Jimenez, supra note 17, at 669 (noting over 300 cases demonstrating "surprisingly few
judges require a plaintiffto show that the equitable principle of 'justice' has been satisfied."); Gan,
supra note 160, at 61-62 (noting judges content that when promise and reliance met justice element
properly satisfied).
205 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 158(2) (1981) (using term "injustice").
206 See Faimon v. Winona State Univ., 540 N.W.2d 879, 883 n.2 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996);
Thatcher's Drug Store v. Consolidated Supermarkets, Inc., 636 A.2d 156, 160 (Pa. 1994); Landan
v. Wal-Mart Real Estate Bus. Realty Tr., No. 2:12cv926, 2016 WL 5253329, at *7, *15 (W.D.
Penn. Sept. 22, 2016).
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The principle of this section is flexible. The promisor is
affected only by reliance which he does or should foresee to
be enforceable and which must be enforced to avoid
injustice. Satisfaction of the [injustice element] may depend
on the reasonableness of the promisee's reliance, on its
definite and substantial character in relation to the remedy
sought, on the formality with which the promise is made, on
the extent to which the evidentiary, cautionary, deterrent
and channeling functions of form are met by the commercial
setting or otherwise, and on the extent to which such other
policies as the enforcement of bargains and the prevention
of unjust enrichment are relevant.20 7
Only a few jurisdictions (six to date) have referenced or relied upon
these factors in implementing or discussing the avoidance of justice
element.2 08 Vermont, Minnesota, and Wisconsin, in turn, have restated the
Restatement factors as follows: (a) the availability and adequacy of other
remedies, particularly cancellation and restitution; (b) the definite and
substantial character of the action or forbearance in relation to the remedy
sought; (c) the extent to which the action or forbearance corroborates
evidence of the making and terms of the promise, or the making and terms
are otherwise established by clear and convincing evidence; (d) the
207 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. b (1981). Courts have likewise
turned
to section 139 of the Restatement which sets out the detrimental reliance rule as a basis precluding
a statute of frauds defense including "if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1). Furthermore, section 139(2) sets out
certain "circumstances" that were identified as "significant" to the avoidance of injustice element
which include:

(a) the availability and adequacy of other remedies, particularly cancellation and
restitution;
(b) the definite and substantial character of the action or forbearance in relation to the
remedy sought;
(c) the extent to which the action or forbearance corroborates evidence of the making
and terms of the promise, or the making and terms are otherwise established by clear and
convincing evidence;
(d) the reasonableness of the action or forbearance;
(e) the extent to which the action or forbearance was foreseeable by the promisor.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139(2) (1981). According to the accompanying
Comment, "like section 90," this section sets forth a "flexible principle" and that "[ejach factor
relates either to the extent to which reliance furnishes a compelling substantive basis for relief in
addition to the expectations created by the promise or to the extent to which the circumstances
satisfy the evidentiary purpose of the Statute and fulfill any cautionary, deterrent and channeling
functions it may serve." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139 cmt. b.
208 Wisconsin, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Vermont, District of Columbia and Missouri. See
Fifty State Survey and cases cited.

2017-18]

THE FINAL FRONTIER

41

reasonableness of the action or forbearance; [and] (e) the extent to which the
action or forbearance was foreseeable by the promisor.20 9 Courts in the
District of Columbia have also referenced the Restatement factors
emphasizing that the injustice inquiry centers on "evaluation of the formality
of the promise, whether there is a commercial setting and its nature, and
whether there is unjust enrichment." 210 The inquiry has been similarly
referenced by Minnesota courts as involving "[n]umerous considerations ...
including the reasonableness of a promisee's reliance and a weighing of
public policies in favor of both enforcing bargains and preventing unjust
enrichment." 2 11 All such courts treat the injustice inquiry as an independent
element and one of fundamental policy.
Comment b's reference to the "reasonableness" of reliance being a
factor in the injustice inquiry is notable given that section 90's black letter
formulation does not include any "reasonableness" requirement, only an
"action or forbearance." 212 By virtue of the express terms of section 90, the
degree of objective reasonableness is arguably irrelevant similar to the rule
as to contractual consideration with Massachusetts case law, otherwise
making clear that the reliance must be both reasonable and detrimental.213
By utilizing the terms "enforcement of the promise," the suggestion is one
of specific performance of the promise, which is usually reserved for very
few instances and only where money damages are not available.
Compounding the issue is that the remedy is also governed by an interest of
justice consideration which otherwise supports independency.
The Restatement further suggests that neither the reliance by the
promisee nor the promisor's reasonable expectations are, alone,
determinative and that the particular circumstances must also be considered.
This requires consideration of not just the existence of reliance by the
promisee, but its degree and character, as well as the nature of the actions of,
209 Boule v. Pike Indus., Inc., No. 5:12-cv-7, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26588, at *37 (D. Vt.
Feb. 27, 2013); Knauf Realty, LLC v. Prudential Real Estate Affiliates, Inc., 486 F. Supp.2d 855,
863 (W.D. Wis. 2007); Skebba v. Kasch, 724 N.W.2d 408, 411 (citing Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores,
inc., 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965)); Cohen II, 479 N.W.2d 387, 391 (Minn. 1992).
210 Granfield v. Catholic Univ., 530 F.2d 1035, 1041 (D.C. 1996); see also Vila v. InterAmerican Inv. Corp., 570 F.3d 274, 282 (D.C. 2009) (stating same).
211 Faimon v. Winona State Univ., 540 N.W.2d 879, 883 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
212 See Norman v. Hous. & Redevelopment Auth., 681 N.W.2d 376, 378 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004)
(holding if reliance not reasonable injustice element not met).
213 Rhode Island Hosp. Tr. Nat'l Bank v. Varadian, 647 N.E.2d 1174, 1179 (Mass. 1995);
Saade v. Pennymac Loan Servs., LLC., No. 15-CV-12275-IT, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144200, at
*13-14 (D. Mass. Oct. 17, 2016) (naming reliance element of promissory estoppel); Coll v. P.B.
Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 50 F.3d 1115, 1124 (1st Cir. 1995) (same); Trifiro v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 845
F.2d 30, 31 (1st Cir. 1988) (same); see also Anzalone v. Admin. Office, 932 N.E.2d 774, 785-86
(Mass. 2010) (explaining further detrimental reliance required element of promissory estoppel);
Pappas Indus. Parks, Inc. v. Psarros, 511 N.E.2d 621, 623 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987) (holding no
estoppel where plaintiff did not take material steps to his detriment before withdrawal).
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and impact upon, the promisor. In fact, such reliance must be of a substantial
and definite nature. Similarly, it is not just whether there is a basis to find
that there is a reasonable expectation of reliance given the promise, but the
degree and extent of such foreseen by the promisor. As noted by one court,
"[w]hile the threatened injustice to the promisee is equity's first
consideration, it is proper to consider the possible harshness to defendant by
enforcement of his promise."2 14 This would require consideration of the
reasons for non-performance of the promise.2 15 The reliance, promise, and
justice components are, in fact, interrelated:
The first two elements [reliance and promise] should be
weighed in inverse to the third element [justice]. That is the
more clear, definite, and unambiguous the promise, the less
weight need be given to justice considerations. Similarly,
the more the reliance is detrimental to the promisee, the
lighter the burden of justice. And vice versa, if the two
elements are weak, then the justice needs to be very
meaningful. If the promise is not concrete enough and the
reliance caused little or no loss, then the promisee needs to
show significant justice considerations in order to enforce
the promise. In other words, courts should delicately
balance these three elements.2 1 6
The injustice element likewise takes account of the relations
between the parties, the nature of the interest or subject of the promise and
reliance, and requires consideration of any applicable social policies
favoring or disfavoring enforcement of the particular promise. Comment d
not only identifies the need to consider the reasonableness of the promisee's
reliance-and particularly whether it is of a definite and substantial character
in relation to the remedy sought-but also applicable "policies" such as "the
enforcement of bargains and the prevention of unjust enrichment" as well as
"the extent to which the evidentiary, cautionary, deterrent and channeling
functions of form are met by the commercial setting or otherwise." 217

214 Miller v. Lawlor, 66 N.W. 2d 267, 274 (Iowa 1954).

215 Cohen II, 479 N.W.2d at 392 (explaining liability for breaking promises). "[I]n view of the
defendants' concurrence in the importance of honoring promises of confidentiality, and absent the
showing of any compelling need in this case to break that promise, we conclude that the resultant
harm to Cohen requires a remedy here to avoid an injustice." Id See also Cohen v. Cowles Media
Co., 457 N.W.2d 199,204 (Minn. 1999) [hereinafter Cohen I] (inquiring why promise was broken).
"If the court applies promissory estoppel, its inquiry is not limited to whether a promise was given
and broken, but rather the inquiry is into all the reasons why it was broken." Id.
216 Gan, supra note 160, at 76.
217 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. b. (1981).
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The injustice component and the comment b criteria reflect the
"equitable" nature of the doctrine and the power of the court "to do justice"
in particular circumstances. According to one court, "this standard has 'the
merit . . of invoking Justice and reminding the court that this particular rule
cannot be applied by a mechanical process . .. the clause is a suggestion that
sometimes the answer should be No."'2 18 Whether this reflects a limiting or
robust role, one is hard pressed to treat the injustice element as superfluous
or pertaining solely to remedy. It is a discrete and fundamental substantive
element219 with the key to provide it substance and discipline.
b. Lack of Independence View
Despite its prominence in Section 90's formulation, there are courts,
including in Massachusetts, that do not include or recognize "avoidance of
justice" as a separate element. 220 It either receives no mention at all or is
referenced only as the underlying guide, policy, or end result behind the
application of the promise and reasonable reliance components. The injustice
element is deemed meaningless in that once it is shown that a party
justifiably relied to its detriment, which the promisor reasonably did or
should have expected, the avoidance of the injustice element is met. 2 2 1 if
218 Ramone v. Lang, No. 1592-N, 2006 WL 4762877, at *16 (Del. Ch. Apr. 3, 2006) (quoting
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 8.9, at 33 (Rev. ed. 1996)).
219 See Gan, supra note 160, at 83 (arguing courts should "affirmatively and explicitly consider
justice as an independent element rather than be guided by a vague sense ofjustice.").
220 See Gan, supra note 160, at 62. "Contrary to the specific language of section 90 that
requires courts to examine whether enforcement is warranted to prevent injustice, courts rarely
consider justice in their holdings." Id.; see also Mid-Town Surgical Ctr. LLP v. Blue Cross Blue
Shield of Texas, Inc., CIV.A. H-1 1-2086, 2012 WL 1252512, at *2 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (avoiding
injustice not an element of promissory estoppel); Mass Cash Register, Inc. v. Comtrex Sys. Corp.,
901 F. Supp. 404,419-20 (D. Mass. 1995) (same); Sentinel Prods. Corp. v. Mobile Chem. Inc., No.
CIV.A. 98-11782-PBS, 2001 WL 92272, at *18 (D. Mass. 2001) (same); Moriera v. Citimortgage
Inc., Civil No. 15-13720-LTS, 2016 WL 4707981, at *4 (D. Mass. 2016) (listing elements of
estoppel and comparing equitable with promissory with no mention of injustice element); Yin v.
Biogen Inc., No. CIV.A 14-12255-WGY, 2015 WL 8024542, at *4 (D. Mass. 2015) (citing Cellucci
v. Sun Oil Co., 320 N.E.2d 919, 923 (Mass. App. Ct. 1974), affd sub. Nom., Cellucci v. Sun Oil
Co. of Penn., 331 N.E.2d 813 (Mass. 1975)); Neves v. Neves, 15-P-99, 2017 WL 1380748, at *5
(Mass. App. Ct. 2017) (defining promissory estoppel as "consist[ing] simply of a promise that
becomes enforceable because of the promisee's reasonable and detrimental reliance.") (citing
Souminem v. Goodman Indus. Equities Mgmt. Group, LLC., 914 N.E.2d 694, 701 (Mass. App. Ct.
2011)); Gould v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 123 F. Supp. 3d 197, 204 (D. Mass. 2015) (citing Sullivan
v. Chief Justice for Admin. & Mgmt. of Trial Court, 858 N.E.2d 699, 711 (Mass. 2006)); Rooney
v. Paul D. Osborne Desk Co., 645 N.E.2d 50, 51 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995) (defining promissory
estoppel as "a promise that becomes enforceable because of the promisee's reasonable and
detrimental reliance); Grant v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins., 183 F. Supp. 2d 344, 370 (D. Mass.
2012) (citing Rooney, 645 N.E.2d 50, 51 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995)).
221 See Mann v. Robles, No. 13-14-00190-CV, 2016 WL 1274690, at *5 (Tex. Ct. App. 2016)
(stating "while we agree that injustice may be a consideration, we disagree that it is an element of
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there has been a sufficient promise and reasonable reliance, "injustice" has
resulted.2 22 Stated differently, the doctrine "avoids injustice" by functioning
solely as a substitute for consideration.223
While Section 90's formulation includes "reasonableness" of
reliance under the avoidance of injustice component, most states, including
Massachusetts, recite reasonable reliance as a single operative element. 224
The inclusion of "reasonableness" of reliance in the "avoidance of injustice
aspect-if a purely equitable element for the court and not the jury-would
result in the Court determining whether the degree of reliance was sufficient
and potentially rub against any jury right to determine the issue. The same
concern applies to the reasonableness of the foreseeability to the promisor of
the action or forbearance element. Under strict application, a jury would
determine both the promise and action or forbearance, but the court would
address the "reasonableness" of the action or forbearance, as well as the
extent of the foreseeability of the promisee's inducement. This rub militates
against recognizing any true independency.
Similarly, most of the considerations set forth in comment b further
inform the promise and reliance elements. The degree of the promisee's
reliance, including whether the reliance was of a substantial and definitive
character, for instance, is a consideration easily placed under the reasonable
reliance inquiry. Similarly, the formality and form of the promise and the
channeling functions revealed in the circumstances go to the sufficiency of
the promise (as well as reliance), as does the inquiry whether any policy
consideration would require non-enforcement of the promise regardless of
reliance. Consideration of the relation of the parties and their respective
sophistication also can be deemed to inform both the promise and reasonable
reliance elements leaving little, if anything, for any loose notion of avoidance
of injustice. Finally, to the extent the lack of an adequate remedy must be

promissory estoppel"); Grand Ave. Surgical Center Ltd. v. Health Care Servs. Corp., No. 1-152373, 2016 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2732, at *16-25 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016) (suggesting injustice not
prima facie element).
222 Jimenez, supra note 17, at 703 (suggesting some judges may believe, where promise and
reliance shown, "injustice" automatically met).
223 Edwards, infra note 233, at 231.
224 See Clawson v. Clawson, 15-P-58, 2016 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1000, at *9-12 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2016) (utilizing reliance in analysis); Barrie-Chivian v. Lepler, 34 N.E.3d 769, 771 n. 8
(Mass. App. Ct. 2015) (requiring more than "mere" reliance; promissory estoppel requires a
showing that promise was intended to induce reliance, and that such reliance was reasonable);
Anzalone v. Admin. Office of Trial Court, 932 N.E.2d 774, 785-86 (Mass. 2010) (same). A
common formulation incorporating the substitute for consideration view is: "Detrimental reliance
on an offer or a promise (also known as promissory estoppel) is a substitute for consideration.
Therefore, an offer that reasonably induces the other party to act is enforceable as a contract in the
same manner as any other contract to the extent necessary to avoid injustice." Johnny's Oil Co. v.
Eldayha, 978 N.E.2d 86, 94-95 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012).
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shown, this would not require an additional or separate element of
"injustice," but rather the acknowledgement that promissory estoppel has
equitable origins and otherwise needs limited application so as not to
undercut benefit of the bargain promises.
This view of avoidance of injustice is that it provides no operative
substance to the inquiry. It is the very use and reliance on such general
notions, such as "injustice", "good conscience," or "fairness," that, in
application, provide no meaningful means of principled or accountable
decision-making. "While doing justice is indeed a lofty goal, in a system of
stare decisis an exhortation to do justice, without more, contributes little to
the development, the certainty, or the predictability of legal rules."22 5 Not
only is such a notion difficult if not impossible to define for purposes of
certainty and predictability, but it poses the potential that while both promise
and reliance are questions for a jury, avoidance of injustice is entirely
equitable and is to be addressed solely by the court-resulting in a potential
court/jury bifurcation as to a single cause of action. This view eliminates any
need for balancing of hardships or consideration of "fairness," as the
inquiries into the sufficiency of the promise and reasonable reliance are the
activating principles and should not be further constrained or cluttered by
inchoate notions of "injustice" or balancing of hardships.
3. Limiting Principle or Robust Remedy
Even if independent, there remains the issue of the element's
substance and overarching purpose. There is a divide between whether the
injustice component portends a limiting or robust remedial function. This
division can be seen despite the relatively scant case law and the very few
jurisdictions which have provided any substance to the avoidance of injustice
component.
For instance, courts in Wisconsin, while expressly referencing the
"injustice" component to be one of "policy," otherwise import an expansive
breath stating that when "determining whether an injustice can be avoided
by enforcing the promise-a court 'must remember all of its powers derived
from equity, law merchant, and other sources, as well as the common law."226
Indeed, Wisconsin does not require a promise that is a commitment in the
contractual sense and may include indefinite promissory representations.22 7
225 John Fleming Powers, PromissoryEstoppel and Wagging the Dog, 59 ARK. L. REV.
841,
842 (2007).
226 Scott v. Savers Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 663 N.W.2d 715, 729 (Wis. 2003) (citing
Hoffman
v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267, 277 (1965)).
227 See Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267, 273 (Wis. 1965) (suggesting
indefinite promissory estoppel representations).
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California, in turn, has been found to have "overt[ly] recogniz[ed] ...
promissory estoppel as an equitable theory evidencing and providing
correlative equitable rights, duties, and remedies" unconstrained by any
notion of limitation.2 28 Others, like Minnesota, have referenced "avoidance
of injustice" as a limiting principle, observing that "[t]he test is not whether
the promise should be enforced to do justice, but whether enforcement is
required to prevent an injustice. As has been observed elsewhere, it is easier
to recognize an unjust result than a just one, particularly in a morally
ambiguous situation."22 9
Based on the wording and equitable origins of Section 90, there is a
substantial argument that the injustice component is not only an independent
element, but a limiting principle. "Enforcement of the promise" through
promissory estoppel is limited in that the promise is "only" to be enforced to
avoid injustice.2 30 It is not an inquiry whether the promise should be enforced
to do justice.2 31 As worded, enforcing promises "should only be used as a
last resort."232 "[I]f the court can achieve this goal [of enforcement] by
another means or if no injustice is expected, then the promise should not be
enforced."233 The criteria listed in comment "b" all serve to restrict or whittle
down the circumstances in which the injustice element permits redress. This
is consistent with the view that estoppels are disfavored and applied
cautiously.234 The limitation function of the injustice element is also in
228 See Eric Mills Holmes, Restatement ofPromissory Estoppel, 32 WILLIAMETTE L. REV.
263, 322 (1996).
229 Cohen II, 479 N.W.2d at 391.
230 See William Harvey, DiscretionaryJustice Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
67 CORNELL L. REv. 666, 675 (1982) (explaining injustice element, "Professor Williston probably
accorded it the sole function of cautioning against any enforcement of the promise if restitutionary
relief in quasi-contract would be adequate").
231 See Gan, supra note 160, at 60 n.21 (citing Cohen 11) (noting this distinction court states:
"it is easier to recognize an unjust result than a just one. ); Davis v. Davis, 855 P. 2d 342, 349
(Wyo. 1993) ("[t]he doctrine of promissory estoppel can only be invoked when it is necessary to
avoid injustice").
232 See Gan, supra note 160, at 60.
233 See id. (concluding § 90 indicates "only a limited notion of equity and justice into the
contracting process"); see also Carolyn Edwards, Promissory Estoppel and The Avoidance of
Injustice, 12 OKL. L. REv. 223, 226 (1987) ("[T]he concept of avoiding injustice, invoked as
measure of contract liability and remedies, has become an important tool in the law.").
234 See cases cited supra note 42 and accompanying text (suggesting estoppels are disfavored
and cautiously used); Novak v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 599 N.W.2d 546, 552 (Mich. App. 1999)
("[w]e are to exercise caution in evaluating an estoppel claim and should apply the doctrine only
where the facts are unquestionable and the wrong to be prevented undoubted"). See also Barrow v.
Dartmouth House Nursing Home, 14 N.E.3d 318, 324 (Mass. App. Ct. 2014) (finding estoppel
disfavored) (citing Boston & A. R. R v. Reardon, 115 N.E. 408, 411 (Mass. 1917)); Licata v.
GGNSC Malden Dexter, LLC., 2 N.E.3d 840, 849 (Mass. 2014) (noting "important principle" is
that estoppel is disfavored); Gallant v. Fed. Mut. Ins. Co., 235 N.E.2d 810, 813 (Mass. 1968)
(same); McElligott v. Lukes, 674 N.E.2d 1108, 1111 n.5 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997) (same); Holt v.
Macy's Retail Holdings, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d 903, 913 (Tenn. 2010) (applying Tennessee law);

2017-18]

THE FINAL FRONTIER

47

keeping with the long-standing recognition that equitable relief is largely
reserved for "extraordinary" circumstances, and that reliance based promises
are subordinate to existing bargained for contracts. As a limiting principle, it
serves to maintain a meaningful demarcation between consensual bargained
for contracts, and those seeking enforcement through reliance.
Despite the paucity of case law, there are decisions that both
meaningfully apply the element and reflect its necessary limiting nature. One
example is Thatcher's Drug Store of West Goshen, Inc. v. Consolidated
Supermarkets, Inc.,235 where the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania addressed
a claim for promissory estoppel by a shopping center pharmacy against the
supermarket anchor store that had plans to open a pharmacy. The claim
hinged on the assertion that the supermarket had given prior "oral
assurance[s]" that it did "not intend to operate [a competing] pharmacy."236
The pharmacy's lease provided it was prohibited from selling food, and the
shopping center would not have a competing pharmacy.237 At some point,
the pharmacy began selling milk and the supermarket responded by posting
a sign announcing that a pharmacy was coming soon.238 When the pharmacy
inquired regarding the sign, the supermarket informed the pharmacy "[y]ou
get out of the dairy business and we won't open a pharmacy." 239 The
pharmacy ceased selling the milk, and the supermarket removed the sign.
Subsequently, and prior to renewing its lease, the pharmacy sought
assurances from the supermarket that it would not open a competing
pharmacy with it again-representing that the supermarket had no intention
of opening one.240 The pharmacy proceeded to renew its ten-year lease.
Ultimately, the supermarket decided it would operate a retail pharmacy on
its premises.
The court in Thatcher expressly noted the avoidance of justice
factors identified in the Restatement and found that they required denial of
relief.24 1 It was assumed that there was both a promise and reliance with the
dispositive issue being whether enforcement of the promise was necessary
to avoid injustice. The court found that lack of meaningful reliance, lack of

Midwest Energy Inc. v. Orion Food Sys. Inc., 14 S.W.3d 154, 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (identifying
estoppel as disfavored doctrine).
235 636 A.2d 156 (Pa. 1994).
236 Thatcher's Drug Store of West Goshen, Inc. v. Consolidated Supermarkets, Inc., 636 A.2d
156, 159 (Pa. 1994) [Hereinafter Thatcher's].
237 Id. at 163 (describing pharmacy's lease).
238

Id

Id.at 157 (quoting the pharmacy).
Id at 158.
241 Thatcher's, 636 A.2d at 158-61.
239
240
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formalization, and lack of evidentiary, cautionary, and channeling functions
controlled.24 2
As to reliance, the court found that the terms of the respective leases
of the pharmacy and supermarket expressly reserved the right of the
supermarket to operate a pharmacy. According to the court, "[u]nder the
circumstances of this case, where [the pharmacy] sought ten years of
protection from a source of potential competition with whom it had a less
than amicable relationship, it was unreasonable for [pharmacy] to proceed
on the basis of indefinite oral assurances."24 3 The court explained:
In view of the relationship between the parties and the nature
and duration of the promise, any agreement not to compete
should have been formalized. Proceeding in such a manner
would have memorialized the occasion and reduced the
possibility that the terms of the agreement would be
misunderstood. As a business entity operating in the
commercial setting, Thatcher's showed poor judgment
when it decided to renew its ten-year lease and forgo its
opportunity to relocate on the basis of an indefinitely
worded promise uttered in an informal conversation with a
potential competitor. 2 4
The court likewise found the informality in which the promise was
asserted also militated against any injustice in not enforcing the promise:
[The circumstances] fail[] to reflect the degree of formality
one would expect when business rivals operating in a
commercial setting have rights at stake as important as the
freedom to enter a new line of business and the choice of
where to locate for a ten-year period of time. Despite the
gravity of these matters, the record fails to reveal that the
parties even so much as shook hands to formalize their
agreement.245
The lack of any measurable formalities "prevented the parties from
exercising the caution demanded by a situation in which each had significant
rights at stake" and, as such, the parties were not "able to appreciate the
seriousness of their actions," or "deterred from making ill-considered

242
243
244
245

Id.
Id.
Id
Id.

at
at
at
at

160-61.
160.

160-61.
161.
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The court also found that the circumstances demonstrated a
credibility contest between two individuals and involved a vague agreement
"at risk of being misunderstood." 24 7
There was a dissent. While the majority emphasized the pharmacy's
lack of enforcement reliance, the dissenting opinion emphasized the
reasonableness of the pharmacy's performance reliance in light of the
supermarket's history of performing its promises with the pharmacy.248
Another more recent example is found in Walshe v. Zabors.249 There,
the claimant (Walshe), a subcontractor of a utility consultant firm, asserted
a promissory estoppel claim against the consultant firm seeking to "estop" it
from treating him as an employee rather than a partner entitled to
compensation over and above salary and benefits. 250 Although a proposed
letter agreement was drafted, but never signed by Walshe, he otherwise
joined and worked for the defendant. 2 51 The claim included the assertion that
the defendant firm was unjustly enriched by receiving revenue from
Walshe's largest client which he had transferred to the firm, and that the firm
had wrongly delayed in consummating an equity agreement for more than a
year while Walshe generated revenues.252
The Federal District Court of Colorado found the evidence sufficient
to support an actionable promise, reasonable foreseeability and reliance. The
reliance consisted of Walshe joining the firm, transferring his largest client,
and generating over $400,000 in revenue for the firm. 253 Walshe never
received any additional compensation or distribution either before or after
his departure. 254 There was evidence that Walshe, had he stayed with his own
company and not joined the defendant, would have earned approximately
$17,000 more a month.255
Despite the strength of the evidence as to promise, foreseeability,
and reasonable reliance, the court denied the claim based on the injustice
element.256 The court proceeded to identify the claimed additional bonus and
compensation as the operative loss and promise based on the revenues
Walshe and his client generated. Nonetheless, there was no evidence that
promises."246

Thatcher's, 636 A.2d at 161.
id.
248 Id. at 161-64 (Papadakos, J. dissenting) (dissenting against the majority's assertion that
the pharmacy had a lack of enforcement reliance).
249 Civil Action No. 15-cv-01218-MEH, 2017 WL 1048278 (D. Colo. 2017).
250 Id at *1-4.
246

247

251

id

id. at *1
Id. at *5-6.
254 Walshe v. Zabors, Civil Action No. 15-cv-01218-MEH, 2017 WL 1048278, at *5-6 (D.
Colo. 2017).
255 Id at *6.
256 id.
252
253
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Walshe was treated differently from other partners and directors of the firm.
To the extent there was evidence that there was a subsequent promise to treat
Walshe differently, it was found to be prospective, not retrospective, and
thus not operative as to the $400,000 in revenues relied upon.257 Enforcement
of the promise was found not necessary to avoid injustice as there was no
evidence that any other director or partner was paid anything beyond their
salary and benefits, and because the firm provided no one any such
compensation as to the year at issue, given low overall revenues. 258
While the application in Thatcher's and Walshe represent the view
that avoidance of injustice is a limiting principle and otherwise accentuate
enforcement reliance over performance reliance, there is support for the view
that the injustice component should have a "robust" role and serve as a tool
to effect "distributive justice that goes beyond [the] considerations of the
interests of the parties."2 59 Under this view, the "injustice" component
empowers the doctrine to "serve both to protect the reliance of the
underprivileged parties and to empower underprivileged parties" so that, in
the end, "the contracting process [is] more flexible, egalitarian, and
conscionable" as well as renders "contract law more inclusive and
pluralist."2 60
There are, arguably, seeds in Massachusetts case law supporting
such a "robust" view. As early as 1931, it was noted that "[i]t is in the main
to accomplish the prevention of results contrary to good conscience and fair
dealing that the doctrine of estoppel has been formulated." 261 Not only did
the decision in Greenstein v. Flatley26 2 equate promissory estoppel with a
statutory consumer protection violation, but in a 1995 decision, the Appeals
Court upheld a promissory estoppel award for a claimant in the employment
setting where a corporation promised to issue shares to an employee in return
for future services, although this practice was expressly prohibited by statute.
263
in a spacious view of promissory estoppel, and with no mention of
avoidance of injustice, the court allowed the employee to enforce his right to
receive the shares based on future services.2 More recently, in a dispute

Id.
See id.
259 See Gan, supra note 160, at 72.
260 See id.
261 McLearn v. Hill, 177 N.E. 617, 619 (Mass. 1931).
262 474 N.E. 2d 1130, 1133-34 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985) (analyzing promissory
estoppel
applying to statutory consumer protection violation).
263 Rooney v. Paul D. Osborne Desk Co., 645 N.E. 2d 50, 51-53 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995)
(upholding promissory estoppel award).
264 See id. at 51-52.
257
258
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over the validity of a marriage, it was stated "that the policy considerations
underlying the use of estoppel are expansive rather than narrow. "265
As revealed by the survey above, Massachusetts case law has given
little to no treatment to the avoidance of justice element with it not even
mentioned as a required element in a significant portion of decisions. The
idea of "injustice" has, however, long been a fundamental reference in
Massachusetts equity jurisprudence including as to such equitable bull-dogs
as restitution, specific performance, 266 injunction, 2 67 piercing the corporate
veil, 2 6 8 and subrogation.269 It represents court formed relief necessitated by
unique hardships posed by rigid application of normal rules and, as such,
requires a showing of something more than prima facie elements to invoke
relief. Indeed, "[t]he project of equity is the making of exceptions to usual
rules." 27 0 As to restitution, for example, not only must there be a benefit
incurred, but it must be "unjust" to merit recovery. 271
In the end, "the great and primary use of a court of equity is to give
relief in extraordinarycases. "272 Moreover, while the "exercise of a court's
equity powers . .. must be made on a case-by-case basis," equity "must [still]
be governed by rules and precedents no less than the courts of law." 273 As
such, equitable relief is usually reserved for "extraordinary" circumstanceS 274
265 Poor v. Poor, 409 N.E.2d 758, 760 n.5 (Mass. 1980).
266 Econ. Grocery Stores Corp. v. McMenamy, 195 N.E. 747, 748 (Mass. 1935) (noting

specific performance is an equitable remedy which should not be granted when requesting party
engaged in conduct "savored with injustice touching the transaction").
267 Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24-33 (2008) (utilizing injunction
analysis when reviewing the U.S. Navy's sonar training and its effect on environment).
26' Kraft Power Corp. v. Merrill, 981 N.E.2d 671, 677-78 (Mass. 2013) (applying piercing of
corporate veil doctrine).
269 Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. U.S., CIVIL ACTION NO. 12-11038-NMG, 2014 WL
12573990, at *3-6 (D. Mass. 2014) (utilizing subrogation analysis).
270 Nash v. Conn. Student Loan Found., CIVIL ACTIONNO. 04-11745-GAO, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17899, at *10 (D. Mass. 2005).
271 The Cmty. Builders Inc. v. Indian Motorcycle Ass'n., 692 N.E.2d 964, 979 (Mass. App. Ct.
1998) (asserting unjust enrichment requires a benefit, and that the benefit must be unjust).
272 Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 129-30 (1995) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 569
(Alexander Hamilton)); see also C.E. Frazier Const. Co., Inc. v. Campbell Roofing & Metal Works,
Inc., No. 51,317, 1979 Miss. LEXIS 2315, at *3-7 (Miss. 1979) (refusing to enforce promise must
amount to fraud or other injustice); DHIR v. Grp. Emp. Co., No. 16-cv-06378 (RJS), 2017 WL
4402566, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2017) (stating promissory estoppel is "narrow" and available
"only when there is unconscionable injury") (citing Kleinberg v. Radian Group, Inc., No. 01
Civ.9295(RMB)(GWG), 2002 WL 31422884, *10 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2002)); ; N. Am. Rescue
Prods. Inc v. Richardson, 769 S.E.2d 237, 241 (S. C. 2015) (same).
273 Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 648-49 (2010) (quoting Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S.
314, 323 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
274 See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 9 (2008) (noting equitable injunction
is an extraordinary remedy); Easthampton Savings Bank v. City of Springfield, 21 N.E.3d 922, 933
(Mass. 2013) (appointmenting of receiver is familiar relief in equity, but it remains an
"extraordinary" remedy); Rines v. Rines, 70 N.E.2d 180, 181 (Mass. 1946) (noting equity would
not intercede as to tax assessment absent exceptional or extraordinary circumstances); Normandin
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with fraud, bad faith, or deceit as its center stones.27 5 In short, the
incorporation of the purely equitable notion of "avoidance of injustice" can
be seen as ensuring that any relief is only available in limited instances and
is a narrow exception to the usual rule necessitating exceptional
circumstances for its invocation. Estoppel has, in fact, been often referenced
as only applying in "extraordinary" circumstances.27 6 Even where there is a
reliance inducing promise, it remains the exceptional circumstance that
enforcement of the promise will be necessary to avoid injustice. Promissory
estoppel remains the exception to the usual bargain for exchange contractual
obligation and, as such, must also be reserved for exceptional circumstances
as reliance is not agreement. While inter-familial and donative transfers may
well represent such unique circumstances, transactions and dealings in
commercial settings, and particularly among sophisticates, usually do not.
4. Remedial Measure
a. Expectation, Reliance or Discretionary
As with the avoidance of injustice element, limited attention has
been afforded to the issue of remedy. There remains discordance among
jurisdictions as to the appropriate remedy 277 which centers around three

v. Eastland Partners, Inc., 862 N.E.2d 402, 414 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (noting specific performance
is an extraordinary equitable remedy); In re Louscheschi, Bankruptcy No. 11 -42578-MSH, 2013
WL 3788485, at *2 (D. Mass. 2013) (holding foreclosure of mortgage by bill in equity is available
only in extraordinary circumstances); Perry v. Walker, Case No. 11,010, 1846 U.S. App. LEXIS
570, at *3 (D. Mass. 1846) (intervening in extraordinary circumstances).
275 See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814-15 (1945)
("[W]hile 'equity does not demand that its suitors shall have led blameless lives', as to other
matters, it does require that they shall have acted fairly and without fraud or deceit as to the
controversy in issue.") (quoting Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 229 (1934)).
276 See Saccucci Auto Grp. v. Am. Honda Motor Grp., 617 F.3d 14, 27 (1st Cir. 2010)
(applying Rhode Island law); In re Olympic Mill Corp., BAP NO. PR 04-047, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS
2306, at *43 (1st Cir. 2005) (applying Delaware law and its requirement that estoppel requires,
inter alia, "extraordinary" circumstances); Fried v. Stiefel Labs., Inc., No. 11-CV-20853, 2012
WL 4364300, at *10 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (noting promissory estoppel is extraordinary remedy);
Berman v. Tyco Int'l Ltd., No. 08 Civ. 43(DAB), 2011 WL 1334851, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(holding New York law requires extraordinary circumstances for application of promissory
estoppel in employment setting); Rice v. Atkins, No. 09-2021, 2009 WL 2095966, at *2 (W.D.
Tenn. 2009) (applying Tennessee law and noting need for extraordinary circumstances for liability
under promissory estoppel).
277 See Dugas-Felippi v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 971 F. Supp. 2d 802, 805 (N.D. Ill. 2013)
(identifying split in case law over whether expectation damages apply to promissory estoppel
claim). Compare Garwood Packaging Inc. v. Allen & Co., Inc., 378 F.3d 698, 703 (7th Cir. 2004)
(applying benefit of bargain to promissory estoppel claim) with Joerger v. Gordon Food Servs.,
Inc., 568 N.W.2d 365, 369 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (holding damages limited to reliance).
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primary views: expectation, 278 reliance 27 9 and a flexible or discretionary
approach. 280 This divergence reflects the competing views as to the purpose
and scope of promissory estoppel.
278 Waters v. Marathon Oil Co., 642 F.2d 1098, 1100-01 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding promissory
estoppel, as equitable doctrine, allowed recovery where party had proven "the amount of the lost
profits ... with reasonable certainty"); Gutteridge v. J3 Energy Grp., Inc., No. 3397 EDA 2013,
2015 WL 7253671, at *6 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015) (noting promissory estoppel should be value of
promise unless equity dictates otherwise); ZBS Indus., Inc. v. Anthony Cocca Videoland, Inc., 637
N.E.2d 956, 960 (Ohio App. Ct. 1994) ("[W]e find that a plaintiff may recover expectancy
damages, including lost profits, in a promissory estoppel action where ...the promise relied upon
obligates the promisor into the future and those damages are demonstrated with reasonable
certainty."); Seattle First Nat'l Bank, N.A. v. Siebol, 824 P.2d 1252, 1256 (Wash. Ct. App.
1992) (noting "[1]ost profits are recoverable in promissory estoppel cases as long as there is a
substantial and sufficient factual basis supporting the amount awarded.").
279 See Creative Demos Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 142 F.3d 367, 369 (7th Cir. 1998) ("[Iln
Indiana, as in most other states, promissory estoppel does not support lost-profits damages.");
Rosnick v. Dinsmore, 457 N.W.2d 793, 800 (Neb. 1990) ("[t]he usual measure of damages under
a theory of promissory estoppel is the loss incurred by the promisee in reasonable reliance on the
promise, or 'reliance damages."'); Fretz Constr. Co. v. S. Nat'l Bank, 626 S.W.2d 478, 483 (Tex.
1981) (stating '[d]amages recoverable in a case of promissory estoppel are not the profit that the
promisee expected, but only the amount necessary to restore him to the position he would have
been in had he not acted in reliance on the promise" (citations omitted)); Range v. Calvary Christian
Fellowship, NO. 14-15-00672-CV, 2017 WL 2819254, at *20-22 (Tex. Ct. App. June 29, 2017)
(utilizing the reliance view); Bouton v. Byers, No. 109,026, 2014 Kan. App. LEXIS 14, at *17
(Kan. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2014) ("permitting a restorative remedy would be consistent with
protecting reasonable reliance interests, the fundamental purpose of promissory estoppel."); ;
Bechtel Corp v. CITGO Prods. Pipeline Co., 271 S.W. 3d 898, 927 (Tex. Ct. App.
2008) ("expectancy damages like lost profits, for example, are not recoverable based on promissory
estoppel"); Joeger v. Gordon Food Serv., Inc., 568 N.W.2d 365, 369 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) ("[t]he
guiding principle in determining an appropriate measure of damages is to ensure that the promisee
is compensated for the loss suffered to the extent of the promisee's reliance"); Wyatt v. BellSouth
Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1327 (M.D. Ala. 1992) (holding under Alabama law reliance measure
applies to promissory estoppel).
280 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. b (1981) (noting flexibility of
section 90); see also Walser v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A. Inc., 43 F.3d 396, 402 (8th Cir. 1994)
(holding promissory estoppel damages properly limited to reliance damages where lost profits
were "far from a certainty"); Merex A.G. v. Fairchild Weston Sys., Inc., 29 F.3d 821, 826 (2d Cir.
1994) ("[i]f successful [on a promissory estoppel claim], the plaintiff is not entitled, as of right, to
expectation damages; the court retains the discretion to award relief to avoid 'injustice,' and can
mold that relief 'as justice requires."'); Chedd-Angier Prod. Co. v. Omni Publ'ns Int., 756 F.2d
930, 937 (1st Cir. 1985) (allowing expectation damages on promissory estoppel claim and finding
recovery amount in discretion of court); Green v. Interstate United Mgmt. Serv. Corp., 748 F.2d
827, 831 (3d Cir. 1984) (limiting recoverable damages on promissory estoppel claim to reliance
damages given the promise's "manifestly contingent nature."); Weitz v. Hands, Inc., 882 N.W.2d
659, 672 (Neb. 2016) (finding no single measure of damages applies in promissory estoppel and
damages dictated by justice); Grouse v. Grp. Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W .2d 114, 116 (Minn. 1981)
(using section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts); Toscano v. Greene Music, D043281,
2004 Cal. App. LEXIS 2029, at *10, *15 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2004) (explaining because
promissory estoppel is rooted in equity, trial courts can "fashion remedies in the interests ofjustice"
and award damages "proven with reasonable certainty"); Hunter v. Hayes, No. 74-239, 1975 Colo.
App. LEXIS 1019, *4 (Colo. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 1975) ("When a plaintiffs recovery is predicated
on findings of a promise and detrimental reliance thereon, there is no fixed measure of damages to
be applied in every case. Rather, the amount of damages should be tailored to fit the facts of each
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The argument for an expectation measure of damages is that reliance
serves as consideration, and that a contractual binding obligation is formed
entitling promisee to all the same remedies available to those where there
has been a breach of a mutually bargained for contract. 28 1 "Promissory
estoppel is simply consideration, cloaked in a new name."2 82 The "wrong"
remains the failure to perform the promise not in the making of the promise
or the reliance undertaken. Promissory estoppel thus remains contractual in
that it seeks to address injuries occasioned by the breaking of commitments.
"[T]he role of contract law is not reliance protection, it is bargain
enforcement." 28 3
While there appears symmetry between the activating reliance,
rendering the promise enforceable and a reliance measure of damages, it is
argued to be without substance. Under this view, promissory estoppel is not
a tort as it "rightfully belongs to the domain of promise-enforcement ... it
should neither be exiled nor shanghaied across the border."2 84 Expectation
damage-placing the party in the position they would have been had the
promise been honored-is considered the best means of protecting the
bargain including the reliance interest.2 85 Unlike a reliance measure, the
expectation measure allows for compensation of lost opportunities and
provides more accurate and complete compensation for the harm caused.
Expectancy relief, likewise, promotes beneficial economic activity. Under
this view, ordinary contractual remedial rules apply and, as such, absent a

case and should be only that amount which justice requires."); ZBS Indus. Inc., 637 N.E.2d at 960
(noting remedy for promissory estoppel is either expectation or reliance depending upon what
equity requires); Lobolito, Inc. v. N. Pocano Sch. Dist., No. 193 M.D. Appeal Docket 1999, 2000
Pa. LEXIS 1843, at *18 n.10 (Pa. 2000) (noting remedy for promissory estoppel is to be limited as
justice requires); Dynalectric Co. of Nev. v. Clark & Sullivan Constructors, Inc., No. 51758, 2011
Nev. LEXIS 43, at *7 (Nev. July 14, 2011) (same); see also Cosnan v. Street Eats, Ltd., 15-CV00858-RJA-JJM, 2016 WL 8416456, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2016) (noting measure of damages
for promissory estoppel may differ depending on factual presentation).
281 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 347 cmt. a (1981) ("Contract damages are
ordinarily based on the injured party's expectation interest and are intended to give him the benefit
of his bargain by awarding him a sum of money that will, to the extent possible, put him in as good
a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed."); see also VMark Software
Inc. v. EMC Corp., 642 N.E.2d 587, 590 n.2 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) ("[t]he long-established general
rule for breach of contract recovery in Massachusetts is that the wronged party should receive the
benefit of his bargain, i.e., be placed in the same position as if the contract had been performed")
(citing John Hetherington & Sons, Ltd. v. William Firth Co., 95 N.E. 961, 962 (Mass. 1911)).
282 C.M.A. McCauliff, A Historical Approach to the Contractual Ties That Bind Parties
Together, 71 FORD L. REv. 841, 864 (2002).
283 See Knapp, supra note 22, at 1211.
284 Id. at 1333.
285 See Seattle First Nat'l Bank, N.A. v. Siebol, 824 P.2d 1252, 1256 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992)
(using measure of lost profits available in promissory estoppel claim).
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showing that benefit of the bargain damages were not foreseeable or too
uncertain or speculative, the expectation measure applies.286
The reliance proponents view the "wrong" as the plaintiff's reliance
and change of position, not the denial of the expectation of the actual
promise. It is the reliance interest underlying the promise that is important.
Where a contract has failed to be formed, the promisee can be fairly deemed
to be partially responsible for not forming a mutually binding contract and,
as such, justice and equity require no more than to put the promisee in the
position he or she would have been had there been no action or
forbearance. 287 Reliance, in turn, allows for the recognition that there
remains a viable distinction between bargained for contracts and those
imposed unilaterally through reliance. A reliance remedial approach thus
allows the doctrine to not fully unmoor contractual bargains.288
It has been argued, as well, that if there is no binding contract but
only a promise which causes reasonable reliance, benefit of the bargain
damages chills the incentive for, and freedom to, negotiate. 28 9 This reliance
view is thus a more "tort" or "equitable" view of promissory estoppel as
opposed to a contractual view. 2 90 The "tort" like nature of promissory
estoppel is revealed by the element that a party has a duty not to make
promises which it does or should understand will cause reasonable
reliance. 2 9 1 By providing relief by reliance, promissory estoppel-as with the
tort of misrepresentation-more appropriately seeks to punish or deter those
who mislead or cause those to act to their detriment.292 Finally, there is an
Seattle FirstNat'l Bank, N.A., 824 P. 2d at 1256.
287 SeeClifford R. Gray, Inc. v. LeChance Const. Servs., 857 N.Y.S.2d 347, 350 (N.Y. App.
286

Div. 2008) (holding no right to benefit of bargain damages where no mutual assent and thus no
bargain).
288 See D&G Stout, Inc. v. Bacardi Imports, Inc., 923 F.2d 566, 569 (7th Cir. 1991) ("the line
Indiana draws is between expectation damages and reliance damages ..Indiana will not grant
relief based on promissory estoppels to compensate and aggrieved party for ... expectancy
damages."); Wyatt v. Bellsouth Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1327 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (using Alabama
law, reliance is appropriate measure of damages for promissory estoppel); Wilder v. Cody Cty.
Chamber of Commerce, 933 P. 2d 1098, 1107 (Wyo. 1997) (striking award of lost profits for
promissory estoppels claims).
289 Dixon v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 798 F. Supp. 2d 338, 347 (D. Mass. 2011) (noting that
enforcing reliance-based promises, made during negotiations, restricts parties' freedom to justify
reliance damages).
29 See VMark Software, Inc. v. EMC Corp., 642 N.E.2d 587, 588-90 n. 2 (Mass. App. Ct.
1994) (finding measure of contract reliance damages "similar to the tort standard of actual, or outof-pocket, loss proximately suffered.").
291 See Alden, supra note 6, at 671-73 (describing promissory estoppel as a tort).
292 See, e.g., Twin Fire Inv. LLC. V. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 837 N.E.2d 1121,
1135-36 (Mass. 2005) (noting benefit of bargain is general rule for fraud claim although, court can
limit damages). "Limiting recovery to reliance damages where the plaintiffs have suffered no loss
of value in the subject of the transaction is consistent with the purpose of tort law 'to compensate
for loss sustained and to restore the plaintiff to his former position, and not to give him the benefit
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argument that to reject reliance and award benefit of the bargain is to elevate
innocent, albeit serious, promises to the same stature as intentional
misrepresentations.2 93
The flexible or discretionary approach adopted by the Second
Restatement, in turn, permits the Court to identify the appropriate measure
based on the circumstances and in the "interest ofjustice."2 94 It has been held
that while affording discretion based on the doctrine's equitable nature, the
discretion must be "limited as justice requires."295 Some courts have found
that the language and intent of section 90 suggests specific performance or
expectation as the presumed remedy, subject to the discretion of the court to
award something else (usually reliance) when the circumstances so
dictate.2 96 Comment d of the Second Restatement supports this view:
of any contract he has made with the defendant."' Id See also David v. Belmont, 197 N.E. 83, 85
(Mass. 1935) ("the rule of damages is one to compensate the party for the loss suffered by the
wrong which has been done"); Greenstein v. Flatley, 474 N.E.2d 1130, 1134 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985)
(awarding compensatory and punitive damages, finding defendant mislead plaintiffs into believing
deal was made).
293 See Twin Fires, 837 N.E.2d at 1135 (noting benefit of bargain is general rule for fraud
claim although, court can limit damages). While statements as to future intention are not always
actionable, they are actionable when the parties are not on "equal footing" or the promise-making
party is deemed to have superior knowledge. See also Cellucci v. Sun Oil Co., 320 N.E.2d 919,
920-24 (Mass. App. Ct. 1974); Alden, supranote 6, at 673 (discussing promissory estoppel as an
intentional tort).
294 See, e.g., Walser v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 43 F.3d 396, 402 (8th Cir. 1994) (limiting
promissory estoppels damage to reliance damages where lost profits were "far from a certainty");
Merex A.G. v. Fairchild Weston Sys., 29 F.3d 821, 826 (2nd Cir. 1994) ("If successful [in a
promissory estoppel claim], the plaintiff is not entitled, as or right, to expectation damages; the
court retains the discretion to award relief to avoid 'injustice' and can mold that relief 'as justice
requires"'); Chedd-Angier Prod. Co. v. Omni Publ'n Int'l, Ltd., 756 F.2d 930, 936-37 (1st Cir.
1985) (allowing expectation damages, and stating., "whether to charge full contract damages, or
something less, is a matter of discretion delegated to the district court."); Newton Tractor Sales,
Inc. v. Kubota Tractor Corp., 906 N.E.2d 520, 524, 528 (Ill. 2009) (using discretionary approach);
Cambridge Says. Bank v. Boersner, 597 N.E.2d 1017, 1023 n. 13 (Mass. 1992) (finding plaintiff
may be entitled to range of damages and recovery "may be limited as justice requires"); Gold v.
Dubish, 549 N.E.2d 660, 666 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) ("an award of damages based on lost profits may
be appropriate in a promissory estoppels case when such an award is necessary in order to do
compete justice."); Toscano v. Greene Music, D043281, 2004 Cal. App. LEXIS 2029, at *10 (Cal.
Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2004) (seeing as promissory estoppels is rooted in equity, trial court free to
"fashion remedies in the interests of justice"); Hunter v. Hayes, 533 P.2d 952, 954 (Colo. App.
1975) ("no fixed measure of damages to be applied in every case; damages should be tailored to fit
the facts of each case and should only be that amount which justice requires").
295 See C & K Eng'g Contractors v. Amber Steel Co., 587 P.2d 1136, 1139 (Cal. 1978); see
also Harvey, supra note 38, at 675 (explaining drafters of § 90 "wanted to assure remedial
flexibility under a grant of discretion to protect expectancy, reliance or restitution interests as
deemed appropriate").
296 See Jackson v. Morse, 871 A.2d 47, 51-52 (N.H. 2007) (stating expectation damages is
presumed remedy for promissory estoppel unless awarding would be inequitable); Gutteridge v. J3
Energy Grp., Inc., No. 3397 EDA 2013, 2015 WL 7253671, at *5-6 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015) (noting
general rule to award "value of the defendant's promises unless equity dictates otherwise"); see
also Lobolito, Inc. v. N. Pocono Sch. Dist., 755 A.2d 1287, 1292 n. 10 (limiting promissory
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A promise binding under this section is a contract, and fullscale enforcement by normal remedies is often appropriate.
But the same factors which bear on whether any relief
should be granted also bear on the character and extent of
the remedy. In particular, relief may sometimes be limited
to restitution or to damages or specific relief measured by
the extent of the promisee's reliance rather than by the terms
of the promise."2 9 7
Others make no mention of any presumption and emphasize that the
remedy is flexible and determined by the specific circumstances.2 98
The treatment of reliance as consideration, as well as the frequent
emphasis that a promise enforceable through reliance is considered a
contractual obligation, suggests rather strongly that full contractual or
expectation damages are an appropriate remedy where otherwise not
precluded.29 9 Not surprisingly, a number of decisions reflect expectation

estoppel remedy as justice requires); Walser, 43 F. 3d at 402 (finding damages properly limited
to reliance damages where lost profits were "far from a certainty"); Merex, 29 F.3d at 826 ("If
successful [on promissory estoppel claim], the plaintiff is not entitled, as of right, to expectation
damages; the court retains the discretion to award relief to avoid 'injustice,' and can mold that relief
'as justice requires."'); Chedd-Angier Prod. Co., 756 F. 2d at 937 (holding plaintiff properly
allowed to recover expectation damages on promissory estoppel claim; "whether to charge full
contract damages, or something less, is a matter of discretion delegated to the district court.");
Green v. Interstate United Mgmt. Servs., 748 F. 2d 827, 831 (holding promissory estoppel damages
properly limited to reliance damages given "manifestly contingent nature" of promises); Toscano,
2004 Cal. App. LEXIS 2029, at *10, *15 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2004) (explaining because
promissory estoppel is rooted in equity, courts can "fashion remedies in the interests of justice"
and award damages "proven with reasonable certainty"); Hunter, 533 P. 2d at 954 ( "When a
plaintiff's recovery is predicated on findings of a promise and detrimental reliance thereon, there
is no fixed measure of damages to be applied in every case. Rather, the amount of damages should
be tailored to fit the facts of each case and should be only that amount which justice requires.").
297 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. d; see also Kiely v. Raytheon Co.,
105 F.3d 734, 736 (1st Cir. 1997) (relying on comment b of Restatement for holding
Massachusetts authorizes expectation damages under promissory estoppel).
298 Weitz, Co. v. Hands, Inc., 882 N.W.2d 659, 673 (Neb. 2016) (noting flexibility "is
consistent with promissory estoppel's equitable roots").
299 See Rhode Island Hosp. Tr. Nat'l Bank v. Varadian, 647 N.E.2d 1174, 1177-79 (Mass.
1995); Stevens v. Stevens, 12-P-773, 2013 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 883, at *7 (Mass. App. Ct.
Sept. 3, 2013) ("We treat a claim of promissory estoppel as equivalent to a contract action");
Loranger Const. Corp. v. E.F. Hauserman Co., 384 N.E.2d 176, 179 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978)
(Braucher, J.) ("When a promise is enforceable in whole or in part by virtue of reliance, it is a
'contract,' and it is enforceable pursuant to a 'traditional contract theory'). This, in turn, would be
consistent with Williston who intended the doctrine to render a promise binding by reason of
reliance and to be the same as a contract- subject to all the same rules and remedies as any
bargained for promise. Loranger Constr. Corp. v. E.F. Hauserman Co., 374 N.E.2d 306, 308-10
(Mass. App. Ct. 1978), affd, 384 N.E.2d 176 (Mass. 1978).
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awards.3 00 For instance, in the contractor bidding cases (Loranger), the
measure of damages was the difference between the sub-contractor's
301
dishonored bid and the substitute bid the contractor had to obtain. Other
courts have affirmed the award of lost profits-a consummate expectation
damage.30 2 In a 1985 case, the Appeals Court intimated that where there
could be no recovery under a contract due to public policy ground, but that
an otherwise viable claim under promissory estoppel existed for a subsidiary
promise, damages should be limited to reliance "as it would be improper to
accomplish, in the guise of compensation for breach of the subsidiary
promise, what could not be done directly because of the policy reasons. . ."0
There are likewise a number or decisions which reference the
Restatement's flexible approach and limit damages to reliance. For instance,
certain federal court decisions applying Massachusetts law have suggested
0
that the reliance measure is the governing rule."* In Palandjianv. Pahlavi,
for example, it was held that "[w]here recovery rests solely upon the justified
reliance of the promisee, without any suggestion of fraud, it would seem
equitable that such recovery be measured by the extent of the reliance
interest, i.e. restitution, rather than by conferring the benefit of the
30 7
bargain." 30 6 Further, in Dixon v. Wells Fargo, the reliance measure was
likewise found to be the operative measure as to an oral modification to a
300 See Callahan v. Bedard, 16-P-979, 2017 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 287, at *3-4 (Mass.
App. Ct. Mar. 22, 2017) (affirming award of value of promised unperformed work under
promissory estoppel claim).
301 Loranger, 374 N.E.2d at 308. It is difficult to categorize this measure as either reliance or
expectation, although many treat it as expectation as it places the contractor in the same position it
would have been in if the subcontractor had honored the bid. See Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, The
PromissoryBasis of Section 90, 101 YALE L. J. 111, 146-48 (1991) (noting ambiguity in case law
with respect to classifying this measure of damages). Scholars appear to agree, however, that the
Drennanof damages is, in fact, expectation damages. See id at 146 (concluding that this measure
represents expectation damages, even if occasionally labeled "reliance damages"); W. David
Slawson, The Role of Reliance in Contract Damages, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 197, 220-22 (1990)
(discussing impossibility of proving reliance damages in subcontract-bidding, and indicating
Drennanmeasure of damages represents expectation damages); Knapp, supra note 37, at 57 n. 35
(noting ambiguity in case law on this issue). Knapp further states that an award of damages, based
upon difference between nonperforming subcontractor's bid and amount paid to replacement
subcontractor, is a "classic expectation remedy." Id.
302 See Chedd-Angier Prod. Co. v. Omni Publ'n Intern., Ltd., 756 F.2d 930, 936 (1st Cir.
1985) (holding benefit of bargain jury charge for promissory estoppel is proper).
303 McAndrew v. Sch. Comm. of Cambridge, 480 N.E.2d 327, 333 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985). In
McAndrew, the assertion was that the Plaintiff moved from Georgia to Cambridge and served as a
band leader and teacher for three and one-half weeks, pursuant to an offer for a one-year permanent
position as a music director; however, he was fired and never provided the opportunity. Id. at 329.
Palandjian v. Pahlavi, 614 F. Supp. 1569, 1581-82 (D. Mass. 1995) (utilizing the reliance
3
measure for Massachusetts law); Dixon v. Wells Fargo, 798 F. Supp. 2d 336, 340 (D. Mass. 2011)
(same).
305 614 F. Supp. 1569 (D. Mass. 1995).
306 Palandian,614 F. Supp. at 1581 n. 1.
307 798 F. Supp. 2d 336 (D. Mass. 2011).
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line of credit and in the context of a promise in the midst of negotiation and
on-going relationship.30 8There, the court held the reliance measure of
damages applied to a claim made by a borrower against a lender and which
promise arose during negotiations.30 ' The court believed reliance was
appropriate, as to hold otherwise would serve to restrict the parties' freedom
to contract.310
5. Fifty State Survey
A survey of the fifty states informs that both the avoidance of
injustice element, as well as remedy, have not received significant attention
by the courts. While Section 90 is either adopted or relied upon in almost all
jurisdictions, the majority of courts have not provided any meaningful
guidance or substance to the injustice element and otherwise disagree as to
the measure of damages. Only 9 of the 50 jurisdictions have provided any
identifiable substance as to the "injustice" element with it uncertain in a
majority of decisions as to whether the element has any independent
significance beyond promise and reliance. Only Wisconsin, Minnesota,
Vermont, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and the District of Columbia have
specifically referenced and relied upon the factors or considerations
identified in the Restatement as to the injustice element. As to remedy, the
jurisdictions are divided although at least 14 jurisdictions have made clear
that the damage remedy is discretionary or dependent on the "interests of
justice."
As to independency, 21 states have indicated, at least implicitly, that
avoidance of injustice is independent of both promise and reliance. 13 states
have indicated no such independence while 17 jurisdictions appear to have
not addressed the issue.
The issue as to whether promissory estoppel or the injustice element
is for the court or jury has also received fairly scant attention. Indeed, 40
jurisdictions have yet to directly address the issue with promissory estoppel
claims otherwise being routinely submitted for jury determination. Of the
jurisdictions that have addressed the issue, six have found no right to a jury
trial as to either the claim or the injustice element while four have found a
308 See id. at 347 (finding promise to complete HAMP loan modification
can create estoppel
claim, limited to reliance damages). The court states, "to negotiate a loan modification would give
the borrower the right to stay in his or her home - the doctrine of promissory estoppel is properly
invoked under Massachusetts law to provide at least reliance based recovery." Id. at 352.
3
Dixon, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 347-48 (finding reliance damages appropriate for estoppel
claim for promises during negotiation between borrower and lender).
310 Id. at 347 (asserting reliance is appropriate to avoid restricting parties from the freedom to
contract).
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right to a jury trial. As to federal decisions decided under the federal common
law, four circuits (Second, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth) addressing the issue
311
have held no right to jury based on the circumstances presented. The
Federal District Court decisions that have addressed the issue are about
evenly split.3 12 The result of the review is as follows:3 13
States

Adopts
Section
90

Explanation

Right to

Injustice

Injustice

Damages

Jury

Independent

Court/Fact

(R, E, or

of the

-Finder

D)

Injustice

NYA

31

Trial

Element
Alabama

Y

3 14

NYA

Y

R 5&

N

31

E 6
Alaska

y317

Y318

Y

FF

NYA31

Y320

311 See InCompass IT, Inc. v. XO Commc'n. Servs., 719 F.3d 891, 899 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding
no right to jury trial); Merex A.G. v. Fairchild Weston Sys., 29 F.3d 821, 826 (2d Cir. 1994)
(holding no jury); Nimrod Marketing, Ltd. v. Texas Energy Inv. Corp., 769 F.2d, 1076 1079 (5th
Cir. 1985) (finding plaintiffs complaint not triable); Wyler, 235 F.3d 1184, 1194 (distinguishing
cases allowing trial).
312 Compare Miller v. Bank of Am., Case No. 2:13-cv-02203-RFB-CWH, 2016 WL
3636920, at *2-3 (D. Nev. July 7, 2016) (holding no right to jury on promissory estoppel claim);
and Friedman v. U.S. Bank, No. 2:10-CV-01544 RSM, 2014 WL 969642, at *4-5 (W.D. Wash.
Mar. 12, 2014) (same); Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc., No. 98 Civ.861 RWS, 99
Civ.3687 RWS, 2003 WL 1345136, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 19, 2003 (same) with Sedghi v.
PatchLink Corp., 823 F. Supp. 2d 298,307 (D. Md 2011) (allowing right to jury trial on promissory
estoppel claim); Burton v. General Motors, No. 1:95-cv-1054-DFH-TAB, 2008 WL 3853329, at
*31-32 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 15, 2008) (same); Roberts v. Karimi, 204 F. Supp. 2d 523, 528-29
(E.D.N.Y. 2000) (same).
313 NYA=Not yet addressed; Y=Yes; N=No; C= Court; FF=Fact-Finder; E= Expectation; R=
Reliance; D=Discretionary.
314 See Cantrell v. City Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 496 So. 2d 746, 751 (Ala. 1986).
311 See Graddick First Farmer's & Merchants Nat'l Bank of Troy, 453 So. 2d 1305, 1210 (Ala.
1984); see also Wyatt v. BellSouth, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1327 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (applying
appropriate measure of damages for
the
"reliance damages are
law,
Alabama
a promissory estoppel claim").
316 Smith v. Norman, 495 So. 2d 536, 537-38 (Ala. 1986).
317 Sea Hawk Seafoods, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 282 P.3d 359, 365-66 (Alaska 2012); Slaymaker
v. Peterkin, 518 P.2d 763, 766 (Alaska 1974).
* See Brooks v. Hollaar, 297 P.3d 125, 129-31 (Alaska 2013).
319 See Alaska Bussell Elec. Co. v. Vern Hickel Constr. Co., 688 P.2d 576, 581 n.8 (Alaska
1984).
320 See Alaska Democratic Party v. Rice, 934 P.2d 1313, 1317 (Alaska 1997).
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321 See Chewning v. Palmer, 650 P.2d 438,440 (Ariz. 1982); Waugh v. Lennard, 211 P.2d 806,
812 (Ariz. 1949).
322 But see Big Bear Imp. Brokers, Inc. v. LAI Game Sales, Inc., No. CV-08-2256-PHX-

DGC, 2010 WL 729208, at *5 n. 4 (D. Ariz. Mar. 2, 2010) ("It is not clear that [plaintiff] is entitled
to a jury trial on its promissory estoppel claim.... The parties should address this issue in their
proposed final pretrial order.").
323 Compare Higginbottom v. State, 51 P. 3d 972, 977 (Ariz. 2002), and Contempo Constr. v.
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 736 P.2d 13, 16 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (explaining justifiable
reliance) with Emp'rs Reassurance Corp. v. GMAC Ins., 308 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1018 (D. Ariz.
2004) (using injustice as factor).
324 .See Davis v. Bank of America Corp., No.-CV-12-01059-PHX-NVW, 2012 WL 5984939,
at *3 (D. Ariz. 2012).
323 See DePriest v. Astrazeneca Pharm. L.P., 351 S.W.3d 168, 179-80 (Ark. 2009); Van Dyke
v. Glover, 934 S.W.2d 204, 209 (Ark. 1996).
326 See C & K Eng'g Contractors v. Amber Steel Co., 587 P.2d 1136, 1139-41 (Cal. 1978); AC Co. v. Sec. Pac. Nat'l Bank, No. D001064, 1985 Cal. App. LEXIS 2642, at *16-22 (Cal. Ct. App.
Oct. 18, 1985).
327 See Wilson v. Los Angeles Cty. Metro. Transp. Auth., 1 P.3d 63, 66-67 (Cal. 2000);
Toscano v. Greene Music, D043281, 2004 Cal. App. LEXIS 2029, at *8-10 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 2,
2004).
328 See Cooper v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. E047002, 2009 Cal. App. LEXIS 1544, at *4647(Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2009).
329 See Kinzli v. City of Santa Cruz, 539 F. Supp. 887, 901-02 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (noting court
had choice in granting remedy under Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 90).
330 See Wheat Ridge Urban Renewal Auth. v. Cornerstone Grp. XXII L.L.C., 176 P.3d 737,
741 (Colo. 2007); Vigoda v. Denver Urban Renewal Auth., 646 P.2d 900, 905 (Colo. 1982); Kiely
v. St. Germain, 670 P.2d 764, 767 (Colo. 1983).
331 See Snow Basin, Ltd. v. Boettcher& Co., 805 P. 2d 1151, 1153 (Colo. App. 1990).
332 See Jones v. Denver Pub. Schs., 427 F.3d 1315, 1325-26 (10th Cir. 2005).
3 See Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs v. DeLozier, 917 P.2d 714, 716 (Colo. 1996).
334 See Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385, 387 (Conn. 1980).
335 See Chem-Tek, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 816 F. Supp. 123, 131 (D. Conn. 1993).
336 See id.
1
See Lord v. Souder, 748 A.2d 393, 396-99 (Del. 2000).
338 See Harmon v. Delaware Harness Racing Comm'n, 62 A.3d 1198, 1202 (Del. 2013);
Chrysler Corp. v. Chaplake Holdings, Ltd., 822 A.2d 1024, 1034 (Del. 2003); Chrysler Corp. v.
Quimby, 144 A.2d 885, 887-88 (Del. 1958). But see Richardson v. Bd. of Pension Tr., No. 574,
2016, 2017 WL 3721791, at *3 n.19 (Del. Aug. 29, 2017) (noting no need to address either
reasonable expectation or avoidance of injustice prongs).
339 Id.
340 Ramone v. Lang, No. 1592-N, 2006 WL 4762877, at *16-17 (Del. Ch. Apr. 3, 2006); Haveg
Corp. v. Guyer, 226 A.2d 231, 236-38 (Del. 1967).
341 Harmon, 62 A.3d at 1202.

JOURNAL OF TRIAL &APPELLATE ADVOCACY [Vol. XXIII

62

District of

Y34 2

NYA

NYA

NYA

D3

Y3"

NYA

Y

NYA

R34

N

D3"

N

Y

Columbia
Florida
Georgia

Y

NYA

Y347

NYA

Hawaii

Y349

NYA

NYA

NYA

Ds350

N

Idaho

Y 35 '

NYA

N352

NYA

NYA

N

Illinois

Y 3 53

NYA

NYA

D35s

N

358

N

Indiana

Y3

56

Y

35

7

NYA

NYA

3

5

NYA

R

See Ficken v. AMR Corp., 578 F. Supp. 2d 134, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
See Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684, 684-85 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
*4 See Vila v. Inter-American Inv. Corp., 570 F. 3d 274, 282 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Granfield v.
Catholic Univ. of Am., 530 F. 2d 1035, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
345 See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Geodata Servs., Inc., 547 So. 2d 919, 924 (Fla. 1989); Leonardi
v. City of Hollywood, 715 So. 2d 1007, 1008-09 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
346 See Devon Med., Inc. v. Ryvmed Med., Inc., 60 So. 3d 1125, 1126-28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2011).
347 See U.S. Foodservice., Inc. v. Bartow Cty. Bank, 685 S.E.2d 777, 780 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009).
348 See Mbigi v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 785 S.E.2d 8, 18-21 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016).
349 See Ravelo v. County of Hawaii, 658 P.2d 883, 885 (Haw. 1983).
31o See Gonsalves v. Nissan Motor Corp., 58 P.3d 1196, 1226-27 (Haw. 2002); see also HiPac, Ltd. v. Avoset Corp., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1236-38 (D. Haw. 1997) (limiting damages to
reliance).
351 See Smith v. Boise Kenworth Sales, Inc., 625 P.2d 417, 421-22 (Idaho 1981).
352 See Brown v. City of Pocatello, 229 P.3d 1164, 1169-70 (Idaho 2010).
353 See Newton Tractors Sales, Inc. v. Kubota Tractor Corp., 906 N.E.2d 520, 523-24 (Ill.
2009) (citing Bank of Marion v. Robert "Chick" Fritz, Inc., 311 N.E.2d 138 (Ill. 1974)).
354 See R.S. Bennett & Co. v. Econ. Mech. Indus., Inc., 606 F. 2d 182, 186 (7th Cir. 1979)
(noting injustice might be question of law, citing Wisconsin law).
1ss See Newton Tractors, 906 N.E.2d at 527-29; State Mech. Contractors, Inc. v. Pleasant Hill,
477 N.E.2d 509, 512-13 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); see also Goldstick v. ICM Realty, 788 F.2d 456, 464
(7th Cir. 1986) (applying Illinois law where presumptive measure of damages is expectation); Gold
v. Dubish, 549 N.E.2d 660, 666 (111. App. Ct. 1989) ("[A]n award of damages based on lost profits
may be appropriate in a promissory estoppel case when such an award is necessary in order to do
complete justice."); Gerson Elec. Constr. Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 453 N.E.2d 726, 728 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1983) (permitting plaintiff to seek expectation damages of lost profits for promissory estoppel
claim).
316 See First Nat'l Bank of Logansport v. Logan Mfg. Co.., 577 N.E.2d 949, 954 (Ind. 1991);
Lyon Metal Products, Inc. v. Hagerman Const. Corp., 391 N.E.2d 1152, 1154 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979).
3
See Burton v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 1:95-cv-1054-DFH-TAB, 2008 WL 3853329, at *89 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 15, 2008).
ss See D & G Stout, Inc. v. Bacardi Imps., Inc., 923 F.2d 566, 569 (7th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he line
Indiana draws is between expectation damages and reliance damages. . .. Indiana will not grant
expectancy
relief based on promissory estoppel to compensate an aggrieved party for ...
damages."); Jarboe v. Landmark Community. Newspapers, 644 N.E.2d 118, 122 (Ind. 1994)
(noting Indiana draws line between expectation damages and reliance damages), reh'g denied. The
court further held that where doctrine of promissory estoppel may be available the remedy "is
limited to damages actually resulting from the detrimental reliance." Id.; Hrezo v. City of
Lawrenceburg, 934 N.E. 2d 1221, 1231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) ("A successful party is entitled to
reliance damages only...."). But see Burton, 2008 WL 3853329, at *19 (Hamilton, J.) ("There is
no simple answer to the question of what type of damages are appropriate as a remedy for
promissory estoppel. The court concludes that under federal common law, the court and/or the jury
has the discretion to fashion the remedy needed to avoid injustice based on a promissory estoppel
342
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claim, which can include either expectation damages or reliance damages. Indiana law is essentially
the same in a case like this.").
. See Schoffv. Combined Ins. Co. ofAm., 604 N.W.2d43,48 (Iowa 1999) (discussing theory
of promissory estoppel allows liability despite absence of consideration); Allen v. AgReliant
Genetics, L.L.C., No. C15-3172-LTS, 2017 WL 1055970, at *1, *6 (N.D. Iowa Mar. 20, 2017)
(citing Miller v. Lawlor, 66 N.W.2d 267, 272 (Iowa 1954)) ("'Promissory estoppel' is now a
recognized species of consideration.").
so See Hauan Farms, Inc. v. Northland Coop., No. 00-0370, 2001 WL 1577170, at *1, *5-6
(Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2001) (suggesting error in court denying right to jury trial on promissory
estoppel claim).
361
See National Bank of Waterloo v. Moeller, 434 N.W.2d 887, 889 (Iowa 1989) (citing In re
Estate of Graham, 295 N.W.2d 414, 418 (Iowa 1980); Johnson v. Pattison, 185 N.W.2d 790, 795
(Iowa 1971); Miller v. Lawlor 66 N.W.2d 267, 273 (Iowa 1954)) ("The essential elements of
promissory estoppel are well established: (1) a clear and definite agreement; (2) proof that the party
urging the doctrine acted to its detriment in reasonable reliance on the agreement; and (3) a finding
that the equities support enforcement of the agreement."); accordMatter of Graham's Estate, 295
N.W.2d 414, 418 (Iowa 1980) (alteration in original) (quoting In re Estate of Newsen, 219 N.W.
305, 307 (Iowa 1928)) ("It is the agreement to, and mutual understanding of, the existence of an
obligation assumed by one of the parties to the other, that . .. is the essential element of a
contract."); Allen, 2017 WL 1055970, at *6 (citing Johnson v. Pattison, 185 N.W.2d 790, 795 (Iowa
1971)) ("We have set forth the following elements as essential for recovery under a theory of
promissory estoppel: '(1) a clear and definite oral agreement; (2) proof that plaintiff acted to his
detriment in reliance thereon; and (3) a finding that the equities entitle the plaintiff to this relief."');
But see Kallich v. N. Iowa Anesthesiology Assocs., P.C., 179 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1053 (N.D. Iowa
2002) (noting reliance and injustice element not met).
362 See Jerry's Homes, Inc. v. Tamko Roofing Prods., Inc., 40 Fed. Appx. 326, 327 (8th Cir.
2002) (applying Iowa law).
363 See Bouton v. Byers, 321 P.3d 780, 787 (Kan. App. 2014) (citing Mohr. v. State Bank of
Stanley, 770 P.2d 466 (Kan. 1989); Walker v. Ireton, 559 P.2d 340, 346 (Kan. 1977)) ("The Kansas
Supreme Court has recognized promissory estoppel to be applicable when: (1) a promisor
reasonably expects a promisee to act in reliance on a promise; (2) the promisee, in turn, reasonably
so acts; and (3) a court's refusal to enforce the promise would countenance a substantial injustice.").
" See Glasscock v. Wilson Constructors, Inc., 627 F.2d 1065, 1068 (10th Cir. 1980)
(applying Kansas law); Terra Venture, Inc. v. JDN Real Estate, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1202-03 (D.
Kansas 2004) (recognizing similar test discussed by court in Bouton to establish promissory
estoppel).
365 See Sawyer v. Mills, 295 S.W.3d 79, 89 (Ky. 2009) (citation omitted) (quoting Meade
Constr. Co. v. Mansfield Com. Elec., 579 S.W.2d 105, 106 (Ky. 1979)) ("The doctrine of
promissory estoppel provides ... : 'A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to
induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce
such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.').
366 See Sadler v. General Electric Co., No. 3:17-CV-328-TBR, 2017 WL 4158644, at *2 (W.D.
Ky. Sept. 19, 2017) (identifying injustice as required element); Harris v. Burger King Corp., 993
F. Supp. 2d 677, 692 (W.D. Ky. 2014) (failing to plead facts indicating reliance
and injustice warranted dismissal).
367 See Harris,993 F. Supp. 2d at 692 (applying the injustice element).
3
See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1967 (1985) (providing a cause of action for detrimental
reliance). Louisiana had never adopted Section 90, but does have a cause of action for detrimental
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reliance and is codified in Louisiana Civil Code article 1967. See also FMB Dev., L.L.C. v.
Hibernia Nat'l Bank, 224 So. 3d 431, 434, 438-39 (4th Cir. 2017) (following Louisiana law on
detrimental reliance).
369 See Wilson v. Strong, 474 A.2d 176, 178 (Me. 1984) (discussing elements of promissory
estoppel); Chapman v. Bomann, 381 A.2d 1123, 1127 (Me. 1978) (defining promissory estoppel).
370 See Bowden v. Grindle, 651 A.2d 347, 349-50 (Me. 1994) (finding no right to jury trial on
legal defenses to equitable claim); Strong, 474 A.2d at 179-80 (holding due to circumstances of
case, submitting equitable claim to jury was prejudicial error); see also Berry v. WorldWide
Language Res., Inc., 811 F. Supp. 2d 523, 528 (D. Me. 2011) (resolving promissory estoppel claim
by jury trial, but with plaintiffs breach of contract claim).
371 See Harvey v. Dow, 11 A.3d 303, 308 (Me. 2011) (approving doctrine of promissory
estoppel as set forth in Section 90); Daigle Com. Grp. v. St. Laurent, 734 A.2d 667, 674-75 (Me.
1999) (citation omitted) ("[under section 90] "[a] promise binding under [promissory estoppel is a
contract, and full-scale enforcement by normal remedies is often appropriate.").
372 See Pavel Enters., Inc. v. A. S. Johnson Co., 674 A.2d 521, 527 (Md. 1996) (relying on
Section 90 of Restatement); Maryland Nat'l Bank v. United Jewish Appeal Fed'n, Inc., 407 A.2d
1130, 1134 (Md. 1979) (enforcing Section 90).
13
See Sedghi v. PatchLink Corp., 823 F. Supp. 2d 298, 307 (D. Md. 2011) (finding right to
jury trial on promissory estoppel claim); Ver Brycke v. Ver Brycke, 843 A.2d 758, 775 (Md.
2004) (finding unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel claims "were claims at law because they
[sought] restitution. . ."); see also Nimrod Mktg. (Overseas), Ltd. v. Texas Energy Inv. Corp., 769
F.2d 1076, 1080 (5th Cir. 1985) ("Promissory estoppel is an equitable form of action in which
equitable rights alone are recognized... Defendants had no right to trial by jury.
374 See Union Trust Co. v. Charter Med. Corp., 663 F. Supp. 175, 178 n.4 (D. Md.
1986), aff'd, 823 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1987) (suggesting the unjust enrichment element is redundant).
375 See Pavel, 674 A.2d at 533-34 (applying test of Section 90).
376 See Newton v. Kenific Grp., 62 F. Supp. 3d 439, 446 (D. Md. 2014) (finding reliance
applicable).
.. See State Bank of Standish v. Curry, 500 N.W.2d 104, 107 (Mich. 1993) (recognizing
Restatement Section 90).
378 See Katterman Trucking, Inc. v. Laidlaw, No. 199283, 1998 WL 1997525, at *1-2 (Mich.
Ct. App. Jan. 23, 1998) (quoting Curry, 500 N.W.2d at 107-08 & Maxwell v. Bay City Bridge Co.,
2 N.W. 639, 647 (Mich. 1879)) ("[T]he question of [the doctrine of estoppel's] application in any
case is a mixed question of law and fact, and in cases of jury trial must be submitted to the jury
under proper instructions.
379 See Tomaski v. SRW, Inc., No. 190978, 1997 WL 33343340, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 3,
1997) (utilizing Michigan law to analyze promissory estoppel); Taylor v. First of American BankWayne, 973 F.2d 1284, 1288 (6th Cir. 1992) (applying Michigan law).
"0 See Joerger v. Gordon Food Serv., Inc., 568 N.W.2d 365, 369 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997)
(following Restatement Section 90 for remedies granting breach in promissory estoppel action).
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See Grouse v. Grp. Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114, 116 (Minn. 1981) (applying
Restatement Section 90); see also Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 203-04 (Minn.
1990) (opting for promissory estoppel analysis in Minnesota).
382 See Olson v. Synergistic Techs. Bus., 628 N.W.2d 142, 152 (Minn. 2001) (analyzing
evolvement of promissory estoppel in Minnesota).
383 See Faimon v. Winona State Univ., 540 N.W.2d 879, 883 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (failing to
demonstrate last prong of promissory estoppel, injustice as result of broken promise).
38 See Grouse, 306 N.W.2d at 116 ("'(t)he remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice
requires.' Relief may be limited to damages measured by the promisee's reliance.").
385 See Faimon, 540 N.W.2d at 883 ("Numerous considerations enter into a judicial
determination of injustice, including the reasonableness of a promisee's reliance and a weighing of
public policies in favor of both enforcing bargains and preventing unjust enrichment.").
386 See Brewer v. Universal Credit Co., 192 So. 902, 904 (Miss. 1940) (discussing Restatement
Section 90).
387 See Prenger v. Baumhoer, 939 S.W.2d 23, 26 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (establishing four
elements of promissory estoppel from Restatement Section 90).
388 See InCompass IT, Inc. v. XO Commc'ns Servs. 719 F.3d 891, 898 (8th Cir. 2013)
(asserting no right to jury trial under federal law).
389 See Midwest Energy, Inc. v. Orion Food Sys., Inc., 14 S.W.3d 154, 161 (Mo. Ct. App.
2000) (finding "injustice" element not appropriate in summary judgment when other elements of
Section 90 are present); Zipper v. Health Midwest, 978 S.W.2d 398, 412 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998)
(determining under Restatement factors, adequacy and availability of remedy at law is most
significant).
39 See Midwest Energy, Inc., 14 S.W.3d at 160 ("The last sentence of Section 90(1) provides
'[t]he remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.' Damages are measured by the
reliance and should be limited to those naturally flowing from the reliance.").
391 See Geisinger v. A & B Farms, Inc., 820 S.W.2d 96, 99-100 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991)
(discussing Section 139 of Restatement and whether injustice is only avoided by enforcement of
promise).
392 See Neumann v. Aid Ass'n for Lutherans, 775 F. Supp. 1350, 1353-54 (D. Mont. 1991)
(citing Tynes v. Bankers Life Co., 730 P.2d 1115 (Mont. 1986)) (relying on rationale in Tynes to
bring promissory estoppel claim).
See Turner v. Wells Fargo Bank, 291 P.3d 1082, 1089 (Mont. 2012) (discussing equitable
39
estoppel claims); Trad Indus., LTD v. Brogan, 805 P.2d 54, 59 (Mont. 1991) ("When a promisee
reasonably and foreseeably relies on a promise to his detriment the promise is binding if injustice
can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.").
394 See Rosnick v. Dinsmore, 457 N.W.2d 793, 799 (Neb. 1990) (noting one distinction
contrary to Restatement view). The law in Nebraska is that a promissory estoppel action may be
based on an alleged promise that is insufficiently definite to form a contract, but upon which the
promisee's reliance is reasonable and foreseeable. Id.
See Hossack v. CSG Sys., Inc., No. 8:13CV3178, 2014 WL 1794889, at *3 (D. Neb. May
3s
6, 2014) (suggesting because Nebraska only allows reliance damages, claim is equitable).
396 See Weitz Co., LLC v. Hands, Inc., 882 N.W.2d 659, 671-72 (Neb. 2016) (finding
enforcement of H&S Bid necessary to prevent injustice).
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39
See Dynalectric Co. v. Clark & Sullivan Constructors, Inc., 255 P.3d 286, 288-89 (Nev.
2011) (discussing Restatement Section 90 description of promissory estoppel).
398
See Wyler Summit P'ship v. Turner Broad. Sys., 235 F.3d 1184, 1194 (9th Cir. 2000)
(stating as to federal law, promissory estoppel is "a cause of action cognizable only in courts of
equity.").
39
See Vandalay Enters., Inc. v. Herrin, No. 68548, 2017 WL 700531, at *1-2 (Nev. Feb. 17,
2017) (finding court erred in dismissing promissory estoppel claim).
400 See Dynalectric Co., 255 P.3d at 289 (discussing proper remedy for promissory estoppel
claims).
401 See Panto v. Moore Bus. Forms, Inc., 547 A.2d 260, 266 (N.H. 1988) (relying on theory of
promissory estoppel); see also Rockwood v. SKF USA Inc., 687 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2012) ("The
New Hampshire Supreme Court has adopted the definition of promissory estoppel from Section 90
of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.").
402 See Jackson v. Morse, 871 A.2d 47, 53 (N.H. 2005) (assessing damages for promissory
estoppel).
403 See Pop's Cones, Inc. v. Resorts Int'l Hotel, Inc., 704 A.2d 1321, 1321 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1998) (relying on principles of promissory estoppel enunciated in Restatement Section
90).
' See Toll Bros., Inc. v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 944 A.2d 1, 19 (N.J. 2008) (analyzing
the four elements of promissory estoppel); Hillsborough Rare Coins, LLC v. ADT LLC, 2017 WL
1731695, at *6 (D. N.J. May 2, 2017) (suggesting that injustice was essential justification behind
promissory estoppel rather than separate element).
405 See Rauch v. Rauch, No. A-4745-14T4, 2017 WL 3722545, at *8 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. Aug. 30, 2017) (discussing expectation damages in promissory estoppel case).
406 See Strata Prod. Co. v. Mercury Exploration Co., 916 P.2d 822, 827-28 (N.M. 1996)
(looking at theory of promissory estoppel); see also Eavenson v. Lewis Means, Inc., 730 P.2d 464,
465 (N.M. 1986) (citing Restatement and discussing elements of promissory estoppel).
" See Magnolia Mountain Ltd., P'ship v. Ski Rio Partners, Ltd., 131 P.3d 675, 682-83 (N.M.
Ct. App. 2005) (discussing elements of promissory estoppel).
408 See Eavenson, 730 P.2d at 466 n. 1 (analyzing what should happen if elements of
promissory estoppel were proven in court).
" See Merex A.G. v. Fairchild Weston Sys., Inc., 29 F.3d 821 (2d Cir. 1994) (asserting no
right to jury trial for promissory estoppel claims as to federal law); Geneva Pharm. Tech. v. Barr
Laboratories, Inc., No. 98 Civ.861 RWS, 2003 WL 1345136, at *5 (S.D. N.Y. Mar. 19, 2003)
(assessing remedy sought to establish right to jury trial does not attach).
410 See Cyberchron Corp. v. Calldata Sys. Dev., 47 F.3d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating New
York law).
411 See Clifford R. Gray, Inc. v. LaChase Constr. Servs., 51 A.D.3d 1169, 1170 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2008) (determining appropriate damages).
412 See Home Elec. Co. of Lenoir, Inc. v. Hall & Underdown Heating & Air Conditioning
Co., 358 S.E.2d 539, 540-41 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (relying on promissory estoppel as substitute

for consideration).
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413 See Russell v. Bank of Kirkwood Plaza, 386 N.W.2d 892, 896 (N.D. 1986) (discussing
recovery under promissory estoppel); Knorr v. Norberg, 872 N.W.2d 323, 326 (N.D. 2015) (listing
elements of promissory estoppel).
414 See generally Erickson v. Brown, 813 N.W.2d 531, 535-36 (N.D. 2012) (examining
promissory estoppel doctrine and its elements).
v. ACE Ltd., 909 N.E.2d 93, 100-01 (Ohio 2009)
415 See Olympic Holding Co., L.L.C.
(analyzing promissory estoppel as an action for damages).
416 See Sabatine BK Dev., LLC v. Fitzpatrick Enters., Inc., 85 N.E.3d 1127, 1132 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2017) (finding no right to jury trial on promissory estoppel when seeking specific
performance).
417 See Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 529 N.E.2d 958, 965-66 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988)
(establishing proper measure of damages).
418 See Russell v. Bd. of Cnty. Com'rs., 952 P.2d 492, 503-504 (Okla. 1997) (analyzing
handbook's binding effect as declared policy under theory of promissory estoppel).
419 See id. (discussing elements of promissory estoppel). Instead of "injustice," the court refers
to this aspect as "hardship or unfairness" in the enforcement of the promise. Id.
420 See F.D.I.C. v. Frates, 44 F.Supp.2d 1176, 1223 (N.D. Okla. 1999) ("[t]he
remaining element of the promissory estoppel doctrine would require a finding that it was
reasonable, given the totality of the circumstances, for State's board of directors to rely on the
indemnity promise alleged in this case.").
421 See Cocchiara v. Lithia Motors, Inc., 297 P.3d 1277, 1283 (Or. 2013) (adopting
Restatement formulation of promissory estoppel); Schafer v. Fraser, 290 P.2d 190, 200 (Or. 1955)
(applying Restatement).
422 See Neiss v. Ehlers, 899 P.2d 700, 707 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) (discussing when promissory
estoppel applies).
423 See Lash v. PNC Bank, No. 3:14-cv-01791-SI, 2015 WL 1319321, at *3 (D. Or. Mar. 24,
2015) (examining Oregon's recognition of promissory estoppels).
424 See Thatcher's Drug Store v. Consol. Supermarkets, Inc., 636 A.2d 156, 160 (Pa. 1994)
("The doctrine of promissory estoppel is the law in Pennsylvania.").
425 See Osborne-Davis Transp. Co. v. Mothers Work, Inc., No. 02512, 2008 WL 2175580, at
*58-60 (Pa. Ct. Comm. Pl. Feb. 20, 2008) (establishing when promissory estoppel claim can be
invoked).
426 See Thatcher's DrugStore, 636 A.2d at 160 (applying doctrine of promissory estoppel and
using Restatement).
427 See Lobolito, Inc. v. N. Pocono Sch. Dist., 755 A.2d 1287, 1293 n.10 (Pa.
2000) (citing Banas v. Matthews Int'l. Corp., 502 A.2d 637, 658 n. 12 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) ("under
promissory estoppel a promisee's recovery is ordinarily 'limited to recovery of the amounts lost
and expended in reliance on the promise"').
428 See Thatcher's DrugStore, 636 A.2d at 160 (applying doctrine of promissory estoppel and
using Restatement); Pittsburgh Baseball, Inc. v. Stadium Auth., 630 A.2d 505, 511 n. 5 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1993) ("Pennsylvania has adopted the doctrine of promissory estoppel as it appears
in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 (1979).").
429

See East Providence Credit Union v. Geremia, 239 A.2d 725, 727 (R.I. 1968) (noting

promissory estoppels definition in Restatement Section 90); Alix v. Alix, 497 A.2d 18, 21 (R.I.

1985) (using definition of promissory estoppel in Restatement).
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430 See Citizens Bank v. Gregory's Warehouse, Inc., 375 S.E.2d 316,
318 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988)
(discussing doctrine of promissory estoppel and its application).
431 See Valley Bank v. Dowdy, 337 N.W.2d 164, 165 (S.D. 1983) (citing Northwestern Eng'g
Co. v. Ellerman, 10 N.W.2d 879, 883 (S.D. 1943)) (adopting Section 90 of Restatement).
432 See Durkee v. Van Well, 654 N.W.2d 807, 813 (S.D. 2002) (citing Valley Bank, 337
N.W.2d at 165 (S.D. 1983)) (emphasizing promissory estoppel involves equitable relief).
413 See Canyon Lake Park, L.L.C., v. Loftus Dental, P.C., 700 N.W.2d 729, 739 (S.D. 2005)
(analyzing whether enforcement of easement barred by promissory estoppel); Garrett v. BankWest,
Inc., 459 N.W.2d 833, 848 (S.D. 1990) (discussing application of promissory estoppel).
434 See Alden v. Presley, 637 S.W.2d 862, 864 (Tenn. 1982) (finding Court of Appeals relied
on definition of promissory estoppel found in Restatement Section 90).
435 See Jones v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, No. W2016-00717-COA-R3-CV, 2017
WL 2972218, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 12, 2017) (discussing doctrine of promissory estoppel and
its effect on Statute of Frauds).
436 See Anderson v. Larry H. Miller Commc'ns Corp., 351 P.3d 832, 842 (Utah Ct. App. 2015)
(expressing doubt that request for money damages transforms equitable claim into legal one);
Andreason v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 848 P.2d 171, 174 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citing Tolboe Constr.
Co. v. Staker Paving & Constr. Co., 682 P. 2d 843, 849 (Utah 1984)) ("Promissory estoppel is an
equitable claim for relief which is normally tried to the bench.").
437 See Skanchy v. Calcados Ortope SA, 952 P.2d 1071, 1077 (Utah 1998) (citing Tolboe
Constr. Co., 682 P.2d at 849) (recognizing Talboe's promissory estoppel claim elements); Lantec,
Inc. v. Novell, Inc., 306 F.3d 1003, 1020-21 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing J.R. Simplot Co. v. Sales King
Int'l, Inc., 17 P.3d 1100, 1107 (Utah 2000)) ("[T]he alleged promise must be reasonably certain
and definite, and a claimant's subjective understanding of the promissor's statements cannot,
without more, support a promissory estoppel claim.").
438 See Richards v. Brown, 222 P.3d 69, 83 (Utah Ct. App. 2009) (stipulating damages must
be proven before prevailing on promissory estoppel claim); Andreason, 848 P.2d at 176 ("An award
of damages [on promissory estoppel] requires that a plaintiff prove the fact of damages by a
preponderance of the evidence .... ").
439 See generally, Trammell Crow Co. No. 60 v. Harkinson, 944 S.W.2d 631, 636 (Tex. 1997)
(analyzing application of promissory estoppel against statute of frauds); 'Moore' Burger, Inc. v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 492 S.W.2d 934, 937 (Tex. 1972) (recognizing doctrine of promissory
estoppel as exception to statute of frauds).
440 See Nimrod Mktg. (Overseas), Ltd., v. Texas Energy Inv. Corp., 769 F.2d 1076, 1079-80
(5th Cir. 1985) (observing under federal law no right to jury trial on promissory estoppel claim).
"i
See Mann v. Robles, No. 13-14-00190-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 3250, at *1, *4-5
(Tex. App. Mar. 31, 2016) (reciting relevant facts regarding promissory estoppel claim); Mid-Town
Surgical Ctr., LLP v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Texas, No. H-1 1-2086, 2012 WL 1252512, at *1,
*2 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2012) (deciding promissory estoppel claim).
"
See Range v. Calvary Christian Fellowship, 530 S.W.3d 818, 830-32 (Tex. App. 2017)
(finding no entitlement to recover on promissory estoppel claims); Fretz Constr. Co. v. S. Nat'l
Bank of Houston, 626 S.W.2d 478,483 (Tex. 1981) (holding promissory estoppel applicable).
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See Foote v. Simmonds Precision Prods. Co., 613 A.2d 1277, 1280 (Vt. 1992) (noting
"
promissory estoppel may modify at-will employment relationship and provide remedy for
discharge).
' See Tour Costa Rica v. Country Walkers, Inc., 758 A.2d 795, 801-02 (Vt. 2000) (discussing
detrimental reliance and factors of injustice element of promissory estoppel).
"' See id. at 802-04 (evaluating damages under promissory estoppel).
46 See id at 802 (quoting Remes v. Nordic Group, Inc., 726 A.2d 77, 79-80 (Vt. 1999) ("With
regard to the availability and adequacy of other remedies, we have previously stated that, '[w]hile
a full range of legal damages may be available, promissory estoppel plaintiffs are not necessarily
entitled to them as of right."').
"' See Tour Costa Rica, 758 A.2d at 801-02 (analyzing expectation damages and restitution
damages); Boule v. Pike Indus., Inc., No. 5:12-cv-7, 2013 WL 711937, at *1, *10, *13 (D. Vt.
Feb. 27, 2013) (establishing elements of promissory estoppel claim).
See W.J. Schafer Assocs., Inc. v. Cordant, Inc., 493 S.E.2d 512, 516 (Va. 1997) (providing
44
background on case and award of promissory estoppel by jury trial); Virginia Sch. of Arts v.
Eichelbaum, 493 S.E.2d 510, 511 (Va. 1997) (affirming rejection of application of promissory
estoppel); Ward's Equip., Inc. v. New Holland N. Am., 493 S.E.2d 516, 520 (Va. 1997) ("There is
no merit to the dealer's contention that a 'claim of promissory estoppel can be made under Virginia
law.' This Court has not recognized the doctrine, and today we decide that it should not be adopted
in the Commonwealth.").
"5 See Klinke v. Famous Recipe Fried Chicken, Inc., 616 P.2d 644, 646 (Wash. 1980)
(addressing whether promissory estoppel appropriate in action for damages).
450 See Kin v. Dean, 135 P.3d 978, 980-81 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (establishing when to
empanel jury trial).
"'
See Gorge Lumber Co. v. Brazier Lumber Co., Inc., 493 P.2d 782, 789 (Wash. Ct. App.
1972) (presenting elements to find promissory estoppel applicable).
452 See Farm Crop Energy, Inc. v. Old Nat'l Bank of Washington, 750 P.2d 231, 240-41 (Wash.
1988) (Callow, J., dissenting) (stating court should approve flexible rule dictated in Restatement).
See also Family Med. Bldg. v. State of Washington, 684 P.2d 77, 84-85 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984)
(using expectation).
453 See Koerber v. Wheeling Island Gaming, Inc., No. 5:12CV97, 2013 WL 162669, at *1, *4
(N.D. W. Va. Jan. 15, 2013) (establishing elements required for promissory estoppel).
45 See Hoover v. Moran, 662 S.E.2d 711, 718-19 (W. Va. 2008) (setting principles governing
doctrine of promissory estoppel).
415 See Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267, 273 (Wis. 1965) ("Many courts of
other jurisdictions have seen fit over the years to adopt the principle of promissory estoppel, and
the tendency in that direction continues.").
456 See id. at 267. See also JP Morgan Chase Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Bach, No. 2014AP2781,
2017 WL 2591375, at *1, *3 (Wis. Ct. App. June 14, 2017) (concluding no entitlement of
promissory estoppel claim).
457 See Hoffman, 133 N.W. 2d at 273 (discussing requirements of promissory estoppel
claim).
58 See Tynan v. JBVBB, LLC, 743 N.W.2d 730, 735 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007) (establishing
three elements from Hoffman to prevail on promissory estoppel claim).
459 See Hoffminan, 133 N.W.2d at 275 (finding promissory estoppel unavailable to plaintiff).

70

JOURNAL OF TRIAL &APPELLATE ADVOCACY [Vol. XXm
Wyoming

Y"

NYA

Y

C46

R4 62

Y463

D. PotentialApproach
No Massachusetts appellate court has expressly addressed either the
avoidance of injustice element or the measure of damages. Set forth below
is a potential approach to the issues, which treats the avoidance of injustice
as an identifiable element informed by the criteria identified in comment b
and related considerations.
1. The Injustice Element and Measure of Damages are Questions of
Law for the Court Based on Applicable Policy4 6
This approach opts to give substantive recognition to the fact that no
matter its legal origins, promissory estoppel has substantial equitable roots
with the "necessary to avoid injustice" component, an otherwise longstanding equitable notion. If a jury finds a sufficient promise which the
460 See Worley v. Wyoming Bottling Co., Inc., 1 P.3d 615, 623-24 (Wyo. 2000) (detailing
Section 90 of Restatement and listing required elements of promissory estoppel); Michie v. Bd. of
Trs., 847 P.2d 1006, 1009 (Wyo. 1993) (recognizing Restatement definition).
" See Loghry v. Unicover Corp., 927 P.2d 706, 711 (Wyo. 1996); Birt v. Wells Fargo Home
Mortage, Inc., 75 P.3d 640, 651-52 (Wy. 2003).
462 See Bear v. Volunteers of Am., Wyo., 964 P.2d 1245, 1253 (Wyo. 1998) (finding court
could not further consider issue of promissory estoppel); but see Romberger v. VFW Post 1881,
918 P.2d 993, 995 (Wyo. 1996) ("The amount of recovery is a question intertwined with the equities
of the transaction, necessarily creating a policy question to be decided by the court in the exercise
of its discretion.").
463 See Loghry, 927 P.2d at 711 ("Promissory estoppel is not available to [plaintiff] because of
the specific disclaimer language.").
' See Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267, 275 (Wis. 1965) (holding injustice
element for promissory estoppel claim is matter of policy and question of law); cf C & K Eng'g
Contractors v. Amber Steel Co., 587 P.2d 1136, 1139-41 (Cal. 1978) (stating task of considering
element of injustice is equitable one for court, not jury). See also Jones v. Denver Pub. Sch., 427
F.3d 1315, 1326 (10th Cir. 2005) (acknowledging promissory estoppel as grounded in principles
of equity); D & S Coal Co., Inc. v. USX Corp., 678 F. Supp. 1318, 1320-21 (E.D. Tenn. 1988)
("The injustice requirement of promissory estoppel is an equitable consideration which must
ultimately be determined by the court, not the jury."); Cohen II, 479 N.W.2d 387, 391 (Minn.
1992) (holding determination of injustice in promissory estoppel case "is a legal question for the
court."); Tour Costa Rica v. Country Walkers, Inc., 758 A.2d 795, 801 (Vt. 2000) ("Whether
injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise is a question of law . . ."); Birt v. Wells
Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 75 P.3d 640, 651-52 (Wyo. 2003) (recognizing injustice equitable in
nature); Davis v. Davis, 855 P.2d 342, 348-49 (Wyo. 1992) (finding injustice requirement must be
found by the court). But see Boule v. Pike Indus., Inc., No. 5:12-cv-7, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
26588, at *1, *13 (D. Vt. Feb. 27, 2013) (emphasizing injustice elements under comment (b) to

section 90 of restatement were for jury); Bouboulis v. Transp. Workers Union of Greater N.Y.,
Local 100, No. 03 Civ. 0373(SAS), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12906, at *1, *8 (S.D. N.Y. July 7,
2004) (leaving injustice element for jury).
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promisor should have foreseen would cause reasonable reliance by the
promisee, then it remains for the court to determine the issue of whether the
promise is to be enforced to "avoid injustice." As such, based on the equities
of the transaction, the ultimate enforcement of the promise is one of policy
for the court.
This approach deviates from the express terms of Section 90 to the
extent Section 90 suggests that the "reasonableness" of reliance is to be
considered under avoidance of the injustice element. The proposed approach
deems "reasonable reliance" a singular and separate element that should be
for the fact-finder and jury absent circumstances demonstrating that no
reasonable minds could differ. This is consistent with established
Massachusetts law. It also allows for courts to delineate the limits and
boundaries of the injustice element, and to do so without usurping
supportable factual findings on promise and reliance made by the jury as to
the first two elements. It necessitates written findings by the court serving to
inform and provide accountability. It otherwise allows stare decisis to
65
provide a measure of guidance and certainty in case law moving forward.4
As with the substantive avoidance of injustice element, the issue of
whether to limit the remedy as "justice requires" is also an equitable notion
with the appropriate measure of damages for the court to determine as a
matter of law.4 66 The measure would have to be determined prior to any
instructions to the jury as to its actual determination of any damages if a right
to jury trial attaches.
Illustration A: A brings a breach of contract and promissory
estoppel claim. If there is no right to a jury trial as to promissory estoppel,
the jury would determine the breach of contract and the trial judge would
either submit the promissory estoppel claim to the jury for an advisory
opinion; reserve the decision to itself; or allow, in its discretion, the jury to
decide the claim. The same approach would apply to the "avoidance of
injustice" element if a right to a jury otherwise applied to promissory
estoppel. The findings and determination of the court as to "avoidance of
injustice" would need to be in writing, articulating the basis, and on any
appeal subject to review for abuse of discretion.
Illustration B: A brings a breach of contract, promissory estoppel,
and negligent and intentional misrepresentation claim based on essentially
. " See Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 323 (1996) ("[C]ourts of equity must be governed
by rules and precedents no less than the courts of law.") (citations omitted).
41 See Twin Fires Inv., LLC v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 837 N.E.2d 1121, 1135-36
(Mass. 2005) (stating appropriate measure of damages is question of law); Burke v. Rivo, 551

N.E.2d 1, 1-2 (Mass. 1990) (same); see also Fin Brand Positioning, LLC v. Take 2 Dough Prods.,
Inc., No. 09-cv-405-JL, 2011 WL 6740409, at *1, *2 (D. N.H. Dec. 22, 2011) (stating proper
measure of damages for promissory estoppel to be decided as matter of law).
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the same facts and representations. Assuming there is no right to a jury trial
as to the promissory estoppel claim, the Court would allow a jury to hear the
breach of contract and misrepresentation claims. Since reasonable reliance
is an element common to the estoppel and misrepresentation claims, the jury
would decide the reasonable reliance as to all three claims or the court would
be bound by the finding on reliance as to the misrepresentation claim and
disposition of the estoppel claim.
Illustration C: A brings action against B for breach of contract,
breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, promissory
estoppel, and misrepresentation. A and B disagree over whether the measure
of damages is expectation or reliance. Following the close of evidence and
prior to final argument and charge, the Court will have to decide, based on
briefing, which measure is most appropriate and proceed to charge the jury
accordingly.
Illustration D: A brings action against B based on negligent and
intentional misrepresentation as well as promissory estoppel. A seeks
specific performance and, alternatively, expectation damages as to the
estoppel claim, as well as expectation damages as to the intentional
misrepresentation claim. B disputes that A is entitled to specific performance
or is otherwise entitled to expectation as opposed to reliance damages.
Whether plaintiff is entitled to specific performance is for the court to decide.
The Court will likewise need to decide before closing arguments and charge
whether the measure of damages for intentional misrepresentation and
promissory estoppel is reliance or expectation.
2. Informative Considerations as to Both Avoidance of Injustice
and Remedy
a. Applicable Social Policies Pertainingto the Promise or the
Parties'Relation
This consideration focuses primarily on the larger social context and
policies at play in the particular circumstances. It is consistent with those
instances where otherwise binding contracts have been found unenforceable
due to certain public policies. It is a logical, initial consideration because
regardless of other equitable factors, if the enforcement of the promise would
violate or be inconsistent with a viable social policy, either generally or in
the specific circumstances, it would likely end the inquiry. As set forth
above, there are instances when such or similar policies are implicated in the
circumstances of the particular promise, no different than where a bargained
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for contract is at issue.46 7 These policies include legislative directives and the
public welfare or interest.468 It could also include the policies for and against
more formalized promises for purposes of any enforceability. The analysis
also requires identifying any policies served in enforcing the promise.
Absent a countervailing public policy, the policy served in enforcing the
promise would be considered a factor favoring enforcement.
Illustration A: A was terminated from employment after it was
determined by investigation that A had sexually harassed another employee.
A claims that he was promised by his supervisor, who had him terminated
following receipt of the results of the investigation, that he would be able to
keep his job regardless of the outcome of the investigation. A relied on the
promise in turning down another job. A cannot recover as to enforce the
promise because it would be against public policy.469
Illustration B: A claims a bank promised to loan it $3 million, with
the bank intending to obtain participants as its lending limit was $1 million
under applicable federal regulations. It was foreseeable to the bank that the
promise and its circumstances would cause A to reasonably rely and take
action to its detriment which A did. The bank's claim that the promise cannot
be enforced due to the lending limit fails and A is entitled to recover.
Illustration C: A agrees to interview with B, a newspaper doing a
story with B, agreeing that it would not reveal A's identity. A gives the
interview and provides highly private and personal information. B later
publishes the story with many highly personal details, effectively disclosing
the identity of A. The policies behind the First Amendment do not preclude
enforcement of the promise.4 70

" See Beacon Hill Civic Ass'n. v. Ristorante Toscano, Inc., 662 N.E.2d 1015, 1018-19 (Mass.
1996) (finding contract unenforceable because public policy of open public participation in
discussions before licensing officials); Capazzoli v. Holtwasser, 490 N.E.2d 420, 421 (1986)
("[P]romise to support a woman made in consideration of the woman's abandonment of her
marriage, or promise to abandon her marriage, to another man violates public policy and is
unenforceable.").
468 See Beacon Hill Civic Ass'n. at 1019 ("'The public policy thus declared supersedes the
ordinary doctrine of estoppel, so far as that would interfere with the accomplishment of the
dominant purpose' of those provisions.").
469 See Gan, supra note 160, at 88 (discussing Gonsalves v. Nissan Motor Corp., 58 P. 3d
1196, 1213 (Haw. 2002)).
470 See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991) ("[T]he doctrine is generally
applicable to the daily transactions of all the citizens of Minnesota. The First Amendment does
not forbid its application to the press."); see also Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 479 N.W.2d 387,
391 (Minn. 1992) [hereinafter Cohen 1] (anonymity promise to news source not sufficiently
important to require invalidation based on public policy).
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b. Availability of Other Remedies

Promissory estoppel is an equitable remedy, unavailable where there
are other remedies. If there are alternative remedies outside of those
associated with enforcement of the promise (i.e. specific enforcement and/or
expectation damages), the injustice element requires refusal to enforce the
promise.4 71 If monetary remedy under an alternative legal claim for the same
472
This is
injury is available, the injustice element would not be met.
consistent with the element's limiting rule and the primacy of bargained for
exchange contracts.
While promissory estoppel may be pled and pursued in the
alternative to a breach of contract claim, it is only viable if the breach of
contract claim fails for lack of consideration. If it is otherwise subsumed
within the contract, there can be no independent claim.4 73 If there is a right
to seek a breach of contract, then there would be no injustice in failing to
enforce the promise through promissory estoppel.4 74 Additionally, where
restitution can be made is a consideration militating against enforcement of
the promise or otherwise providing the limits of any remedy.
There is no reason not to apply the same logic to parallel
misrepresentation claims. If there is both misrepresentation and promissory
estoppel claims, and they are both based on the same or significantly
overlapping representations and/or promise, the legal remedy applicable to
misrepresentation should control.
471 See Clawson v. Clawson, No. 15-P-58, 2016 WL 6093597, at *1, *3 (Mass. App. Ct. Oct.
19, 2016) (refusing to enforce promise under promissory estoppel because there existed adequate
remedy at law).
472 See Dickens v. Equifax Servs., Inc., No. 95-1217, 1996 WL 192973, at *1, *5-6 (10th Cir.
Apr. 22, 1996) (holding general promises of compensation and career opportunities not sufficiently
definite for employee who relocated).
473 See Malden Police Patrolman's Ass'n v. City of Malden., 82 N.E.3d 1055, 1064 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2017) (citing Brewster Wallcovering Co. v. Blue Mountain Wallcoverings, Inc., 864
N.E.2d 518, 531 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007)) (stating if an enforceable contract exists, there can be no
claim for promissory estoppel). See also Doe v. Brandeis Univ., 177 F. Supp. 3d 561, 613 (D.
Mass. 2016) (finding no estoppel with governing contract and attempt to use estoppel as contract

gap filler); Charest v. President of Harvard Coll., No. 13-11556-DPW, 2016 WL 614368, at *1,
*21 (D. Mass. Feb. 16, 2016) (finding promissory estoppel inapplicable given the existence of
contract); Robinson v. Spencer Stuart, Inc., No. 13-10278-RWZ, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183961,
at *1, *5 (D. Mass. Feb. 24, 2015) ("Promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment are equitable
remedies available in the absence of contract only."); Conte v. Bank of America, N.A., 52
F.Supp.3d 265, 269 (D. Mass. 2014) (finding no promissory estoppel claim where complaint stated
plausible claim for breach of contract); Moore v. La-Z-Boy, Inc., No. 07-CV-10708-RGS, 2008
WL 2247146, at *1, *3, n.6 (D. Mass. May 30, 2008) (emphasizing promissory estoppel is an
equitable remedy available when contract remedy not available); Knowlton v. Swampscott, 181
N.E. 849,851 (Mass. 1932) ("Aparty cannot come into equity to secure relief open to him at law.").
4 See Arrow Southampton, LLC v. Akinnola, No. A15-0731, 2016 WL 363487, at *1, *7
(Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2016) (finding no injustice as contract covered alleged promise).
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Specific performance of the promise "is neither precluded nor
disfavored as a remedy for promissory estoppel."4 75 Particularly with
promises related to land, division of property, other such unique subjects, or
otherwise included within the terms of the promise, specific performance
may be obtained.476 Specific performance is appropriate not only where there
is no adequate remedy at law, but also where the advantage gained will not
be disproportionate to the "practical burdens of enforcement." 4 77
Circumstances where the remedies of expectation or reliance damages
would not be an adequate protection for the injured party have been found to
include those where it is difficult to prove damages with reasonable certainty
or where damages would not be a suitable substitute performance or where
it is likely that damages could not be collected.
Illustration A: A sues B under a promissory note. B seeks certain
off-setting credits as B provided A certain accommodations on B's property
for a horse related business of A. The credits sought included certain fees
and expenses B claimed to have paid for A's horse and monthly rental fees
for various horse stalls. B sought to enforce oral promise to pay for the
credits on detrimental reliance as B claimed he had evicted a tenant to allow
for A's use of the stalls. Court refused to enforce promise asserting that B
had adequate remedy at law available as evidenced by separate action B had
pending for owing rents on use of stalls. 478
Illustration B: A sells a group of cars to B pursuant to written
agreements. B defaults and A sues B as well as C (B's wife), as A claims C
promised to pay for cars if B failed to pay. Even assuming C reasonably
relied, avoidance of injustice element is not met as A had an available
remedy against B under agreement.

" Skebba v. Kasch, 724 N.W.2d 408, 413-14 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006). Here, the jury found no
contract, but did find in favor of the promissory estoppel claim. Id. at 410. The appellate court
determined that the trial court erred in ruling that the promise could not be specially enforced. Id.
at 414. The court went on to state "specific performance is neither precluded nor disfavored as a
remedy for promissory estoppel; preventing injustice is the objective." Id. See also Cellucci v.
Sun Oil Co., 320 N.E.2d 919, 926-27 (Mass. App. Ct. 1974) (ordering conveyance of land subject
of promise); Tour Costa Rica v. Country Walkers, Inc., 758 A.2d 795, 804 n.2 (Vt. 2000) (rejecting
suggestion that section 90 is limited to specific performance).
476 See MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 214, § lA (LexisNexis, Lexis Advance through Act 109 of the
2017 Legislative Session) ("The fact that the plaintiff has a remedy in damages shall not bar an
action for specific performance of a contract, other than one for purely personal services.
477 Atlantech Inc. v American Panel Corp., 540 F. Supp. 2d 274, 285 (D. Mass. 2008)
(discussing appropriateness of specific performance).
478 See Clawson v. Clawson, No. 15-P-58, 2016 WL 6093597, at *1, *3 (Mass. App. Ct. Oct.
19, 2016). The court further found enforcement to be properly denied as B had unclean hands when
he asserted the horse stall rental accommodation was a scheme devised by B to avoid making
payments on the promissory note, while also reducing his taxable income. Id. at 15.
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c. Fairnessand Hardship
If there are no controlling general or specific policies prohibiting or
militating against enforcement or other available and suitable remedies, then
an equitable balancing of the hardships to both parties as to enforcement
should be considered. The fundamental question is whether failing to
specifically enforce the promise or to award expectation damages results in
undue hardship and injustice to the promisee. While this factor has primacy,
the court should also consider the possible harshness to defendant by
enforcement of his promise. Indeed, "injustice" can just as easily result from
enforcement of a promise unsupported by consideration as from nonenforcement. This factor includes a review of the reasons the promisor did
not honor the promise. Moreover, it includes whether the promisee could
meet its obligation under the promise.
The injustice element is significantly informed by the extent the
promisor may have benefited from the promisee's reliance. The existence
and degree of any such benefit supports enforcement of the promise, as
allowing the promisor to obtain such a benefit would be unjust. The existence
and definitive degree of any such benefit, enrichment, or advantage would
also potentially support the award of expectation based damagesparticularly if the circumstances supports that the promise was intended to
be legally binding. Conversely, the lack of any significant benefit or the
speculative nature of any asserted benefit would be a consideration militating
against enforcement, and a factor to consider in determining whether justice
would be served by limiting any remedy to reliance or restitution.
Furthermore, if the promise or its enforcement involves discretion,
injustice may well not be present with any enforcement absent a clear
showing of abuse of that discretion.479
Illustration A: A claimed B promised to modify existing credit
agreement. There was a clear oral promise made upon which A reasonably
and detrimentally relied. There was no evidence that A could meet the
obligation under the asserted modification. There is no injustice in not
enforcing the promise. A had no ability to make the payment obligations
under the claimed modification with there being a state policy discouraging
litigation against lenders based on oral promises concerning financing.

49 See Doe v. W. New Eng. Univ., 228 F. Supp. 3d 154, 182 (D. Mass. 2016) ("[D]ue to the
[conduct review board's] discretion regarding witnesses and their testimony, Plaintiff cannot plead
sufficient facts to demonstrate that the failure to enforce general counsel's promise resulted in
injustice."). The court in this case found that the discretion afforded over witnesses and testimony
at a school hearing precluded a finding that enforces the alleged oral promise that all of plaintiff's
witnesses would be allowed at hearing. Id.
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Illustration B: A agrees to interview with B, a newspaper doing a
story, with B agreeing that it would not reveal A's identity. A gives interview
and provides highly private and personal information. B later publishes story
with many highly personal details, effectively disclosing the identity of A.
B's explanation for not honoring promise was that disclosure of identity of a
confidential source is valuable to the story. As this was not hardship, and as
the payment of compensatory damages is "a cost of acquiring newsworthy
material to be published at a profit. . .," there was no injustice in enforcing
the promise.48 0
d. Extent ofForeseeabilityandIntent to be Bound
The greater the extent the detrimental reliance by the promisee was
either known or foreseeable to the promisor, the more it would be unjust not
to enforce the promise or otherwise award expectation damages. Where there
is evidence of not just a reliance inducing promise, but a promise that evinces
an intention to be legally bound, then enforcement would be permissible.
There is a measurable difference between a reasonable belief in the legal
enforceability of the promise and a reasonable belief that the promise will be
performed.48 1
Actual knowledge of the reliance, evidence as to an intent to be
bound, and evidence of the promisor's inaction or silence in the face of
knowing reliance would militate that the promise be enforced. The more the
promisor knows or should know of the seriousness of the promise in light of
the potential consequences, the more injustice would result absent
enforcement of the promise. This includes examination of the words and
conduct at issue and whether they indicate substantial planning or
understanding of the significance of the consequence. Stated differently, if
there are facts and circumstances indicating that the promisor had reason to
expect reliance even if not specifically sought, enforcement of the promise
should be considered. Similarly, evidence or circumstances indicating the
promisor's understanding of the consequences of making the promise, and
evidence that the promisee, after the promise was made, informed the
promisor of the promisee's intention to act, would also favor enforcement.
The absence of such circumstance would weigh against enforcement.
The clearer and more detailed the promise, such as with essential
terms, the more "justice" and fairness allow for the enforcement of the
480 Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publ'ns, Inc., 999 F.2d 1319, 1323 (8th Cir. 1993) (quoting Cohen
v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991)).
481 See DeLong, supra note 42, at 1021 ("[I]t is not unjust to deny enforcement to a

commercial promisee who relied without a reasonable expectation of a legal remedy for
breach.").
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promise as well as the award of non-speculative expectation damagesparticularly if such circumstances support an intent to be bound. Although
the definitiveness and clarity is of primacy and covered in the promise in the
form of the commitment element under Massachusetts law, it remains that
the degree of such definitiveness and clarity is particularly informative in the
injustice inquiry,48 2 including where the issue involves whether to enforce
such impediments as the statute of frauds. Similarly, where the promisor has
no actual knowledge of the reliance, or no knowledge that the reliance is
based on a reasonable belief the promise is binding, or where only remotely
foreseeable under an objective standard, the less injustice in enforcing the
promise, or the more likely the remedy should be limited to reliance
damages.
This factor includes evaluation of any and all evidence as to the
presence or absence of the promisor's intent to be bound. Conversely, if the
promisee was or should have been aware that the promise was not intended
to be legally binding, enforcement should be denied. Indeed, "[tihe intention
to be bound and the likelihood of reliance go hand in hand."483 Evidence of
any intent or understanding of being bound is highly probative of the
injustice element as it brings the reliance based enforcement closer to
enforcement of a bargain for exchange; thus, supporting enforcement of the
promise and award of expectation damages.
Illustration A: A, father of B, executes a formal assignment of
$25,000 to B, his son, wherein A planned to provide the monies to B when
certain real estate he owned was sold. A and B lived together for 17 years
where B provided various services including care for A. B relied on the
assignment by spending $5,000 to extend option on house both A and B had
agreed to buy. A died and his estate failed to honor the assignment.
Avoidance of injustice would not be avoided unless the promise was
enforced and the $25,000 found owing and due, as it was likely that the
promise was intended to be legally binding by the nature of it being a formal
assignment and B having reasonably and detrimentally relied upon the
promise based on the understanding it was binding. A also knew and
observed B's reliance and provided no warning, caution, or retraction.
Enforcement is justified not just as to the $5,000, but for the entire $25,000,
because promise was intended to be binding.4 84
482 See 10 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 27:14(4th
ed. 2011) ("The less clear an agreement, the less likely the plaintiffs reliance will be reasonable
and foreseeable, and the less probable will be the injustice from refusing to enforce the
agreement.
483 Knapp, supra note 22 at 1216.
484 See Becker, supra note 6, at 453-54 (discussing Estate ofBucci, 488 P. 2d 216 (Colo.
App. 1971)).
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Degree and Nature ofReliance and any Foregone
Opportunities

While the fact finder assesses whether there was reasonable reliance
under the reliance prong, it is appropriate for the court to consider the degree
and nature of the reliance on the issue of injustice as well as the remedy
determination. The reliance must not only be reasonable, but be of a
definitive and significant nature so that it reflects an understanding of a
legally binding commitment.48 5
Further, actual harm that is co-extensive with definite and
substantial reliance is essential as is recognition that there may always be
some measure of reliance in the commercial setting.486 The more extensive,
expensive, and identifiable the reliance is, separate and distinct from the
expectation under the promise, the more justice would militate toward
enforcing the promise and/or awarding non-speculative expectation
damages. If what the promisee claims to have given up or endured in reliance
is no different, or of little difference, from what he otherwise would have
done, the injustice element would militate against enforcement and/or limit
the remedy to reliance damages.
The amount of expenditures or the degree of non-monetary reliance,
including the foregoing of other opportunities, should be considered. If the
degree or amount of reliance is trivial or pales compared to the expectation
amount being sought, the court is free to either find that it would not be unjust
to deny enforcement or to otherwise limit damages to the reliance remedy.
This factor would include the duration of reliance and any evidence of
repudiation or retraction after the giving of the promise, as well as any
knowledge or lack of knowledge of the promisor as to the reliance by the
promisee.
This factor also includes consideration of whether, if the promise
was performed, the promisee would have received any benefit or less than
reliance damages. This goes to both enforcement and remedy and is
consistent with the established contract liability/remedy principle:
where full performance of a contract would have given
claimant no benefit, or at least less than the reliance
damages claimed, this fact may justify limiting or
485 See Gerald Reidy, Note, Definite and Substantial Reliance: Remedying Injustice Under
Section 90, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 1217, 1254 (1998) ("[Definite and substantial reliance] is a
necessary component in determining whether a promise must be enforced to avoid an injustice.").
486 See Hellenbrand v. Goodman, No. 01-3437, 2003 WL 21284513, at *11-12 (Wis. App.
Ct. June 5, 2003) (concluding injustice element unmet due to no evidence that failure to honor
promise caused harm).
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disallowing reliance damages. The notion is that claimant
should on no account get more than would have accrued if
the contract had been performed.48 7

Illustration A: A, a sophisticate, enters into oral agreement to
purchase airplane from B, which oral agreement would otherwise be barred
by statute of frauds. A claims that as a result of reliance, A lost the
opportunity to acquire another airplane. A did not expend any significant
resources or expenditures based on the promise including obtaining of any
financing with interest charges; did not increase warehouse space in
anticipation of any purchase; did not make or lose any deposit; and that lost
opportunity to acquire another plane was lost prior to any promise by B. The
asserted reliance was not of sufficient significance to result in any injustice
488
in not enforcing the promise or estopping reliance on statute of frauds.
Illustration B: A, an employer, agreed to pay B, an employee, a
monthly retirement benefit for life upon B's retirement. The promise was
included in a formal resolution of the Board of Directors of A. B retires
earlier than she would have otherwise based on the promise and proceeds to
receive from A monthly benefits for a period of five years before A stops the
payments. Enforcement of the promise (specific performance) was necessary
to avoid injustice, as promise was sufficiently definite and reliance was
reasonable and substantial including that B did not look for other
employment and was, after five years in retirement, in a difficult position to
find comparable work.
Illustration C: A and B are two long time employees of C. C states
that he would like A and B to take over business upon C's retirement. A, in
reliance on promise, performs work beyond his normal duties. A and B
begin negotiating with C about purchasing business. B agreed with A that
he would negotiate with C on both A and B's behalf and during negotiations
an actual closing date was scheduled, but no agreement as to material terms
could be reached with C cancelling closing after believing that A was
seeking unreasonable terms as to purchase. B proceeds to negotiate with C
independently, without notice to A that he is doing so, and C agrees to sell
business to B. Even assuming sufficient promise and reliance, avoidance of
injustice was not met as there was no evidence or showing that breach of

487 Lord's & Lady's Enters., Inc. v. John Paul Mitchell Sys., 705 N.E.2d 302, 307 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1999) (quoting DPJ Co. Ltd. v. FDIC, 30 F.3d 247, 250 (1st Cir. 1994)); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 90 cmt. d (1981) ("Unless there is unjust enrichment of the promisor,
damages should not put the promisee in a better position than performance of the promise would
have put him.").
488 See Aircraft Inventory Corp. v. Flacon Jet Corp., 18 F. Supp. 2d 409, 417 (D. N.J. 1998)
(finding "no evidence that plaintiff expended significant resources in reliance on the promise.").
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promise caused harm. There was no evidence that if B had not promised to
negotiate on A's behalf-or if B had timely informed A that he was pursuing
purchase of the business on his own-A could have done anything to prevent
the sale. There was also no evidence that C would have ever sold business
to A alone, and therefore, breach of B's promise did not cause A's failure to
obtain ownership interest in business.

f

PartyRelation, Form and Setting

The relationship of the parties as well as the form and setting of the
promise are vital to application of the avoidance of injustice element. Their
importance derives from the recognition that contractual consideration, at its
core, is a fundamental tool for identifying those promises intended as legally
binding.489 Form, in turn, has long been recognized as serving important
functions of evidence, caution, and channeling.49 0 Both consideration and
form satisfy an evidentiary function by producing tangible and trustworthy
evidence that an enforceable agreement has been reached and in the event of
controversy. 49' The cautionary function is that which demonstrates the
weightiness or deliberateness of the transaction; i.e. the parties' agreement
or understanding that it is an enforceable transaction.4 92 The channeling
function, in turn, is that there is a usual process that creates an enforceable
agreement (i.e. presence of consideration and particular form). 49 3 in short,
"legally aware commercial actors prefer formal contract as the exclusive
mode of creating enforceable obligations."494
Although claims for promissory estoppel arise in the absence of
consideration, these overlapping functions remain important criteria as to
avoidance of injustice. The party relation, as well as the form and setting,
serve as the default surrogate for consideration's evidentiary, cautionary, and
channeling function. They provide a means to patrol the edges of promissory
liability-beyond just promise and reliance. They allow for judicial
evaluation and concern as to: (1) potential mistaken and even false
testimony; (2) impulsivity and lack of deliberateness or weightiness as to the
"I See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration andForm, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 779, 800-01 (1941)
(discussing importance of circumstances surrounding formation of promise in determination of
promissory estoppel).
490 See id (finding form of promise relevant for enforceability).
491 See id.; see also Alex Johnson, Article, Contracts and The Requirement of Consideration:
Positing a Unified Normative Theory of Contracts, Inter Vivos and Testamentary Gift Transfers,
91 N.D. L. REV. 547, 556 (2015) (stating consideration fulfills evidentiary function).
492 Fuller, supra note 490 (analyzing the cautionary function involved for both promisor and
promise).
493 Id (discussing channeling function as it relates to routine interactions).
494 DeLong, supranote 42, at 979.
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promise; (3) the specific business, legal, or transaction category and its
norms; (4) and repetition or ratification or lack thereof. As such, the focus is
on whether the setting, form, and circumstances make apparent the
consequences of both the promise and reliance, particularly the
understanding that an enforceable obligation has been formed. The court,
through the implementation of the avoidance of injustice element, can seek
to ensure that the relation, setting, and form provide a measurable and
sufficient degree of evidentiary, cautionary, and channeling function-as
similarly served by consideration and form in the bargain for exchange
context.
As to form, the lack of formality of the asserted promise is a
consideration in determining whether injustice will result if the promise is
not enforced. The inquiry includes identification and evaluation of
impediments to a formal or more formal bargain under the circumstances and
the reasonableness of any failure to more formalize the promise. It asks
whether the nature and context of the interaction or general industry specific
standards or practices usually require or involve more formalized agreements
before being enforceable. The opportunity to bargain and include or not
include terms, or provisions limiting liability or excluding responsibility for
certain kinds of losses, is a consideration. The more extensive, elaborate, or
time spanning the subject of or the promise entails, the more it would be
expected that the promise be formalized unless they are circumstances
explaining or excusing such formality. Similarly, the more the parties were
on notice, or should have been on notice, that a more formalized agreement
was the norm, there is no injustice in not enforcing the promise regardless of
the existence of a promise and reliance. Likewise, the more likely the
transaction and circumstances of the promise could be misunderstood
militates that a more formal and complete agreement is necessary to require
enforcement.
The setting, to the extent the circumstances indicate measurable
deliberateness or considerate action as opposed to impulsivity or hastiness,
would favor enforcement. Again, fundamental is whether the setting and/or
form indicate that the promise and reliance occurred in circumstances
revealing an intent to be bound versus no intent to be bound.
As to evidentiary function, it is reasonable to inquire as to the source
of the predicate facts of the promise and its terms (as well as the reliance and
its degree). For instance, to the extent it is based solely on the credibility of
witnesses, particularly where there is any measure of reasonable expectation
of more formality, the setting and form lack evidentiary function and
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injustice would not be avoided by enforcing the promise.4 95 This would be
particularly so where there is any measure of vagueness or risk of
misunderstanding as to the asserted terms of the promise and obligation.
An examination of the relations between the parties, including as to
the issue of form, is important to the injustice evaluation. While the
sophistication of the parties informs the reasonable reliance element, it
likewise informs the avoidance of injustice element. Even if a jury were to
find that the promisee's reliance was reasonable, the court may, under the
injustice element, consider the reliance against the back-drop of the
transaction and the sophistication of the parties and their relation. If the
promisee and promisor are relatively equal in sophistication and as to
knowledge or access to knowledge, and are at arm's length, it would militate
against enforcement and certainly against an expectation award as such
parties can readily fit their transaction into the binding type in which normal
rules of contract would control.
Where there is a disparity in sophistication and/or knowledge, or
access to knowledge as to the subject of or the binding nature of the promise,
it can militate for enforcement. Similarly, contractual flexibility tends to be
more important as to an on-going relationship. Where the parties have a longstanding relationship or course of dealing, or otherwise situated in a
confidential relationship or other relationship of trust and confidence, there
may be less reason to expect conventional means of formalizing a contractual
obligation, and thus militates toward enforcing the promise and/or awarding
expectation damages. This is particularly so if the promisor does or should
know the trust or confidence being placed by the promisee. This
consideration overlaps with the sophistication and length of relationship
between the parties which would also support an intent to be bound without
formality
Illustration A: A, a pharmacy was considering relocating its
business or to renew lease of space owned by B and adjacent to B's
supermarket. The lease agreement did not restrict supermarket from
operating a pharmacy. Before renewing lease, A obtained oral assurances
from B that it had no intention of operating a competing pharmacy in that
location. Soon after A renewed lease, A began preparing to operate a
pharmacy. Injustice not avoided by enforcement of promise. Not only was
reliance questionable given the commercial sophistication of the parties and
essentially equal bargaining power, but the agreement not to compete could

495 See Rhode Island Hosp. Tr. Nat'l Bank v. Varadian, 647 N.E.2d 1174, 1176-77 (Mass.
1995) (finding no promissory estoppel liability as matter of law). The court found no promissory
estoppel even though jury found sufficient promise and reliance as it was undisputed that parties
did not intend to be bound absent a signed writing. See id. at 1179.
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have been easily formalized and would prevent any misunderstanding. A
more formalized agreement would be expected in the circumstances given
the parties were business rivals operating in a business setting and having
important rights at stake, including a new line of business and choice of
where to locate for a ten-year period of time. Enforcement of such an oral
promise would not advance evidentiary, cautionary, and deterrent function
normally served by a writing in this context.
Illustration B: A is a lender and B is a sophisticated real estate
developer with numerous prior development loans with various lenders.
Neither A nor B had ever done business before. B has always signed a letter
of intent, attended a closing, and signed various loan documents setting out
the details of the loan for any of its prior developments before obtaining the
funds from the bank. B had been informed of various conditions of the loan
including that there could be no disbursement absent acceptance and
execution of the loan documents by A. B claims A agreed to provide
multimillion-dollar loan and told him the project was a go, but there was no
finalized and executed letter of intent, closing, or negotiated and completed
loan documents at the time, so it was clear no loan could be made. Even
assuming a definitive enough promise and detrimental reliance, the
sophistication of the parties, lack of prior or on-going relation, the usual
formalization of the promise or contract, and the nature of the relation and
transaction militate against any injustice in failing to enforce the promise.
g. State ofMind, Opportunism, or Dishonesty
The state of mind of the promisor and his or her conduct in terms of
the presence or absence of unfairness or dishonesty in the circumstance of
the promise informs the injustice element and/or remedy. 496 The more unfair
the circumstances surrounding the promise and interaction between the
parties, the more "justice" dictates that the promise be enforced, and/or that
expectation as opposed to reliance be awarded. The more there is evidence
of a deliberate, opportunistic, and/or dishonest intention of the promisor as
to the knowledge of the expected or actual reliance and the dishonor of the
promise, the more circumstances approximate or equate to deceit where
expectation damages can be considered.
Similarly, the lack of any opportunistic behavior or dishonesty or
bad faith (i.e. imperfect or looseness in negotiations, inadvertence, human
error or poor judgment) would militate that the promisor should not be
punished or that, at least, the remedy be limited to the reliance measure. This
factor would include consideration of the promisor's state of mind, including
496

See Feinman, supra note 18, at 313 (reevaluating promissory estoppel).
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whether the promisor understood or believed that the promise was not
binding or enforceable under applicable law and, if so, whether he knew or
believed that the promisee was also aware of unenforceability.
It would be important for the court not to usurp or lessen the standard
and measure of damages underlying negligent and/or intentional
misrepresentation. Negligent misrepresentation is associated with reliance
damages, not expectation. Even with intentional misrepresentation, the Court
49 7
retains discretion to limit damages to reliance as opposed to expectation.
Illustration A: B solicited quote from A for construction of a rugged
specialized computer system to be used in a military vehicle and began
dealing exclusively with A. While A and B were negotiating a formal
contract where B was delaying as to finalization, B informed A that an
agreement would be worked out and exerted pressure upon A to begin
production. Due to the specialized nature of the production process, A
expended significant costs and efforts including over $200,000 in costs. B
never finalized the agreement and entered into a contract with another vendor
having confirmed that the system could be manufactured. Despite absence
of agreement, avoidance of injustice would be met by enforcement of the
promise since B gave assurances that agreement would be reached, delayed
finalizing agreement without any reasonable explanation, and obtained and
used valuable information from A's efforts, including manufacturing
process, feasibility, and timeline, and used the information in obtaining
another vendor.
h. Foreseeability, Certaintyand/or Speculation as to Any
Expectation Remedy (remedy only)
This factor is largely the application of the fundamental rules
pertaining to contractual damages. All such damages must be foreseeable
and not otherwise be contingent or uncertain to the point of being
impermissibly speculative. As a remedy for the uncertainty of business
losses including any lost profits, Massachusetts law permits a reasonable
approximation of compensatory damages. The principle of reasonable
approximation applies with particular force in circumstances of
49 8
indefiniteness caused by the wrongdoer's fault. To the extent reasonable
minds could differ, and thus an issue for the jury if expectation was the
applicable measure, the degree of foreseeability and/or certainty (or lack
497 See Twin Fires Inv., LLC, v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 837 N.E.2d 1121, 1134-35
(Mass. 2005) (noting measure of damages is question of law).
498 See Air Tech. Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 199 N.E.2d 538, 547-48 (Mass. 1964)
(discussing reasonable approximation).
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thereof) would need to be balanced against the other factors underlying the
"interest ofjustice" inquiry as to the appropriate measure of damages. Where
reasonable minds could not differ, then expectation damages are not
appropriate. Foreseeability, certainty, or speculation would also apply to the
reliance measure with any reasonable dispute to be resolved by the jury or
court as fact finder for amount.
Illustration A: A claims loss of future wages based on B's promise
of employment. Expert for A testified that he was unaware that A's
employment with B had a specific tenure and agreed that A could have quit
or been fired from that job from the time he resigned to the present, thereby
assuming that A would have continued employment with B or comparable
employer. Lost future wages until retirement age was speculative, as promise
of employment was employment at will and there was no evidence that B
would have continued to employ A until retirement.
Illustration B: Based on certain promises of B, a lender, A
commenced certain preparatory construction site work in anticipation of loan
to construct a casino. A was informed sixty days later that there could be no
loan given the failure to meet certain loan conditions. A and B understood
their rights and liabilities were to be controlled by various loan documents
and satisfaction of certain loan conditions. A's claim for lost profits of casino
was speculative and not causally related to putative promises with any
damages limited to the reliance damages expended during the sixty days
between promises, and when informed there could be no loan due to failure
to meet conditions.

V.

CONCLUSION

For better or for worse, promissory estoppel in Massachusetts, as
elsewhere, appears here to stay. Whether it ultimately assumes super hero
status providing a tort like remedy in the name of "injustice"; is beaten back
into a use for only exceptional circumstances in order to preserve the
importance of mutual assent and bargain; or lands somewhere in between
remains to be seen. Both the "avoidance of injustice" element and the
appropriate remedy may well be the key to its future and direction.
The proposed construct offered above has shortcomings. There
remains limited judicial treatment of the avoidance of injustice element and
the measure of damages including whether they are matters of policy and
equitable discretion for the court as opposed to a jury to resolve. Further, it
can be argued that the construct overly complicates and overruns the
elements of promise and reliance. It could be argued that the injustice
element is more of a "guide" than a required element, with the identified
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considerations set forth in the proposed construct all able to be subsumed
and included in the promise and reasonable reliance components. It may
well be argued that the sole criterion for "avoidance of injustice" should
simply be whether there are any policy reasons militating against
enforcement, and whether there are any available alternative remedies. The
approach otherwise accepts the notion that promissory estoppel is
"disfavored" and that reliance based promises are not and should not be
placed on equal footing in all circumstances as mutually bargained and
consensual contracts.
The proposed construct is, at least, a modest attempt to give some
flesh to the bones. Even if avoidance of injustice is found not to be a separate
element, the identified considerations provide potentially helpful criteria to
apply and use in assessing the issues of promise, foreseeability, reliance, and
harm. To determine ultimate enforceability and the appropriate measure of
damages based on close inspection and evaluation of the particular
circumstances, as well as through discrete articulation, can only serve to
promote consistent and principled decision-making. By treating the injustice
element as one of law and policy for the court, the construct seeks to
recognize the equitable origins and function of the doctrine. It allows
categorizations or classifications to be of less importance with the primary
aim to drill down and identify what promises merit enforcement and what
remedial measure should apply. Without substantive and principled
application, the "avoidance of injustice" and "flexible" remedy are
rudderless in both a sea of discretion and the grey ofjust promise and reliance
alone. Properly viewed, both are intended to remind that promissory estoppel
is a limited doctrine allowing for enforcement of mutual assent lacking
promises in only limited and extraordinary circumstances, and otherwise
requiring a remedy that fits the particular circumstances.

